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FACT FINDING BY NGOs
There are a considerable number of nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) engaged in overseeing the implementation of human
rights by governments throughout the world.1 Working at the in-
ternational2 and national levels, s these organizations function as
1. See Cassese, Progressive Transnational Promotion of Human Rights, in Human Rights:
Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration 249 (B. Ramcharan ed. 1979); Dahlen, NGO
Organizations for Action, 30 Associations Transnationales 8-14 (1978); Forsythe & Wiseberg,
Human Rights Protection: A Research Agenda, Universal Human Rights, Oct.-Dec. 1979, at
1, 15-19; Green, NGOs, in Human Rights and World Order 90 (A. Said ed. 1978); Leary, A
New Role for Non-governmental Organizations in Human Rights, in UN Law/Fundamental
Rights 197 (A. Cassese ed. 1979); Leary, The Implementation of the Human Rights Provi-
sions of the Helsinki Final Act, A Preliminary Assessment: 1975-1977, in Human Rights,
International Law and the Helsinki Accord 111, 121-27 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Leary, Helsinki Final Act]; Rees, Exercises in Private Diplomacy, in Unofficial
Diplomats 111, 126-29 (M. Berman & J. Johnson eds. 1977); Reynolds, Highest Aspirations
or Barbarous Acts ... The Explosion in Human Rights Documentation: A Bibliographic
Survey, 71 L. Lib. J. 1, 42-45 (1978); Rodley, Monitoring Human Rights Violations in the
1980s, in Enhancing Global Human Rights 119-51 (J. Dominquez, N. Rodley, B. Wood & R.
Falk eds. 1979); Scoble & Wiseberg, Human Rights NGOs: Notes Towards Comparative
Analysis, 9 Revue des Droits de 'Homme 611 (1976); Shestack, Sisyphus Endures: The In-
ternational Human Rights NGO, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 89 (1978); Skjelsbaek, The Growth
of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Twentieth Century, 25 Int'l Org. 420
(1971), reprinted in Transnational Relations and World Politics 70 (R. Keohane & J. Nye
eds. 1972); Weissbrodt, The Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the
Implementation of Human Rights, 12 Tex. J. Int'l L. 293 (1977); [hereinafter cited as Weiss-
brodt, International NGOs]; Wiseberg & Scoble, Monitoring Human Rights Violations: The
Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, in Human Rights and American Foreign Policy 179
(D. Kommers & G. Loescher eds. 1979); Note, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations
in Implementing Human Rights in Latin America, 7 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 476 (1977). See
generally International Protection of Human Rights: The Work of International Organiza-
tions and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1974) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on International Protection of Human Rights].
For current information on human rights activities by nongovernmental organizations, see
the Human Rights Internet Newsletter.
2. Over 700 NGOs have accredited status with the U.N. Economic and Social Council.
Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social
Council in 1978, U.N. Doc. E/1978/INF. 7 (1978).
3. See, e.g., National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Human Rights in
North America, in 2 Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, Human Rights
and Christian Responsibility 80-101 (1974). In the United States, a number of national
NGOs have been at the forefront of protecting civil rights and civil liberties, e.g., the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights, the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, the
American Jewish Committee, and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. For
a description of the activities of Amnesty International's national sections, see T. Claudius
& F. Stepan, Amnesty International, Portrait Einer Organisation 214-78 (3d ed. 1978). See
generally Human Rights Organizations & Periodicals Directory (1977) (lists organizations
and agencies active in civil liberties in U.S. and Canada); D. Weissbrodt, The Influence of
Interest Groups on the Development of United States Human Rights Policies (unpublished
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unofficial ombudsmen safeguarding human rights against govern-
mental infringement, using such techniques as diplomatic initia-
tives,4 reports,5 public statements,6 efforts to influence the deliber-
ations of intergovernmental human rights bodies, campaigns to
mobilize public opinion,8 and attempts to affect the foreign policy
of some countries with respect to their relations with other coun-
tries that regularly commit human rights violations.9
If these nongovernmental human rights organizations wish to
act effectively and responsibly, they must engage in fact-finding.
manuscript on file with the authors) [hereinafter cited as D. Weissbrodt, Influence of Inter-
est Groups].
4. See, e.g., International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1977 (1978). This
report includes accounts of diplomatic initiatives in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, South Africa, and
Indochina. Id. at 15-19.
5. See, e.g., Amnesty International, An Amnesty International Report: Political Imprison-
ment in the People's Republic of China (1978); A. Cook, South Africa: The Imprisoned Soci-
ety (1974) (a publication of the International Defence and Aid Fund); S. Cronje, Equatorial
Guinea-The Forgotten Dictatorship (1976)(Research Report No. 2 of the Anti-Slavery So-
ciety); International Commission of Jurists, Final Report of Mission to Chile, April 1974, to
Study the Legal System and the Protection of Human Rights (1974); J. Mercer, The
Sahrawis of Western Sahara (1979) (Minority Rights Group Report No. 40).
6. For example, Amnesty International (AI) issued 76 news releases on 38 countries from
July 1, 1977 through June 30, 1978. Al, Amnesty International Report 1978, at 319 (1979).
7. B. Andemicael & E. Rees, Non-governmental Organizations in Economic and Social
Development 24-25 (1975); Cassese, How Could Nongovernmental Organizations Use U.N.
Bodies More Effectively?, Universal Human Rights, Oct.-Dec. 1979, at 73-75; Zuijdwijk, The
Right to Petition the United Nations Because of Alleged Violations of Human Rights, 59
Can. B. Rev. 103 (1981). See also AI, Allegations of Human Rights Violations in Democratic
Kampuchea: UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities: Statement Submitted by Amnesty International, a Non-governmental Organization
in Consultative Status (1978); International League for Human Rights, Communication to
the United Nations on a Consistent Pattern of Violations of Human Rights in the Republic
of Guinea (May 25, 1977) (unpublished mimeo on fie with the authors).
8. See, e.g., AI, 1978 Argentina Campaign: Report and Evaluation (May 4, 1979); AI, 1978
El Salvador Campaign: Report and Evaluation (May 14, 1979).
9. Representatives from NGOs frequently appear before foreign policy committees of the
U.S. Congress. See, e.g., Chile: The Status of Human Rights and its Relationship to U.S.
Economic Assistance Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Organiza-
tions of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-13, 196-97
(1976); Human Rights in Iran, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Organiza-
tions of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 1-16, 63-69
(1976); Human Rights in the Phillipines: Report by Amnesty International: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on International Organizations of the House Comm. on International Rela-
tions, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Human Rights in South Korea: Implications for U.S.
Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International
Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Seas.
28-50, 54-69, 104-11 (1974); Human Rights in Uruguay and Paraguay: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Organizations of the House Comm. on International Relations,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 86-108, 154-218 (1976).
FACT FINDING BY NGOs
The fact-finding methods of these organizations in some ways re-
semble those of investigative journalists; in other ways, these bod-
ies function in a quasi-adjudicative mode. Human rights organiza-
tions usually collect information only at their central offices or
secretariats but occasionally send fact-finding missions to perform
on-site interviews and observations. The efforts and resources ex-
pended to gather information will vary from case to case, depend-
ing on how the NGO intends to use the desired data. Information
obtained may appear in a mere diplomatic letter of inquiry, or may
be published as a report to an international body such as the
United Nations 0 or the Organization of American States."" NGOs
differ significantly in membership, structure, size of staff, financial
wherewithal, political focus, and location, but their fact-finding
techniques do not vary greatly-except insofar as financial consid-
erations limit their ability to employ expert staff and to send costly
missions.
Despite all these differences, NGOs share the same basic pur-
pose: to gather information which can be effectively mustered to
influence the implementation of human rights by governments. 12
In order to inspire corrective efforts by governments, human rights
organizations must demonstrate that their factual statements are
true and thus constitute a reliable basis for remedial governmental
policy.'" Human rights organizations-as with any finder of
fact-must pursue reliability through the use of generally accepted
10. See Mdller, Petitioning the United Nations, Universal Human Rights, Oct.-Dec. 1979,
at 57; International Human Rights Law Group, Petition to the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights and Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities: Human Rights Violations in the Socialist Republic of Rumania (June 27, 1979);
National Conference of Black Lawyers, Petition to the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights and Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities: Human Rights Violations in the United States (Dec. 1, 1978).
11. See, e.g., National Council of Churches, Complaint Alleging a Violation of Human
Rights in the United States of America (submitted to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Organization of American States, June 22, 1979).
12. See, e.g., Statute of Amnesty International, art. 2, reprinted in AI, Amnesty Interna-
tional Report 1978, at 299-300 (1979). "In Amnesty International, research is linked in an
essential way to action .... Information is the core of the work of the movement." Al,
Amnesty International Report 1978, at 7 (1979).
13. Another reason why demonstrably reliable procedures for NGO fact-finding may be
important is the potential for the use of such fact-finding in judicial tribunals. For example,
an individual bringing a suit for damages against a torturer has a cause of action in the
United States under the customary international law of human rights. Filartiga v. Pefia-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The findings of an NGO on a State's use of torture, e.g.,
AI, Report on Torture (2d ed. 1975), perhaps could be introduced as evidence in such a suit.
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procedures and by establishing a reputation for fairness and im-
partiality. Useful models for NGOs seeking to employ reliable fact-
finding techniques may be found in the procedures of certain inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs) which over the past century
have gained considerable experience with fact-finding as a means
of settling international disputes.14
There are, however, significant difficulties in establishing a rigid
set of procedural rules for NGO fact-finding-particularly if those
rules are derived from IGO fact-finding experience. NGOs under-
take factual inquiries under circumstances that often differ from
those under which IGOs operate. As compared to IGOs, NGOs
have more limited financial resources, fewer commission members,
less governmental cooperation, and different objectives. A single
set of procedural rules may not adequately cover the many situa-
tions in which NGOs establish fact-finding inquiries. Such rigid
rules are especially inappropriate when the NGO is providing an
early warning mechanism for massive human rights violations.
Nevertheless, the considerable fact-finding experience of IGOs
should be considered and utilized by NGOs where appropriate.
This article concerns the role and importance of fact-finding by
NGOs in the field of human rights. It begins with a basic overview
of human rights organizations and their fact-finding work. In Part
II, sources of international fact-finding standards are examined
and the question of whether these standards are appropriate to the
work of NGOs is considered. The procedures of intergovernmental
and nongovernmental fact-finding bodies for carrying out the vari-
ous phases of a fact-finding project are discussed in Part III, along
with recommendations that NGOs consider certain procedures for
their own fact-finding work. The article concludes with the sugges-
14. See generally N. Bar-Yaacov, The Handling of International Disputes by Means of
Inquiry (1974); W. Shore, Fact-Finding in the Maintenance of International Peace (1970);
Ermacora, International Enquiry Commissions in the Field of Human Rights, Revue des
Droits de 'Homme 180, 181 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ermacora, Enquiry Procedures];
Norris, Observations In Loco: Practice and Procedures of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, 15 Texas J. Int'l L. 46 (1980); van Boven, Fact-Finding in the Field of
Human Rights, 1973 Israel Y.B. on Human Rights 93; Consideration of Principles of Inter-
national Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on methods of
fact-finding, U.N. Doc. A/5694 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Secretary-General's Report]. For
an introduction and bibliography to human rights in general including NGOs, see Reynolds,
supra note 1. See also Checklist of Human Rights Documents (1976-present) (continuation
of the earlier Checklist (1973-1976); W. Miller, International Human Rights: A Bibliography
1970-1976 (1976).
[Vol. 22:1
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tion that NGOs disclose in their final reports certain information
concerning the fact-finding methodology employed during investi-
gations of human rights problems.
I. NGO FACT-FINDING
A. An Overview
Among the most prominent international NG0s which regularly
engage in fact-finding in the field of human rights are Amnesty
International,' 5 the Anti-Slavery Society,16 the Commission of the
Churches on -International Affairs of the World Council of
Churches,17 the International Association of Democratic Lawyers,"
the International Commission of Jurists, 9 the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, 20 the International Defense and Aid
Fund,21 the International Federation of Human Rights,22 the Inter-
15. In 1979 Amnesty International had 2283 adoption groups in 39 countries, 38 national
sections, over 150 persons in the International Secretariat staff in London, and a budget of
1.5 million pounds per year. AI International Executive Committee, Report to the 12th In-
ternational Council 1979, at 7, 33 (1979). See generally AI Handbook (1977); T. Claudius &
F. Stepan, supra note 3; E. Larsen, A Flame in Barbed Wire (1978); J. Moreillon, Le Comit6
International de la Croix-Rouge et la Protection des D~tenus Politiques 199-218 (1973);
Scoble & Wiseberg, Amnesty International: Evaluating Effectiveness in the Human Rights
Arena, 105 Intellect 79 (1976); Scoble & Wiseberg, Human Rights and Amnesty Interna-
tional, 413 Annals 116 (1974). See also 1977 Y.B. Int'l Org., Entry A0054 (Union of Interna-
tional Associations).
16. See Anti-Slavery Society, Human Rights and Development, A 3-Year Research and
Action Programme, 1978-1981 (undated) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors).
17. See generally Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, Human Rights
and Christian Responsibility 2-12 (1974); N. MacDermot, Human Rights and the Churches
(1976); see also Protection of Human Rights in Chile: Note by the Secretary-General, 34
U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 12) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/34/583/Add. 1 (1979).
18. See generally International Association of Democratic Lawyers, IXth Congress of the
International Association of Democratic Lawyers (1970); International Association of Demo-
cratic Lawyers, XXth Anniversay of the I.A.D.L. (1967). The IADL publishes the Revue de
Droit Contemporain in Brussels.
19. See generally MacDermot, The Work of the International Commission of Jurists, 1
Index on Censorship 155 (1972). The general principles advocated by this NGO may be
found in International Commission of Jurists, The Rule of Law and Human Rights (1966).
20. See generally D. Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the
Red Cross (1977); J. Freymond, Guerres, Revolutions, Croix-Rouge (1976); J. Moreillon,
supra note 15, passim; D. Tansley, Final Report: An Agenda for Red Cross (1975); M.
Veuthey, Gu6rilla et Droit Humanitaire 48-61, 242-64, 319-33 (1976); Bissell, The Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross and the Protection of Human Rights, 1 Revue des Droits
de l'Homme 255 (1968); Forsythe, The Red Cross as Transnational Movement- Conserving
and Changing the Nation-State System, 30 Int'l Org. 607 (1976); International Committee of
the Red Cross, Le CICR, la Lique et la Rapport Tansley (1977).
21. The International Defense and Aid Fund (Defense and Aid) is headquartered in
1981]
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national League for Human Rights,2 3 the Minority Rights Group, 4
Survival International,25 and the World Peace Council. 26 NGOs
collect most of their information by reviewing relevant laws, peri-
odicals and submitted documents, interviewing occasional visitors,
and corresponding with informants such as the families and
friends of victims, 27 political parties opposing an oppressive re-
gime,28 and other repressed groups.
While the bulk of an NGO's information-gathering activity takes
London and has regularly issued reports about human rights violations in South Africa and
other African countries. See, e.g., R. Ainslie, Masters and Serfs, Farm Labour in South Af-
rica (rev. ed. 1977); A. Cook, supra note 5; Defense and Aid, The Sun Will Rise (M. Benson
ed. 1976); Defense and Aid, Boss: The First 5 Years (1975); Defense and Aid, South African
Prisons and the Red Cross Investigation (1967) [hereinafter cited as Defense and Aid, Pris-
ons]; A. Hepple, Press Under Apartheid (1974).
22. See Federation Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, Bull. No. 2 (Dec. 1977-Feb.
1978).
23. See International League for Human Rights, Annual Review (1976-1977) (undated);
Wiseberg & Scoble, Human Rights as an International League, in Human Rights and World
Order 100 (A. Said ed. 1978). See also Wiseberg & Scoble, The International League for
Human Rights: the Strategy of a Human Rights NGO, 7 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 289 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Wiseberg & Scoble, The International League]; 1977 Y.B. Int'l Org.,
Entry A2205) (Union of International Associations).
24. Minority Rights Group is an international research and information group headquar-
tered in London which publishes its research findings about minority groups suffering dis-
crimination. See, e.g., H. Coombs, Australia's Policy Toward Aborigines, 1967-1977
(1978)(Minority Rights Group Report No. 35); J. Mercer, supra note 5; G. Schdpflin, The
Hungarians of Rumania (1978) (Minority Rights Group Report No. 37); S. Steiner, The
Mexican Americans (1979) (Minority Rights Group Report No. 39).
25. See generally Survival International, Review (Spring 1978).
26. See generally 1977 Y.B. Int'l Org., Entry A3502 (Union of International Associations);
see also World Peace Council, Violations of Human Rights in Haiti, El Salvador, and Nica-
ragua (undated).
27. See, e.g., AI, Amnesty International Briefing: Guatemala (1976); Al, Political Impris-
onment in the People's Republic of China (1978); AI, Report on Allegations of Torture in
Brazil (1972) [hereinafter cited as Torture in Brazil]; Juridical Sub-Commission of the In-
ternational Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile, The
Crimes of the Chilean Military Junta in the Light of Chilean Law and International Law
(1974); S. Steiner, supra note 24; Argentina Beset by Arrest Queries, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13,
1976, at 5, col. 1; Plea for "Vanished" Chileans Arrested by Secret Police, Christian Science
Monitor, Nov. 16, 1977, at 18, col. 1; Vance Wins Argentine Pledge on Nuclear Arms, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 22, 1977, at 3, col. 1. See also AI, Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR: Their
Treatment and Conditions 2 (2d ed. 1980).
28. See J. Moreillon, supra note 15, at 217; Arab Captives in Gaza Say Israelis Beat Them
but Don't Use Torture, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1977, § A, at 15, col. 5; 18 Days of Terror in an
Iraqi Prison, Wash. Post, June 2, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 2; Physicist Says Argentina Jails Many
Scientists, Wash. Post, May 27, 1977, § A, at 26, col. 1; You Don't Like Liberty?, Newsweek,
May 15, 1978, at 50, col. 1. See also AI, Prisoners of Conscience, supra note 27, at 2; The
Civil Rights Movement in the USSR, Int'l Comm'n Jurists Rev., Mar. 1970, at 13; notes 327-
39 infra & accompanying text.
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place in its central office, an organization may also elect to pursue
an on-site investigation of a human rights problem. Over the past
twenty years, NGOs have frequently sent fact-finding missions to
areas in which human rights violations are alleged to be occur-
ring.29 Some of the missions are mounted to investigate specific
human rights situations;30 others are sent to observe trials of sub-
stantial international interest.3 1 For example, during the period
1971-78 Amnesty International established 111 inquiry missions
and 76 trial observer missions.32 During the period 1971 through
1976 the International Commission of Jurists sent 42 trial observer
missions 3 and 14 others.34 Since World War II the International
Committee of the Red Cross has sent representatives to visit over
29. See, e.g., AI, The Republic of Nicaragua: An Amnesty International Report (1977);
Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of the Philippines (2d ed.
1977) [hereinafter cited as AI Mission to the Philippines]; Continued Absence of Democracy
in Indonesia, Int'l Comm'n Jurists Bull., Sept. 1966, at 9. See generally Weissbrodt, Interna-
tional NGOs, supra note 1, at 300-04; Wiseberg & Scoble, The International League, supra
note 23, at 309-10.
30. See, e.g., Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report of the Mission of
Lawyers to Argentina April 1-7, 1979 (1979); W. Butler, J. Humphrey & G. Bisson, The
Decline of Democracy in the Philippines (1977); Pierson-Mathy, The International Fact-
Finding Mission to Southern Africa, Rev. Contemp. L., No. 2, 1978, at 129; Association In-
ternationale des Juristes Democrates, Mission d'Enqu~te en Argentine et en Uruguay (May
10-20, 1978); R. Goldman & D. Jacoby, Report of the Commission of Enquiry to Mexico
(1978); Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, International Human Rights Law Group &
Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (Alien Rights Law Project),
The Haitians in Miami: Current Immigration Practices in the United States (Dec. 1978); B.
Stephansky & D. Helfeld, Denial of Human Rights in Paraguay: Report of Second Commis-
sion of Enquiry of the International League for Human Rights (Dec. 1977); Unitarian Uni-
versalist Service Committee, Human Rights in El Salvador-1978: Report of Findings of an
Investigatory Mission (1978) (report prepared by R. Drinan, J. McAward & T. Anderson).
31. See, e.g., Jacoby, Le Mot du Secretaire aux Observations Judiciaires, La Pratique des
Observateurs Judiciaires Internationaux, in Federation International des Droits de l'Homme
Bull., Dec. 1977-Feb. 1978, at 3; Martin-Achard, Political Trials and Observers, Int'l
Comm'n Jurists Rev., Apr.-June 1971, at 24; D. Weissbrodt, International Observers at Tri-
als of Human Rights Interest (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); D. Weissb-
rodt, The Third Trial of Arnold Rampersaud, Report by David Weissbrodt to the Interna-
tional Executive Committee of Amnesty International (1978).
32. AI, Amnesty International Report 1978, at 278-79 (1979); AI, Amnesty International
Report 1977, at 318-20 (1977); AI, Amnesty International Report 1975-1976, at 196-97
(1976); AI, Amnesty International Annual Report 1974/75, at 137-39 (1975); AI, Amnesty
International Annual Report 1973-74, at 77-78 (1974); AI, Annual Report 1972-73, at 34, 69,
88 (1973); Al, Annual Report 1971-72, at 58 (1972); Al, Annual Report 1970-71, at 17-19
(1971).
33. International Commission of Jurists, Report on the Activities of the International
Commission of Jurists 1971-1977, at 31-35 (1977).
34. Id. at 37-38.
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300,000 political detainees in 72 countries. 5 Between 1952 and
1972 the International Association of Democratic Lawyers sent 115
missions.3 6
Of course, some sources to which NGOs look for information are
more reliable than others. NGOs employ a variety of techniques to
determine the accuracy of information supplied to them, such as
looking for circumstances which might cause the informant to be
biased and testing for inconsistencies by careful questioning. In
many cases, NGOs will attempt to corroborate the information ac-
quired through their fact-finding efforts. Statements of an accused
government may lend credence to allegations of human rights vio-
lations.3 7 Corroboration is also facilitated by exchanges of informa-
tion among NGOs with different sources of information and areas
of expertise.3 "
NGOs use the results of these fact-finding efforts in different
ways. The human rights organization may gather the relevant ma-
terial and make a diplomatic effort to raise any apparent problem
with the offending government." Persistent silence in response to
such NGO requests is often taken by the organizations as signifi-
cant, if not as tantamount to an admission of guilt.40 Governmental
replies are carefully analyzed to determine whether they may con-
tain admissions to part or all of the allegations. 1
Some organizations, such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross, stress diplomatic initiatives with governments, al-
though the Red Cross does disseminate information about the
places it visits, the number of prisoners seen, and the dates of its
35. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Le CICR, la Lique et la Rapport Tan-
sley, supra note 20, at 38. Between 1973 and 1977, ICRC delegates visited prisions in 46
countries. Id. at 39. See also J. Moreillon, supra note 15, at 189-98.
36. International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Rappel Chronologique des
Principales Missions (undated).
37. See, e.g., Argentina Admits It Holds Missing Rights Leader, Wash. Post, Sept. 22,
1977, § A, at 24, col. 1.
38. See Paraguay, Int'l Comm'n Jurists Rev., Dec. 1971, at 13; Weissbrodt, International
NGOs, supra note 1, at 314; Note, supra note 1, at 488.
39. See, e.g., AT, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Sri Lanka 9-15 January
1975, at 5 (1976) [hereinafter cited as AI Mission to Sri Lanka].
40. See, e.g., Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser.LN/II.17, doc. 26, art. 51(1) (1967); cf. AI, Political Imprisonment in the
People's Republic of China ix-x (1978) (Although AI did not take silence by the Chinese
government as an admission of guilt, it did not publish its report until after the Chinese
refused to comment thereon.).
41. See, e.g., AI Mission to the Philippines, supra note 29, at 8.
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visits.42 Other organizations, such as Amnesty International, the
International Commission of Jurists, and the International League
for Human Rights, put the results of their fact-finding efforts to
use through a wide range of techniques: (1) diplomatic contacts,,'
(2) limited or massive letter-writing campaigns," (3) issuance of
limited circulation reports,45 (4) distribution of press releases,46 (5)
publication of detailed reports in pamphlet or book format,'47 (6)
printing of brief statements in organization periodicals" or annual
reports,'9 (7) filing of communications with or lobbying interna-
tional human rights bodies,50 (8) testimony before United Nations
42. See, e.g., International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1977, at 13-15
(1978) (list of prisioners in Ethiopian hands).
43. See, e.g., Afghanistan-Al Meets With Vice Premier, in Amnesty Action, Jan., 1979,
at 4. The International League for Human Rights sent the names of persons missing during
the 1974 Cyprus Civil War to President Makarios and the Turkish government, eliciting a
government response. International League for Human Rights, Annual Review 1976-1977, at
15 (1977).
44. AI conducted an El Salvador campaign during October-December 1978. See Al, El
Salvador Campaign Circular 1: Campaign Outline (July 5, 1978); Al, 1978 El Salvador Cam-
paign: Report and Evaluation (May 14, 1979). See also note 8 supra & accompanying text.
45. AI often distributes material marked "INTERNAL (for Al members only)."
46. Amnesty International distributed 76 news releases in 1977-78, 70 in 1976-77, and 46
in 1975-76. Al, Amnesty International Report 1978, at 318 (1979); Al, Amnesty Interna-
tional Report 1977, at 344-47 (1977); Al, Amnesty International Report 1975-1976, at 198-
200 (1976).
47. See, e.g., AI, Human Rights Violations in Ethiopia (1978); Al, Indonesia: An Amnesty
International Report (1977); W. Butler, J. Humphrey & G. Bisson, supra note 30; D. Fox,
Human Rights in Guatemala: Report of a Mission to Guatemala in June, 1979, on Behalf of
the International Commission of Jurists (1979); International Defense and Aid Fund, South
Africa: The Boss Law (1971); R. Goldman & D. Jocoby, Report of the Commission of In-
quiry to Mexico (Dec. 1978) (report prepared for the International League for Human
Rights).
48. Amnesty International has several periodicals, including Amnesty Action and Am-
nesty International Newsletter. The International Commission of Jurists Review contains a
section entitled "Human Rights in the World," as well as commentaries and articles. See
also Human Rights Bulletin (published by the International League for Human Rights), and
Flash (published by the World Confederation of Labor).
49. Amnesty International devotes a large section of its annual report to "Prisoners and
Human Rights Country by Country." See, e.g., Al, Amnesty International Report 1978, 27-
277 (1979). The International League for Human Rights also summarizes its results country
by country. See, e.g., International League for Human Rights, Annual Review 1976-77
(1977).
50. See Domb, Who is a "Victim" of a Violation of Human Rights?, 1975 Israel Y.B. on
Human Rights 181; see, e.g., Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub. 2/426 at 14-129 (1979). The National Council of the Churches of Christ recently sub-
mitted a complaint to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights regarding United
States treatment of Haitian refugees who seek political asylum. National Council of the
Churches of Christ, Complaint Alleging a Violation of Human Rights in the United States of
America (June 22, 1979).
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organs 1 and national legislative bodies, 52 (9) lobbying certain gov-
ernments to raise human rights issues with other governments,"
(10) lobbying governments or corporations to take trade, aid, or
other measures against violating nations," and (11) a combination
of these and other techniques. 55
The way an organization uses the results of its fact-finding will
depend less upon the reliability of its fact-finding procedures than
it will upon the financial and organizational strength of the NGO.
For example, with a staff of two or three in New York and with
relatively independent affiliates in thirty countries, the Interna-
tional League for Human Rights can issue press releases, distribute
reports to a limited number of people, and monitor events at the
United Nations, but it cannot always engage in the range of activi-
51. See, e.g., AI, Allegations of Human Rights Violations in Democratic Kampuchea, U.N.
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Aug. 1978);
International League for Human Rights, Communication to the United Nations on a Consis-
tent Pattern of Violations of Human Rights in the Republic of Guinea (1977). In 1976 the
League also submitted a 73-page complaint to the U.N. Human Rights Commission regard-
ing violations in India. International League for Human Rights, Annual Review 1976-1977,
at 13 (1977).
52. See, e.g., Human Rights in the Philippines: Report by Amnesty International: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations of the House Comm. on International
Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. (1976). The International League for Human Rights
presented a proposal for the advancement of freedom of information in Congressional hear-
ings held by Senator Jackson in 1976. International League for Human Rights, Annual Re-
view 1976-1977, at 4 (1977).
53. A general effort along these lines was made in February 1977, when the International
League for Human Rights submitted a 75-page report to President Carter. International
League for Human Rights, Report of the Conference on Implementing a Human Rights
Commitment in U.S. Foreign Policy (Mar. 4, 1977). More specifically, the League petitioned
the U.S. State Department to investigate a list of persons missing in the 1974 Cyprus Civil
War. International League for Human Rights, Annual Review 1976-1977, at 15 (1977). Addi-
tional examples may be found in D. Weissbrodt, Influence of Interest Groups, supra note 3,
at 7.
54. Amnesty International has studied the use of economic pressures to achieve human
rights results. See, e.g., AI, Report on Amnesty International Seminar "Human Rights and
Economic Pressures" (Apr. 3, 1978) (seminar held in London on Jan. 28-29, 1978). See also
Harkin, Human Rights and Foreign Aid: Forging an Unbreakable Link, in Human Rights
and U.S. Foreign Policy: Principles and Applications (P. Brown and D. MacLean eds. 1979);
D. Weissbrodt, Influence of Interest Groups, supra note 3, at 4-5.
55. An example of action involving a combination of techniques is the Amnesty Interna-
tional 1978 Argentina campaign. The objective of the campaign was to highlight human
rights violations in Argentina in conjunction with the June 1978 World Cup Soccer Champi-
onship played in that country. The techniques included media coverage of the human rights
situation, public meetings, demonstrations, enlisting the support of the soccer players, and
bringing pressure upon the Argentinian government from a wide range of groups. AI, 1978
Argentina Campaign: Report and Evaluation (May 4, 1979).
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ties open to NGOs with more members and resources.5" The Anti-
Slavery Society and the International Association of Democratic
Lawyers, among many others, are similarly limited in their activi-
ties. Some organizations lack the finances even to attempt original
fact-finding work and instead rely entirely upon data gathered by
other NGOs. 57 Nevertheless, most NGOs engage in fact-finding and
their credibility depends in large measure upon the reliability of
the facts obtained through such efforts. The reliability of an
NGO's information depends, in turn, on the methods used to ob-
tain such information.
B. Should NGOs Adopt Formal Fact-Finding Procedures?
-Some Considerations
NGOs have not formally adopted any standard procedure for
fact-finding. A paragraph or two is sometimes found in the intro-
duction to a report outlining some aspect of the procedures used.5 8
A reference to an evidentiary standard may arise in the narrative
of events59 and the schedule of an on-site visit may, on occasion, be
described.60 Some NGOs are so devoid of expertise, time, and re-
sources that they lack the ability to develop any regular proce-
dures.6' Instead, they live from press release to hastily drawn re-
port, without time for methodology. This lack of uniform fact-
finding procedures is a problem because much of the monitoring
and reporting of human rights violations in the world is done by
NGOs. 62
56. See Wiseberg & Scoble, The International League, supra note 23, at 308.
57. See D. Weissbrodt, Influence of Interest Groups, supra note 3, at 31.
58. See, e.g., International Commission of Jurists, Uganda & Human Rights 5 (1977) (re-
ports to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights). Frequently, the thorough human rights
fact-finding efforts of rapporteurs appointed by U.N. bodies also lack adequate attention to
methodology and procedure. See, e.g., Study of the Human Rights Situation in Equatorial
Guinea, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1371 (1980).
59. See International Commission of Jurists, Report of the Committee of Enquiry into
Events in Bizerta, Tunisia 7, 9, 16 [hereinafter cited as Bizerta Report]. See also Ermacora,
Enquiry Procedures, supra note 14, at 202.
60. See Bizerta Report, supra note 59, at 5-8.
61. See D. Weissbrodt, Influence of Interest Groups, supra note 3, at 20-26.
62. See Claude, Reliable Information: The Threshold Problem for Human Rights Re-
search, 6 Human Rights 169, 174-75 (1977); Franck & Cherkis, The Problem of Fact-Finding
in International Disputes, 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 1483, 1511 (1967); Hazzard, The League of
Frightened Men, The New Republic, Jan. 19, 1980, at 17; Rodley, supra note 1, at 120, 124,
138-47.
Most NGO human rights fact-finding has concentrated on civil and political rights, but
violations of economic, social, and cultural rights also require factual investigation. See Al-
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In determining the extent to which they ought to establish regu-
lar fact-finding procedures, NGOs must take into account several
competing considerations. On the one hand, fact-finding proce-
dures may add to the respect NGO findings will be accorded by
criticized governments, intergovernmental human rights bodies,
and by world public opinion.6 3 Furthermore, use of a standard set
of procedures may ensure that results obtained by different offices
and missions within the same organization will be consistent and
comparable. Fact-finding guidelines may also assist the NGO in
obtaining the cooperation of governments and witnesses to the ex-
tent they can be assured of being treated fairly.
On the other hand, strict fact-finding rules may impede the
NGO in reaching the sorts of conclusions necessary in certain situ-
ations, where the NGO "knows" human rights violations are occur-
ring, but cannot "prove" them.6 It is not enough that an organiza-
tion's intentions are laudable; it must also reach concrete factual
conclusions. If the procedures prevent conclusions and thus action
in too many cases, the NGO ultimately will lose adherents and in-
fluence. There are instances where access to first-hand information
is so limited that neither general nor particular allegations of
ston, The United Nations' Specialized Agencies and Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 79, 101-05
(1979); Cassese, supra note 7.
Legislative bodies have also engaged in human rights fact-finding. See Salzberg, Monitor-
ing Human Rights Violations: How Good is the Information?, in Human Rights and U.S.
Foreign Policy 173 (P. Brown & D. MacLean eds. 1979). In addition, fact-finding commis-
sions have been used on matters of national concern. See H. Clokie & J. Robinson, Royal
Commissions of Inquiry (1937); Corman, The Riot Commission's Report, 9 Ariz. L. Rev. 347
(1968); Franck & Cherkis, supra, at 1512-19; Lockwood, A History of Royal Commissions, 5
Osgoode Hall L. J. 172, 200-07 (1967); Sloane, Presidential Boards of Inquiry in National
Emergency Disputes, 18 Lab. L.J. 665, 674-75 (1967).
63. See Franck & Cherkis, supra note 62, at 1523-24 (1967). It has been argued that when
a State refuses to cooperate in an inquiry, which is the usual case, "the enquiry is con-
demned in advance to lose the character of an objective investigation." Ermacora, Enquiry
Procedures, supra note 14, at 204. Under these circumstances, it is important to have proce-
dures which will guarantee impartiality and thoroughness.
64. Amnesty International's Urgent Action Network handles this type of situation. See,
e.g., AI, Amnesty International Handbook 15-16 (1977); AI USA, Companion to the Am-
nesty International Handbook 5 (2d ed. 1979). Urgent action appeals, pleas by AI to the
allegedly offending government to take immediate action, are frequently used in emergency
situations where there is an imminent risk of torture or execution. Often there is not time
for Al to obtain definite "proof" as most tortures and deaths occur within hours or days of
an individual's arrest. See, e.g., Al, Urgent Action Notice (Apr. 26, 1979) (kidnapping and
detention of six persons in Mar del Plata, Argentina); AI, Campaign for the Abolition of
Torture, Urgent Action Notice (July 11, 1977) (abduction of Father Silva Iribarne-Garay in
Buenos Aires).
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human rights violations can be proven with the desired exacti-
tude.65 In this type of situation, a quasi-judicial model of fact-find-
ing would hamstring NGO activity. A human rights NGO does not
serve its underlying purpose by responding with silence to allega-
tions of torture or illegal detention because its investigation fails to
meet a judicial standard of proof.
Moreover, fact-finding procedures might limit the sort of flex-
ibility upon which NGOs have come to rely, particularly in situa-
tions in which life and liberty are endangered. 6' For example, if a
rule were established prohibiting comment by a mission upon a
human rights problem while the mission remained in the country
under investigation,67 the mission members might feel constrained
to avoid comment even though lives could be saved. A government
might use such a procedural guideline to exploit even the most in-
nocent remark by an NGO mission member as a pretext for expul-
sion. Similarly, procedures requiring that information be received
only in open session at which the government is represented might
seriously hamper a mission's work. Indeed, even a procedural
guideline requiring the mission to identify sources of information
would discourage communications from repressed groups or might
expose witnesses to a greater risk of retaliation.68
Ignoring these difficulties, the International Law Association at
its 1980 meeting in Belgrade adopted "by consensus a set of mini-
mal procedures to protect the integrity of human rights fact-find-
ing by nongovernmental organizations." '69 The rules were based
upon a study prepared by Thomas Franck and Scott Fairley of
New York University.70 It is remarkable that these proposed
65. See, e.g., Al, Indonesia 11, 31-40 (1977); Al, Islamic Republic of Pakistan 15 (1977);
AI, Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China 28-31 (1978); AI, Political
Imprisonment in South Africa 37-40 (1978).
66. Cf. Comment, Negotiation by International Bodies and the Protection of Human
Rights, 7 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 90, 131 (1968) (disadvantages of formal procedures and
strict rules of admissibility in dealing with human rights problems).
67. See, e.g., AI, Rules to be Observed by All Persons Charged with Attending Trials or
Carrying Out Other Missions on Behalf of Amnesty International, rule 7 (Dec. 16, 1975).
68. See, e.g., Al, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Argentina 6-15 No-
vember 1976, at 6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as AI Mission to Argentina]; Al, Violations of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 4
(1979).
69. Current Development, The Belgrade Minimal Rules of Procedure for International
Human Rights Fact-finding Missions, 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 163, 163 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Belgrade Rules].
70. Id. at 163 n.1; Franck & Fairley, Procedural Due Process in Human Rights Fact-find-
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"rules" for nongovernmental organizations were founded upon a
study which deals almost exclusively with the fact-finding experi-
ence of intergovernmental organizations. The study fails to note
the unique problems facing NGOs that are set forth above. While
the International Law Association is an NGO itself, it lacks sub-
stantial experience in fact-finding. Neither the Franck-Fairley
study nor the Belgrade Rules appear to recognize the significant
difficulties in imposing rigid procedural prescriptions upon the
fact-finding work of NGOs.
To make matters worse, Franck and Fairley adopt, in significant
respects, an unfortunately narrow, adversarial model that does not
fit much of the fact-finding efforts of intergovernmental organiza-
tions, any more than it suits the efforts of NGOs. Franck and Fair-
ley draw a useless distinction between prosecutorial marshalling of
evidence-about which they have little to suggest-and adjudica-
tive fact-finding limited by numerous safeguards.7 1 Such a distinc-
tion faithfully reflects the contrast between the roles of the prose-
cutor and the judge in the United States. But it also reflects a
failure to understand the efforts of most international fact-finding
bodies. For example, how could one classify under the Franck and
Fairley dichotomy the fact-finding role of the many experts who
make direct contacts with governments for the U.N., the Interna-
tional Labor Organization or NGOs?
The Belgrade Rules evidence a slight improvement over the lim-
its of the Franck-Fairley study, but still bear far too much of an
adversarial bias. For instance, the Belgrade Rules in most situa-
tions mandate public testimony with an opportunity for question-
ing by the State involved.72 Even if the organization obtains the
assurances of protection for witnesses, which the Belgrade Rules
propose,73 such an opportunity for questioning by States is not
"ordinary," but rare for IGO fact-finding and almost without pre-
cedent for NGOs.74 The realities facing NGO fact-finding and the
ing by International Agencies, 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 308 (1980).
71. Franck & Fairley, supra note 70, at 310.
72. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 164, rule 14.
73. Although the Belgrade Rules in one provision appear to afford the State concerned
ample opportunity to confront complaining witnesses, id., at 164, rule 14, thereby chilling
communications from repressed groups, the Rules also suggest that "[t]he factfinding mis-
sion may withhold information which, in its judgment, may jeopardize the safety or well-
being of those giving testimony, or of third parties, or which in its opinion is likely to reveal
sources." Id., rule 17.
74. See notes 411-18 & 439-49 infra & accompanying text.
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risks to informants make such a requirement appear naive. Fur-
thermore, it is inappropriate to propose an adversarial model
wherein only the State is represented. Human rights victims will
not be represented and the fact-finding commission cannot adopt
the passive role of a judge in a common law system.
From the foregoing considerations, it is clear that NGOs might
benefit from the adoption of certain fact-finding rules, but should
be left free to choose those procedures they wish to follow, so as to
leave intact that flexibility and freedom of action vital to an
NGO's work. There are quite a few procedural models, primarily in
use by governmental bodies, from which to choose. Hence, it might
be helpful to examine briefly these models and the organizations
which employ them, and to discuss the appropriateness of applying
governmental fact-finding rules to the work of an NGO. Further,
there is much in the Belgrade Rules that may be taken as a distil-
lation of the experience of intergovernmental fact-finding and thus
may be useful for NGOs to study and adopt, where practicable.
II. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING STANDARDS
Assuming that it is appropriate to suggest some procedural prin-
ciples for NGO fact-finding or at least to compare NGO reports
with the extant standards, it must be determined which set of
standards should be applied. Since NGOs have not developed dis-
cernable standard fact-finding practices, one has very little choice
but to refer to the standards based on the experience of govern-
ments and IGOs, such as the Hague Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, the United Nations model
rules for human rights bodies, and the International Labor Organi-
zation rules.
A. The Hague Convention of 1907: The First International Fact-
Finding Standard
The Hague Convention of 1907 is one of the most thorough
codifications of procedures for bilateral inquiry strictly limited to
fact-finding. 75 The Hague Convention of 1907 provides that a com-
mission of inquiry can be constituted only by an agreement be-
75. See generally N. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 14, at 20-108; Ermacora, Enquiry Proce-
dures, supra note 14, at 182-83; Franck & Cherkis, supra note 62, at 1491-92; W. Shore,
supra note 14, at 12-28.
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tween two disputing States. 7 The Convention envisioned that in-
quiry would be limited to investigation of disputes "arising from a
difference of opinion on points of fact" but "involving neither
honor nor vital interests."' 7 The exact nature of the inquiry is left
to negotiation between the disputing States who together deter-
mine the composition of the commission, the powers of the com-
missioners, the facts to be examined, when and where the commis-
sion will sit, which languages will be used and any other rules of
procedure the States wish to impose. 8 In order to encourage the
use of inquiry, the 1907 Hague Convention provided model rules of
procedure governing the nomination by the parties of special
agents or counsel,79 the communication of statements of facts and
documents by each party,80 requests by the commission for infor-
mation,"' the production of witnesses, 82 the examination of wit-
nesses,8 3 the secrecy of the commission meetings,8 ' the closure of
the proceedings, 85 the majority vote86 and right to dissent,8 7 the
public reading of the decision,88 and the allocation of expenses.8
The narrow scope of "inquiry" conceived by the Hague Convention
is re-emphasized by the provision in article 35 that the "report of
the Commission is limited to a statement of facts, and has in no
way the character of an Award."' 0
Even though use of the Hague model for inquiry was limited to
several naval disputes,91 the Hague Convention continues to serve
as a model of procedure for inquiry commissions that undertake to
make recommendations as well as find facts.92 The functional lim-
76. Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1907, art.
10, 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention of 1907].
77. Id. art. 9.
78. Id. arts. 10, 12, 45, 57.
79. Id. art. 14.
80. Id. art. 19.
81. Id. art. 22.
82. Id. arts. 23-25.
83. Id. arts. 26-28.
84. Id. art. 30.
85. Id. art. 32.
86. Id. art. 30.
87. See id. art. 33.
88. Id. art. 34.
89. Id. art. 36.
90. Id. art. 35.
91. See W. Shore, supra note 14, at 18 (1970); Kaufman, The Necessity for Rules of Pro-
cedure in Ad Hoc United Nations Investigations, 18 Am. U.L. Rev. 739, 741-43 (1969).
92. See generally N. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 14, at 109-246; W. Shore, supra note 14, at
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its of these commissions, even if expanded beyond inquiry to in-
clude mediation and conciliation, continue to be determined by the
disputing State parties in accord with article 10 of the Hague
Convention."
B. The United Nations Fact-Finding Rules
A second form of inquiry has been developed by the League of
Nations, 4 the United Nations9 5 and other IGOs.9 When inquiry is
undertaken by international organizations, the appointment of a
commission does not depend on joint initiative of the parties to a
dispute.9 7 The State requesting an inquiry by the organization
15-22, 32-36; Leurdijk, Fact-Finding Its Place in International Law and International Poli-
tics, 1967 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht 141, 154-58; Secretary-General's
Report, supra note 14, at 23-33, 60-64. Professor Emacora suggested in 1968 that both the
U.N. and NGOs adopt the Hague rules. Ermacora, Enquiry Procedures, supra note 14, at
205.
93. W. Shore, supra note 14, at 15-22, 32-36. The voluntary resort to enquiry by a party
State and the non-binding character of the commission finding under the Hague rules are
inappropriate to human rights investigation. "To conform to such rules of procedure would
be tantamount to a concession that human rights are purely a domestic matter .... .
Kaufman, supra note 91, at 743.
94. See W. Shore, supra note 14, at 22-26; Secretary-General's Report, supra note 14, at
37-47; Williams, The Pan American and League of Nations Treaties of Arbitration and Con-
ciliation, 1929 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 14.
95. See generally N. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 14, at 247-321; Carey, Procedures for Inter-
national Protection of Human Rights, 53 Iowa L. Rev. 291, 315-16 & n.128 (1967) (U.N.
Trusteeship on-site visits) [hereinafter cited as Carey, Human Rights Procedures]; Darwin,
Factfinding and Commissions of Inquiry, in David Davies Memorial Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, International Disputes 159, 172-76 (1972); Secretary-General's Report, supra
note 14, at 69-128. See also J. Carey, U.N. Protection of Civil and Political Rights (1970);
Carey, United Nations Scrutiny of South African Prisons, 1 Revue de Droits de l'Homme
531 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Carey, U.N. Scrutiny]; Note, UN Fact-Finding as a Means
of Settling Disputes, 9 Va. J. Int'l L. 154, 178-82 (1969).
96. See generally J. Ralston, The Law and Procedure of International Tribunals 43-44
(1926); A. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe (2d ed. 1977); Foster, Fact Finding and the
World Court, 1969 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 150, 153-54; Leurdijk, supra note 92, passim; Robert-
son, "Enqu~tes" en Mati~re le Droits de l'Homme, in L'Inspection Internationale 501 (G.
Fischer & D. Vignes eds. 1976); Monconduit, ettude Fonctionelle des Organes Europe6ns de
Protection Internationales des droits de l'Homme: La Fonction d'Enqu6te et d'Instruction, 2
Revue de Droits de l'Homme 208 (1969); Comment, supra note 66, passim.
97. The departure by international organizations from the Hague bilateral approach to
inquiry is clearly illustrated in the establishment by the U.N. General Assembly of the Spe-
cial Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Popula-
tion of the Occupied Territories. G.A. Res. 2443, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 50, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2443, at 2 (1969). Not only did the State under investigation have no hand in
the formation of the Committee, but the Committee was composed of two States that had
no diplomatic relations with Israel and one State whose relations with Israel were limited.
Id.
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need not be directly harmed or even a party to the dispute.98 In
fact, since the subject State has only indirect and often very little
control over the membership, terms of reference, and mode of op-
eration of the commission, the consent and cooperation of subject
States have not regularly been required for the establishment of
inquiry commissions.9 Nevertheless, the subject State may be con-
sulted and have some influence on how the inquiry proceeds.
The League of Nations, acting under the impetus of the Bryan
Treaties,100 expanded the role of fact-finding commissions to in-
clude conciliation, provided for the mandatory submission of dis-
putes to inquiry,101 and authorized the publication of the concilia-
tion commission's report. These procedural developments reflected
a modification of the traditional concept of State sovereignty by
recognizing collective responsibility for the maintenance of peace.
Inquiry no longer served merely to settle facts disputed by two
States, but also to provide a basis for collective action by interna-
tional bodies. In fact, the initiation of fact-finding and the publica-
tion of a report became in themselves the most important action of
the international body.
10 2
98. See N. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 14, at 292; W. Shore, supra note 14, at 50-60.
99. See, e.g., Ermacora, Enquiry Procedures, supra note 14, at 188; van Boven, supra note
14, at 107-15. Although the League of Nations enquiry commissions were never appointed
without the consent of the concerned parties, see W. Shore, supra note 14, at 25, the U.N.
has conducted extended enquires in South Africa, Israel, and Chile over the objections of
those governments. Communications regarding human rights violations may be made under
Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503, E.S.C. Res. 1503,48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No.
1A) at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (1970), but the express consent of the concerned State
must be obtained before they can be the subject of thorough on-site investigations. Direct
contacts by a U.N. official with the government of the concerned State under resolution
1503 have permitted some related fact-finding. E.g., Study of the Human Rights Situation
in Equatorial Guinea, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1371, Annex 1 (1980); see notes 159 & 164-65 infra
& accompanying text.
The ILO's experience in fact-finding demonstrates the crippling effect of a consent re-
quirement. The Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association has
had only five cases referred to it in over 20 years because government consent was required.
The Governing Body's Committee on Freedom of Association, which can investigate com-
plaints from any country regardless of consent, has handled over 850 complaints since 1951.
International Labour Office, 193rd Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association,
I.L.O. Doc. GB.209/6/9, at 3 (1979). See also W. Shore, supra note 14, at 141-44; van Boven,
supra note 14, at 111-12. For a discussion of ILO procedures, see notes 137-92 infra & ac-
companying text.
100. See W. Shore, supra note 14, at 19-22; Franck & Cherkis, supra note 62, at 1492-93;
Secretary General's Report, supra note 14, at 29-33.
101. See W. Shore, supra note 14, at 134-35.
102. See W. Shore, supra note 14, at 137. The international community, including the
League of Nations and the United Nations, has been slow to proceed from fact-finding to
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Inquiries have been undertaken by the United Nations pursuant
to article 13 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that the General
Assembly "shall initiate studies and make recommendations for
the purpose of. . .the realization of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms."108 Article 14 states that "the General Assembly may
recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situa-
tion .... " Article 34 authorizes the Security Council to "inves-
tigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to interna-
tional friction or give rise to a dispute. 10 5 U.N. inquiry has thus
come to be used not only to settle disputes between two States, but
to adjust "situations" existing within single countries. The scope of
inquiry has also been expanded occasionally to include an investi-
gation of all aspects of a dispute-legal, political, or fac-
tual' 06-and the formulation of recommendations in addition to
findings. 10 7
The General Assembly, s08 the Security Council, 09 the Secretary-
General, 0 and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights'" have
undertaken fact-finding primarily on an ad hoc basis." 2 Some U.N.
coercive action. See D. Weissbrodt, Case Studies of Trade and Aid Sanctions 1-7 (1979).
103. U.N. Charter art. 13.
104. Id. art. 14.
105. Id. (emphasis added); see W. Shore, supra note 14, at 100-03.
106. See generally Secretary-General's Report, supra note 14, at 65-127.
107. See notes 519-41 infra & accompanying text; see, e.g., W. Shore, supra note 14, at 50-
51, 57-58, 60.
108. See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 14, at 75-101; see, e.g., Report of the
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, 31 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 35) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/31/35 (1976); Report of the Sub-Committee on the
Situation in Angola, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/4978 (1961).
109. See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 14, at 102-21.
110. Id. at 122-27.
111. See, e.g., Interim Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts Prepared in Ac-
cordance with Resolution 19 (XXIX) of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. El
CN.4/1135 at 1 (1974); Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on the Investiga-
tion Requested in Resolution 21 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. El
CN.4/1020 at 2 (1970); Report of the Economic and Social Council, Protection of human
rights in Chile, U.N. Doe. A/33/331 at 1, Annex 1 (1978); Report of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on Human Rights in Democratic
Kampuchea, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1335 at 1 (1974). For discussion of the legality and authority
of ad hoc working groups established by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, see Kauf-
man, supra note 91, at 745-50.
112. The International Court of Justice has also engaged in fact-finding on an ad hoc
basis. The Permanent Court of International Justice undertook an on-site visit in The Di-
version of Water from the Meuse, 1937 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 70, at 9. See also I.C.J. Stat.
art. 22, para. 1; 1 L. Gross, The Future of the International Court of Justice 65 (1976);
Hudson, Visits by International Tribunals to Places Concerned in Proceedings 31 Am. J.
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commissions of inquiry have adopted written procedures modeled
on the rules of their parent bodies and previous commissions,"'
while some commissions have relied on no written rules. 4 The
U.N. Fact-Finding Mission to South Vietnam was an ad hoc com-
mission that adopted 21 rules of procedure and described in detail
the method of its operation.11 5 The rules adopted dealt with the
duties of officers, 1 6 quorum and voting requirements,111 the terms
of reference, 18 the type of evidence that would be admitted,1"9 the
manner of accepting petitions,120 the process of hearing wit-
nesses, 21 the conduct of on-the-spot investigations,12 2 and the au-
thority of commission members to make public statements. 2 s
In 1970 the Secretary-General issued Draft Model Rules of fact-
finding procedure for U.N. bodies dealing with violations of human
rights.124 Although these Draft Model Rules were adopted in 1974
in substantially abbreviated form by the U.N. Economic and Social
Council, 2 5 they have been used by the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Int'l L. 696 (1937); Jessup, Foreword to D. Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribu-
nals, at xi-xii (rev. ed. 1975); Leurdijk, supra note 92, at 143-44.
113. See Report of the Economic and Social Council: Protection of Human Rights in
Chile, U.N. Doc. A/10285 at 15-17, 94-100 (1975); Secretary-General's Report, supra note 14,
at 80 (U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea); id. at 76 (U.N. Special Committee on
Palestine).
114. See J. Carey, supra note 95, at 96-98, 111; Ermacora, Enquiry Procedures, supra note
14, at 192; Carey, U.N. Scrutiny, supra note 95, at 532-33.
115. Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission to South Viet-Nam, 18 U.N.
Doc. A/5630, at 7, Annex H (1963). See generally, Kaufman, supra note 91, at 753-55, 764-
68.
116. Report, supra note 115, rules 1-6.
117. Id. rules 7-11.
118. Id. rules 12-13.
119. Id. rules 13-14.
120. Id. rules 17-18.
121. Id. rules 19-20.
122. Id. rules 15-16.
123. Id. rule 21.
124. Model Rules of Procedure for United Nations Bodies Dealing with Violations of
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1021/Rev. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Draft Model
Rules of Procedure]. The adoption of rules of procedure has been urged by a number of
authors. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 91; van Boven, supra note 14, at 96-107.
125. Report of the Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights on Model Rules
of Procedure for United Nations Bodies Dealing with Violations of Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1134 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Model Rules]. Section IX (rules 18-23), con-
cerning sources of information, was condensed into one rule that allows the organ establish-
ing the ad hoc body to determine its own rules regarding sources, unless the ad hoc body is
explicitly authorized by the organ to draw its own such rules. Id. at 6-7, rule 18. Some U.N.
reports still lack any explanation of fact-finding methodology. See, e.g., Human Settlements:
Living Conditions of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Territories, U.N. Doc. A/34/
19811 FACT FINDING BY NGOs
Chile as the basis for rules of procedure'26 and will probably serve
as the framework for rules of future fact-finding commissions. The
25 Draft Model Rules are divided into eleven sections covering ap-
plicability, constitution of the ad hoc body, agenda of meetings,
officers, secretariat, languages, voting and conduct of business, co-
operation with member States, oral and written testimony and
other sources of information, records, and reports.127 The rules al-
low a commission to make recommendations and issue a minority
report.128 They also permit the concerned State to submit evi-
dence, 29 to appoint a representative, and to put questions to wit-
nesses, 30 but they do not allow the State to make recommenda-
tions for the agenda or to place obstacles in the way of the
attendance of witnesses.' 3 ' Consent of the concerned State is re-
quired for the ad hoc body to enter that State.""2 All evidence is
admissible, although its use is subject to the discretion of the com-
mission. 33 Witnesses are placed under oath' " and commission
members swear to perform their duties "honourably, faithfully, im-
partially and conscientiously."' 35 A hearing may be conducted by
one or more members. 36
C. The International Labor Organization Fact-Finding
Procedures
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has several fact-
536, at 3 (1979).
126. U.N. Doc. A/10285 at 15 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Chile Rules].
127. See Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124; Model Rules, supra note 125.
128. Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 13, rule 25; Model Rules, supra
note 125, at 7, rule 20; Chile Rules, supra note 126, at 100, rule 19.
129. Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 10, rule 18(e); cf. Belgrade Rules,
supra note 69, at 164, rule 13 (permitting both petitioners and the State concerned to pre-
sent lists of witnesses to the fact-finding mission).
130. Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 9-10, rule 17(d), (e); cf. Belgrade
Rules, supra note 69, at 164, rule 14 (considering it the "ordinary" case to allow the involved
State to question complaining petitioners in public session).
131. Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 9, rule 17(a)(iii).
132. Id. at 10, rule 17(f).
133. Id. rule 20.
134. Id. at 11, rule 22(a)(i), (ii). These provisions were adopted by the ad hoc working
group investiating the human rights situation in Chile. See Chile Rules, supra note 126, at
98, rule 15(a)(i), (ii).
135. Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 5, rule 6. This provision was
adopted both in Model Rules, supra note 125, at 2, rule 6, and in Chile Rules, supra note
126, at 94, rule 4.
136. Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 12, rule 23.
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finding bodies, each with its own set of procedural rules and/or
practices.13 7
1. Supervision of the Application of Ratified Conventions
Under article 22 of the ILO Constitution, member States are re-
quired to prepare reports on their compliance with certain conven-
tions that they have ratified. 138 These reports are reviewed initially
by ILO Secretariat staff in light of relevant national legislation, ju-
dicial decisions, and all other information available in writing at
the Secretariat.39 No oral testimony is taken nor are on-site visits
made. The government reports and ILO staff analyses are ex-
amined by the twenty-member Committee of Experts,14 ° which
may request more detailed information from the government.141
Upon receipt of the government's further response, or if there is a
lack thereof, the Committee of Experts makes a further request for
information or publishes in a report its observations on problems
of compliance with the convention at issue. 42
At the request or with the consent of the government concerned,
the Director-General may appoint a representative to pursue direct
contacts with a government concerning the application of interna-
tional labor standards and to report back to the Committee of Ex-
137. See Jenks, The International Protection of Trade Union Rights, in The International
Protection of Human Rights 210, 219-47 (E. Luard ed. 1967). For discussions of the ILO
complaint and inquiry procedures, see C. Jenks, The International Protection of Trade
Union Freedom 180-200 (1957); Gormley, The Emerging Protection of Human Rights by the
International Labour Organization, 30 Albany L. Rev. 13 (1966); Poulantzas, International
Protection of Human Rights: Implementation Procedures Within the Framework of the In-
ternational Labour Organization, 25 Revue H6llenique de Droit Internationale 110, 127-29,
136-41 (1972); Valticos, L'inspection Internationale dans le Droit International du Travail,
in L'inspection Internationale 379 (G. Fischer & D. Vignes eds. 1976); Valticos, Les
M~thodes de la Protection International de la Libert6 Syndicale, 1975 Rec. des Cours
(Neth.) 77; Wolf, Aspects Judiciaires de la Protection Internationale des Droits de l'Homme
par 1'O.I.T., 4 Revue des Droits de l'Homme 773, 776-815 (1971).
138. Constitution of the International Labour Organization, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712,
T.S. No. 874 (entered into force for the United States Aug. 20, 1934), amended, T.I.A.S. No.
1868 (adopted by the United States Oct. 9, 1946).
139. International Labour Office, Manual on Procedures Relating to International Labour
Conventions and Recommendations 12-19 [hereinafter cited as ILO Manual].
140. The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
was initially established in 1926. See E. Landy, The Effectiveness of International Supervi-
sion 19-34 (1966).
141. ILO Manual, supra note 139, at 19.
142. Id. at 18-20.
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perts.143 The Government may respond to observations. The Con-
ference Committee on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations regularly examines a selection of cases drawn
from those on which the Committee of Experts has published ob-
servations and the Conference Committee's report is then ex-
amined by the full ILO Conference pursuant to article 23 of the
Constitution.14 4  These procedures have resulted in numerous
changes in national law necessary to bring States into compliance
with ILO standards.145
The ILO Constitution provides for two kinds of filings that set
in motion contentious proceedings concerning the application of a
ratified Convention: representations and complaints. 46 Under arti-
cles 24 and 25, any workers' or employers' organization may file a
representation with the International Labor Office alleging that a
member State has failed to observe any Convention to which it is a
party. The ILO Governing Body may invite the government to re-
spond. If no response is forthcoming or if the government state-
ment is unsatisfactory, the Governing Body may publish the repre-
sentation and any government response. This procedure has only
been used fifteen times in the history of the ILO and apparently
does not afford an opportunity for use of the more sophisticated
fact-finding techniques employed under other ILO procedures. 47
143. Id. at 23; International Labour Office, Report of the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report III, pt. 4A, at 15-16 (1977); see,
e.g., International Labour Office, Report by Pierre Juvigny, Representative of the Director-
General of the International Labour Office, on Direct Contacts with the Government of Por-
tugal Regarding the Implementation of Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No.
105) at 3-4 (1971). See generally Operation of Existing Machinery and Procedures for Estab-
lishing Facts Relating to the Application of International Labour Standards, I.L.O. Doc.
GB.205/SC/1/4, at 3 (1978); International Labour Office, Report of the Committee of Ex-
perts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report III, pt. 4A, at 13-27
(1979). For a discussion of the analogous direct contacts procedure of the Committee on
Freedom of Association, see notes 164-66 infra & accompanying text.
144. Constitution of the International Labour Organization, supra note 138, art. 23; see
ILO Manual, supra note 139, at 20-21.
145. International Labour Office, The Impact of International Labour Conventions and
Recommendations 15-26, 47-59 (1976). See also E. Landy, supra note 140, at 79-204.
146. N. Valticos, International Labour Law 245 (1979).
147. For ILO actions regarding past representations, see, e.g., 1 International Labour Of-
fice, International Labour Code 1951, at 761-62 n.16 (1952) (Japan, 1924); id. at 762 n.16
(Latvia, 1930); id. at 1096-97 n.562 (India, 1935); id. at 43-45 n.30 (India, 1936-37); id. at
687-89 n.12 (Estonia, 1937-39); id. at 1097 n.562 (Mauritius, 1937); 39 I.L.O. Off. Bull. 120-
27 (1956) (Netherlands, 1955); 50"I.L.O. Off. Bull. 267-68 (1967) (Brazil, 1965-66); 55 I.L.O.
Off. Bull. 125-49 (1972) (Italy, 1970-71); International Labour Office, Report of the Commit-
tee set up to Consider the Representation Presented by the International Confederation of
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Under article 26 of the ILO Constitution, any member State of
the ILO has the right to file a complaint if it is not satisfied that
any other member is securing the effective observance of any con-
vention which both States have ratified." 8 Article 26 provides for
the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry to consider the com-
plaint and to report thereon. Although article 26 has been used
very few times in the history of the ILO,14 9 the ILO Constitution
contains a series of interesting procedural rules for its implementa-
tion. These rules require that member States cooperate, 5 ° that the
Commission state its conclusions and recommendations,151 and
that parties indicate whether they accept the recommendations. 15
The rules also allow for appeal to the International Court of Jus-
tice,15 3 and empower the ILO to take action in case of failure to
implement the recommendations.1 54
2. The Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association
Another significant ILO fact-finding procedure was established
in 1951 under the Committee on Freedom of Association, which is
a tripartite body of nine members from the ILO Governing
Body. 55 The Committee has largely replaced the procedures for
Free Trade Unions under Article 24 of the Constitution Alleging Non-Observance of the
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) by Czechoslova-
kia, I.L.O. Doc. GB.206/5/8 (1978).
In November, 1979 the Committee on Standing Orders and the Application of Conven-
tions and Recommendations drafted a proposed revision to the Standing Orders concerning
the examination of representations. The draft provides for more effective consideration of
representations by eliminating some of the cumbersome requirements found in the current
Standing Orders.
148. Constitution of the International Labour Organization, supra note 138, art. 26(1);
see, e.g., International Labour Office, Report by the Officers of the Governing Body on Two
Complaints made by the Government of France Concerning the Observance by Panama Re-
spectively of the Officers' Competency Certificates Convention, 1936 (No. 53) and of the
Repatriation of Seamen Convention, 1926 (No. 23) and the Food & Catering (Ships' Crews)
Convention, 1946 (No. 68), I.L.O. Doc. GB.207/6/6 (1978).
149. See N. Valticos, supra note 146, at 245-47.
150. Constitution of the International Labour Organization, supra note 138, art. 27.
151. Id. art. 28.
152. Id.
153. Id. art. 29(2).
154. Id. art. 33.
155. International Labour Office, I.L.O. Principles, Standards and Procedures Concerning
Freedom of Association 9-10 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ILO Principles]; E. Haas, Human
Rights and International Action 26-30 (1970); Poulantzas, supra note 137, at 127-29; see also
2 M. Tardu & T. McCarthy, Human Rights: The International Petition System, pt. 5 (1980).
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investigating complaints under article 26,156 and the proposed revi-
sion of the Standing Orders concerning articles 24 and 25157 specif-
ically provides that representations dealing with trade union rights
should be referred to this body. The Committee examines com-
plaints against any country, regardless of whether that country has
ratified the freedom of association conventions or consented to the
investigation. 158 The Committee conducts hearings and undertakes
on-site visits159 and has been able to examine more than 850
cases.160 The Committee's procedure calls for the complaint to be
communicated to the government concerned, so that the govern-
ment may comment. Complainants are then often asked for com-
ments on the government's response if further information is
needed. The Committee may also seek more information from the
government itself.161 The Committee considers the allegations, re-
plies or lack thereof, and the documentary evidence and then sub-
mits its conclusions and recommendations to the Governing Body
for adoption.1 1 2 Its reports are published.163
In urgent cases or where the Committee encounters difficulty in
obtaining government responses, 64 the direct contacts procedure
may be utilized. Under this procedure, a representative of the ILO
Director-General is sent to the country for discussion with the gov-
ernment (if the government will consent),165 and to transmit to the
appropriate authorities the concern underlying the complaint, to
obtain the government's reaction, to explain the procedures and
principles involved, to appraise the situation giving rise to the
156. For a discussion of the procedure under art. 26, see notes 148-54 supra & accompa-
nying text.
157. For a discussion of the procedure under arts. 24 & 25, see note 147 supra & accompa-
nying text.
158. ILO Principles, supra note 155, at 9-10.
159. Id. at 9.
160. Id. at 10.
161. International Labour Office, 193d Report of the Committee on Freedom of Associa-
tion, I.L.O. Doc. GB.209/6/9, at 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 193d Report].
162. International Labour Office, Outline of the Existing Procedure for the Examination
of Complaints Alleging Infringements of Trade Union Rights, I.L.O. Doc. GB/LS/March
1977, at 8 (1977).
163. See, e.g., Complaints Presented by the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World
Confederation of Labor and Various Other Trade Union Organizations Against the Govern-
ment of Uruguay (Case 763), 60 I.L.O. Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 3, at 81 (1977).
164. 193d Report, supra note 161, at 5-6.
165. Outline of the Existing Procedure for the Examination of Complaints Alleging In-
fringements of Trade Union Rights, I.L.O. Doc. GB/LS/March 1977, at 6 (1977); see 55
I.L.O. Off. Bull., Supp., at 6, 9 (1972) (committee report recommending procedures).
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complaint, to encourage further response from the government,
and to report back to the committee.1 16
In two of its earliest cases and in regard to recent complaints
against Uruguay, the Committee has heard separate oral presenta-
tions of government representatives and of the complaining inter-
national labor organizations.1 6 7 The Committee evidently intends
to hear such oral presentations more frequently in the future.6 8
3. The Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom
of Association
Yet another major ILO fact-finding procedure was established in
1950 and 1951 under the aegis of the Fact-Finding and Concilia-
tion Commission on Freedom of Association, 9 which examines
complaints about the infringement of trade union rights.17 0 This
procedure can be invoked whether or not the country has ratified
the relevant Conventions. Proceedings may even be commenced
against nations which are not members of the ILO.1 71 Fact-finding
166. ILO Principles, supra note 155, at 9.
167. 193d Report, supra note 161, at 6-7.
168. Id. at 7.
169. Report on the Establishment of a Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on
Freedom of Association, submitted to the Conference by the Governing Body of the Interna-
tional Labour Office, 33 I.L.O. Off. Bull. 74 (1950); see Wolf, supra note 137, at 821-27; Wolf,
ILO Experience in the Implementation of Human Rights, 10 J. Int'l L. & Econ. 599, 622-23
(1975).
170. The Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission has investigated only five cases,
partly because its procedures require the consent of the government concerned. See N. Val-
ticos, supra note 146, at 245-47; Franck & Fairley, supra note 70, at 339-40. For an account
of these investigations, see International Labour Office, The Trade Union Situation in Chile:
Report of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association (prov.
ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Chile Report]; Report of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation
Commission on Freedom of Association Concerning Persons Employed in the Public Sector
in Japan, 49 I.L.O. Off. Bull., No. 1, Spec. Supp., at 2 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Japan
Report]; Report of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Associa-
tion Concerning the Trade Union Situation in Greece, 49 I.L.O. Off. Bull., No. 3, Spec.
Supp., at 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Greece Report]; Report of the Fact-Finding and
Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association concerning Lesotho, I.L.O. Doc.
GB.197/3/5 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lesotho Report]. The other instance of the invoca-
tion of the machinery of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission involves an as yet
uncompleted investigation by the Commission into trade union matters in Puerto Rico. See
N. Valticos, supra note 146, at 251-52. Franck and Fairley used these cases as the basis for a
suggested set of procedural norms for use by fact-finding bodies. Franck & Fairley, supra
note 70, at 340-42. These norms, in turn, formed the basis for the Belgrade Rules. See notes
225-26 infra & accompanying text.
171. ILO Principles, supra note 155, at 8; Valticos, La Commission d'Investigation et de
Conciliation en Matisra de Libert6 Syndicale et le M6canisme de Protection Internationale
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and conciliation panels are normally composed of three indepen-
dent persons appointed by the ILO Governing Body 172 and author-
ized to make direct contact with governments in order to pursue
an adjustment of difficulties through agreement.1 7 -
The methodology of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commis-
sion is modeled upon the infrequently used ILO procedures for
Commissions of Inquiry on complaints by States under article 26
of the ILO Constitution. 4 Matters may be referred to the Com-
mission by the ILO Governing Body, on the recommendation of
the Committee on Freedom of Association, 7 5 and the request of
the Government, 178 or by the U.N. Economic and Social Council. 77
Upon referral, the Commission may adopt its own rules of proce-
dure, but ordinarily it first requests information from the govern-
ment and the complainants, as well as from international and
national organizations of workers and of employers. s75 The Com-
mission's staff then prepares an analysis of the relevant national
legislation, the information submitted by the parties, and other
relevant documentation. Thereafter, the Commission takes testi-
mony of witnesses for the parties in hearings in Geneva at which
des Droits Syndicaux, 1967 Annuaire Frangais de Droit International 445, 450 (Centre Na-
tional de la Recherche Scientifique).
172. See, e.g., Japan Report, supra note 170, at 2.
173. ILO Principles, supra note 155, at 8-9.
174. See Constitution of the International Labour Organization, supra note 138, art. 26;
Past Practice Concerning Special Inquiries with Particular Reference to Human Rights
Questions, I.L.O. Doe. G.B.205/21/7, at 5 (1978); Report of the Commission Appointed
under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to Examine
the Complaint Filed by the Government of Ghana concerning the Observance by the Gov-
ernment of Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), 45
I.L.O. Off. Bull., No. 2, Supp. II, at 5-6, 9-12 (1962); Report of the Commission Appointed
under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to Examine
the Complaint Filed by the Government of Portugal concerning the Observance by the Gov-
ernment of Liberia of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), 46 I.L.O. Off. Bull.,
Supp. II, at 5-7 (1963); International Labour Office, Report of the Commission Appointed
under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to Examine
the Observance by Chile of the Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 1), and the
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) at 1-5 (1975). See
also Valticos, Un double type d'Enqu~te de l'organisation internationale du travail au Chili,
1975 Annuaire Fran ais de Droit International 482, 484-86 (Centre National de la Recher-
eche Scientifique); Vignes, Procedures internationales d'Enqu~te, 1963 Annuaire Frangais de
Droit International 438-59 (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique).
175. See Japan Report, supra note 170, at 1-2; Chile Report, supra note 170, at 5.
176. See Greece Report, supra note 170, at 2.
177. See, e.g., Lesotho Report, supra note 170.
178. ILO Principles, supra note 155, at 8; D. Yiannopoulos, La Protection Internationale
de la Libert6 Syndicale 173-78 (1973).
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representatives of the government and complainant are present.1'7
In most cases the Commission then requests the government to
provide facilities for an on-site visit and to make assurances that
witnesses will not be subjected to any form of sanction or
coercion.1so
During an on-site visit, the Commission may meet with the par-
ties in closed session 8 ' at which it may hear witnesses in private
and under oath. Witnesses are excluded from the session except
when giving testimony. 8 2 Before testifying, each witness is in-
formed of the Commission's terms of reference.183 Members of the
Commission and representatives of the parties may question wit-
nesses, subject to the Commission's control.'8
During on-site visits, members of the Commission may also un-
dertake physical inspections, may meet with individuals,18 5 make
provisional recommendations to the parties, and make a statement
to the press."8 6 The Commission then proceeds to draft its final
report which contains factual findings and published material,18 7
states conclusions, and makes recommendations for the solution of
the problems presented. 88 The final report is presented to the
Governing Body and is published.189 In some cases follow-up ef-
forts may be undertaken. 90
4. Studies
A fourth category of fact-finding by the ILO involves studies of
general world labor conditions. These studies are undertaken with-
out on-site visits but are based on all the material available to the
179. ILO Principles, supra note 155, at S.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Japan Report, supra note 170, at 23. For a discussion of the procedures of
the Commission, see Nafziger, The International Labor Organization and Social Change:
The Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association, 2 N.Y.U. J. Int'l
L. & Pol. 1 (1969); Valticos, La protection international de la libert6 syndicale-Vingt-cinq
ans apris, 7 Revue des Droits de rHomme 5, 23-25 (1974).
182. See, e.g., Japan Report, supra note 170, at 20-21. Further, the Commission usually
excludes testimony irrlelevant to the complaints under scrutiny. Id.
183. Id. at 21.
184. Id. at 21-22.
185. Id. at 24.
186. Id. at 25.
187. Id. at 28.
188. Id. at 25-27.
189. See authorities cited in note 170 supra.
190. See Chile Report, supra note 170, at 8.
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ILO, including the results of questionnaires and country reports.191
The studies are published, are usually quite detailed, and often
make reference to national laws and practices which may not com-
ply with international labor standards. An ILO study group on one
occasion was invited by the Spanish government to visit the coun-
try and to perform a study of the trade union situation there.92
D. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has a proce-
dure for on-site fact-finding that it has begun to use more fre-
quently in recent years. 93 At the request of a member State, an
individual complainant, or any of the principal organs of the Or-
ganization of American States (the General Assembly, the Perma-
nent Council, or a Meeting of Consultation), the Commission may
seek permission from a State to undertake an observation "in
loco.' 94 In addition, the Commission can, on its own initiative, de-
cide by majority vote 95 to request permission for an on-site mis-
sion to investigate possible human rights violations. The Statute of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights arguably em-
powers the Commission to make on-site visits in connection with
191. See, e.g., International Labour Office, Abolition of Forced Labour (1979); Interna-
tional Labour Organization, Children at Work (1979); International Labour Office, Forced
Labour 117, 181-82 (1966).
192. See Valticos, Une nouvelle experience de protection des droit de rhomme: le groupe
d'6tude de l'O.I.T. charg6 d'examiner la situation en mati~re de travail et en matisre syndi-
cale en Espagne, 1970 Annuaire Frangais de Droit International 567 (Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique).
193. Norris, supra note 14; see, e.g., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Sal-
vador and Observations of the Government of El Salvador on the Report, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
Ser.P, AG/CP/doc.222/79, at 11-29 (1979) (visit at invitation of government) [hereinafter
cited as Report on the Situation in El Salvador]; Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Nicaragua, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.45, doc. 16 rev. 1, at 5-24 (1978) (visit); Report
on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.44, doc. 38 rev.
1, at 1-2 (1978) (visit at invitation of government); Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Paraguay, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V11.43, doc. 13 corr. 1, at 1-9 (1978) (visit re-
fused); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Uruguay, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.43, doc. 19 corr. 1, at 1-9 (1978) (visit refused); Second Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Chile, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.37, doc. 19 corr. 1, at 4 (1976) (later visit possi-
ble); Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.40, doc. 10, at 2-3 (1977) (use of questionnaire).
194. Norris, supra note 14, passim.
195. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 23, O.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser.LN/11.17, doc. 26 (1967), reprinted in Handbook of Existing Rules Pertain-
ing to Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.LN/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6, at 33 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as OAS Handbook].
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its authority "to examine communications submitted to it and any
other available information deemed pertinent by the Commission;
and to make recommendations, when it deems this appropriate,
with the objective of bringing about more effective observance of
fundamental human rights." 196 Although the Commission requires
the consent or the invitation of a government to conduct an on-site
observation, 19 7 the government's refusal to grant consent does not
prevent the Commission from preparing a report and issuing pub-
lic statements that may embarrass the government. 98
Once the Commission has obtained the consent of the State for
on-site observation, the Commission is governed by broad rules of
inquiry.1 99 The Commission chooses the members of the special
commission that will conduct the on-site investigation. 00 Before a
visit, the special commission and its staff may consult with the
government and various human rights organizations about whom
the special commission should interview while in the country
under investigation. The special commission can interview wit-
nesses without the presence of government officials,201 can travel
freely in the territory of the consenting country,202 is given access
to all jails and other detention centers to conduct private inter-
views with persons sentenced or detained,203 is able to utilize any
appropriate method for obtaining the information they request,'
196. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 9 (bis)(b), O.A.S.
Doe. OEA/Ser.LIVII.26, doc. 10 (1971), reprinted in OAS Handbook, supra note 195, at 27;
see Sandifer, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Dominican Repub-
lic, June 1965 to June 1966, in The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965, at 115, 120-26, 134-40
(J. Carey, ed. 1967).
197. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution on On-Site Observations,
reprinted in OAS Handbook, supra note 195, at 42-43 (adopted at the 42nd session of the
Commission, held Oct. 31-Nov. 12, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Resolution on On-Site Obser-
vations]. But cf. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 164, rule 18 (stating that the fact-finding
mission should independently determine the need for on-site inspection; the rule makes no
reference to obtaining consent from the government concerned).
198. Norris, supra note 14, at 94 (draft). See generally authorities cited in note 193 supra.
199. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Regulations Regarding On-Site
Observations, O.A.S.. Doc. OEA/Ser.LN/II.35, doc. 4 rev. 1 (1975), reprinted in OAS Hand-
book, supra note 195, at 41; Resolution on On-Site Observations, supra note 197.
200. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Regulations Regarding On-Site Ob-
servations art. 1, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.LN/II.35, doc. 4 rev. 1 (1975) reprinted in OAS
Handbook, supra note 195, at 41; Resolution on On-Site Observations, supra note 197, rule 1
(a).
201. Resolution on On-Site Observations, supra note 197, rule 1(b).
202. Id. rule 1(c).
203. Id. rule 1(e). See also Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 165, rule 21.
204. Resolution on On-Site Observations, supra note 197, rule 1(g).
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and must be provided by the government with documents or infor-
mation necessary for the preparation of its report.20 5 Although the
Rules of the Commission do not so require, it appears to be the
practice of the special commission to interview witnesses without
the use of an oath. Even though the special commission doesn't
recognize parties, as such, in its fact-finding procedures, it may ini-
tiate private interviews with government representatives and with
domestic human rights organizations.
After the on-site investigation is completed, the special commis-
sion will present its report to the Commission and to the govern-
ment prior to publication.20 8 The government is given time to re-
spond to the report.20°  The Commission may include the
government's response in the published report.208
The Inter-American Commission also has a procedure for the re-
ceipt of individual human rights complaints, for obtaining re-
sponses from governments, and for making determinations on the
complaints. 20 9 In addition, the Inter-American Commission may
promptly bring emergency cases to the attention of govern-
ments.21 0 These procedures are based entirely upon materials
brought to the attention of the Inter-American Commission and do
not ordinarily involve any oral presentation or on-site visits, al-
though individual complaints sometimes are resolved through on-
site visits arranged in response to a more general concern about
human rights in a country.211 For example, during its visit to a
prison in El Salvador, the Inter-American Commission was able to
verify complaints that certain individuals had been secretly de-
tained by finding their names or initials inscribed on the doors of
205. Id. rule 1(f).
206. See Norris, supra note 14, at 88.
207. Id.
208. Id.; see, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation
of Human Rights in Uruguay, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.LN/lI.43, doc. 19 corr. 1, at 9 (1978).
209. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 9 (his) (b), O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.26, doc. 10 (1971), reprinted in OAS Handbook, supra note 195, at 27;
Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, arts. 37-5.7, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser.LN/lI.17, doe. 26 (1967), reprinted in OAS Handbook, supra note 195, at 35-39;
see OAS Handbook, supra note 195, at 44-45 (model complaint form).
210. See OAS Handbook, supra note 195, at 47; Farer & Rowles, The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, in International Human Rights Law and Practice 47, 68
(rev. ed. 1978).
211. See, e.g., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
Ser.LN/II.44, doc. 38 rev. 1, at 1, 41-47 (1978).
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cells where they had been held.212
E. The European Commission on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights2 13 establishes pro-
cedures for the receipt of petitions from States and individuals
concerning the violation of human rights.214 The European Com-
mission on Human Rights is responsible for considering the admis-
sibility and ascertaining the facts underlying the numerous indi-
vidual petitions it receives.2 5 The Commission relies primarily
upon the petition and information supplied by the parties, 21  but
after finding a petition to be admissible, 17 it may undertake its
investigation in any way it deems necessary, such as by hearing
witnesses, examining documents, or visiting any locality.2 8 In any
oral hearing, the Commission may put questions to the parties and
witnesses through its President or his delegate; with the Presi-
dent's leave, Commission members may also question parties and
witnesses directly.21 9 The Commission rules also provide for wit-
ness summonses, oaths, verbatim records of hearings, the appoint-
ment of a rapporteur, the form of the report, voting (including the
expression of separate opinions in the report), and appeals to the
European Court of Human Rights or the Committee of
Ministers.220
Article 28 of the European Convention requires the signatory
212. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador and Observation of the
Government of El Salvador on the Report, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.P, AG/CP/doc.222/79, at
97 (1979).
213. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened
for signature November 4, 1950, 1953 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 71 (Cmd. 8969) (entered into force,
September 3, 1953), reprinted in Council of Europe, European Convention on Human
Rights, Collected Texts 101 (1976) [hereinafter cited as European Convention].
214. European Convention, supra note 213, art. 24 (complaints by States); id. art. 25 (in-
dividual petitions).
215. Id. art. 27; see European Commission on Human Rights, Bringing an Application
Before the European Commission on Human Rights, in 3 Council of Europe, Case-Law Top-
ics 1 (rev. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Bringing an Application].
216. European Convention, supra note 213, art. 28(a); A. Robertson, supra note 96, at 172.
217. Bringing An Application, supra note 215, at 21-33.
218. European Convention, supra note 213, art. 28(a); Bringing an Application, supra note
215, at 33-34; Rules of Procedure of the European Commission on Human Rights, rule 30, in
Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Collected Texts 301, 308 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as European Rules]; Monconduit, La Fonction d'Enqu~te et d'Instruction,
2 Revue des Droits de rHomme 208, 208-214 (1969).
219. European Rules, supra note 218, rules 31, 34.
220. European Rules, supra note 218, rules 30-35, 44-62.
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States to furnish the Commission with "all necessary facilities, af-
ter an exchange of views with the Commission, '22 1 for any inquiry
that might be undertaken. Accordingly, the European countries
which are parties to the Convention have given consent in advance
to any visits that the Commission may require for an investigation,
subject only to a requirement of "an exchange of views," that is,
prior consultation. 22 2 For example, a sub-commission visited Cy-
prus in January of 1958 to investigate an application by Greece
against Britain concerning human rights violations that allegedly
occurred while Cyprus was still a British colony.225 Similarly, a
sub-commission selected to investigate allegations by a German
prisoner of inhuman treatment heard the prisoner's testimony in
Berlin and visited the prison with the full cooperation of the
government.2
F. The Belgrade Rules
Intergovernmental human rights organizations developed and
use the procedural models discussed in the previous sections.
NGOs cannot simply adopt these procedures wholesale because
NGO objectives, structures, and range of fact-finding efforts differ
from those of IGOs. In 1980 the International Law Association met
in Belgrade and adopted by consensus a set of rules ostensibly
designed specifically for NGO use. The rules resulted from a study
of fact-finding by IGOs that revealed "departures from the funda-
mental norms of due process. ' 22 5 The International Law Associa-
tion perceived a need for an expressed standard of fairness "to en-
courage states to cooperate with fact-finding missions and to
contribute to the credibility of the facts found." 2 6
221. European Convention, supra note 213, art. 28(a).
222. See A. Robertson, supra note 96, at 172-73.
223. Id. at 173-74; 1958-1959 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on Human Rights 174-81 (Eur. Comm. on
Human Rights). In 1969 the Sub-Commission investigating the applications of Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands against Greece visited Greece and with the coopera-
tion of the Greek government heard witnesses and inspected detention camps. The Sub-
Commission was denied visitation and inspection rights with respect to other witnesses and
camps. 1 Council of Europe, The Greek Case, pt. 1, at 7-8 (1969).
224. A. Robertson, supra note 96, at 175; see Council of Europe, The Zeidler-Kornmann
Case (1968).
225. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 163. For the substance of this study, see Franck &
Fairley, supra note 70, passim.
226. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 163. In their article Franck and Fairley focus on
credibility as the rationale for stricter fact-finding procedures. Franck & Fairley, supra note
70, at 310.
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The Belgrade Rules cover five areas of concern: (1) terms of ref-
erence, (2) selection of fact-finders, (3) collection of evidence, (4)
the on-site investigation, and (5) the final stage-preliminary find-
ings, the report, and the publication of the report.22 7 The rules ap-
pear mainly concerned with purging fact-finding missions of all
hints of prejudice against the State under investigation. The ad-
versarial model serves as a vehicle for reaching this goal.
The rules require the terms of reference to be objective, consis-
tent with the establishing instrument of the sending organization,
unprejudiced as to the issues to be investigated, and specific as to
the subject of the investigation. 228 Further, "[t]he resolution au-
thorizing the mission should not prejudge the mission's work and
findings. '22
The rules direct NGOs to select fact-finders "who are respected
for their integrity, impartiality, competence and objectivity and
who are serving in their personal capacities. '"2 30 The governments
under investigation should also be "consulted in regard to the com-
position of the mission" whenever possible.3 1 Members of the fact-
finding mission should not be removed or added except in extra-
ordinary circumstances. 2
NGOs must generally adhere to an adversarial model of fact-
finding when collecting evidence under the guidance of the rules.
Fact-finding mission staffs should have access to all the relevant
materials when the mission begins..23  The mission may invite writ-
ten, verifiable statements of fact.34 The State concerned should be
able to comment in writing on all information and statements re-
ceived by the mission.2 3 5 From a list of witnesses submitted by
concerned parties the mission may choose whom it wishes to
227. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 163-65.
228. Id. at 163, rules 1, 3; see Franck & Fairley, supra note 70, at 315-17.
229. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 163, rule 2.
230. Id. at 163, rule 4; see Franck & Fairley, supra note 70, at 313-15.
231. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 163, rule 5. This provision safeguards against the
extreme cases cited by Franck and Fairley where members of the mission were from coun-
tries openly hostile to the investigated State. Franck & Fairley, supra note 70, at 313-14.
Allowing countries to object to the composition of the mission, however, would not serve as
a delaying tactic in many cases.
232. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 163, rule 6.
233. Id. at 164, rule 9. For a general discussion of investigation procedures, see Franck &
Fairley, supra note 70, at 317-21.
234. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 164, rule 11.
235. Id. rule 12.
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hear. ' If a State guarantees nonretaliation against petitioners,
witnesses, and relatives, the mission should allow the State to
question the witnesses or make a record of their testimony availa-
ble to it. 37 Petitioners ought ordinarily to be heard in public ses-
sions where they can be questoned by the concerned State.2 3 8 The
mission may withhold information that may jeopardize the safety
of witnesses or third parties, or may reveal sources. 39
From the evidence collected, the mission determines whether it
needs to conduct an on-site investigation. 4 ° Prior to arrival on-
site, the mission should draw up an agenda of its activities. 241 The
mission may operate as a whole or in smaller groups and should
insist on interviewing all necessary persons whether or not
incarcerated. 42
In the final stage of the fact-finding process, the mission should
submit preliminary findings and supplementary questions to the
concerned State and allow a reasonable time for response.2 43 The
final report, prepared by the chairperson, should either reflect a
consensus or contain majority and minority views. 2" If published,
the report should appear in its entirety.2 45 NGOs should review the
State's compliance with the non-reprisal agreement.248
G. Appropriateness of Existing Fact-Finding Models to the
Work of an NGO
Although NGOs might profit from the study and adoption of
certain of the IGO fact-finding techniques discussed above, it must
be recognized that governments and NGOs often engage in fact-
finding for different reasons. This difference between NGOs and
IGOs might undermine the application of government-created
236. Id. rule 13.
237. Id. rule 16; see Franck & Fairley, supra note 70, at 343 (discussing ILO protections).
238. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 164, rule 14; see Franck & Fairley, supra note 70,
at 335-37 (describing an investigation by the ILO which employed these procedures).
239. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 164, rule 17; see Franck & Fairley, supra note 70,
at 341.
240. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 164, rule 18.
241. Id. at 164-65, rule 19.
242. Id. at 165, rules 20, 21.
243. Id. rule 22.
244. Id. rule 23.
245. Id. rule 24. The credibility of a fact-finding mission can be ruined in the final stage if
reporting is mishandled. Franck & Fairley, supra note 70, at 328-31 (describing the
UNESCO mission to areas under Israeli military occupation).
246. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 165, rule 25.
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rules to nongovernmental fact-finding. NGOs are usually involved
in the investigation of governmental misconduct in the human
rights field. Hence, it would be perverse to permit governments to
establish, even indirectly, the ground rules upon which NGOs may
pursue their fact-finding work. Although the fact-finding rules dis-
cussed herein were not designed to limit NGO efforts, they are
based on the experience of governmental organizations and they
reflect the extreme sensitivity of governments to foreign intru-
sion.24 To the extent that NGOs may seek to obtain governmental
cooperation in their fact-finding and to influence governmental
conduct in the area of human rights, however, these rules may still
be instructive and helpful to NGOs.
Human rights fact-finding procedures used by multilateral inter-
national organizations are more applicable to NGO fact-finding
than is the Hague model of bilateral inquiry.248 The object of in-
quiry for both NGOs and other relevant international organiza-
tions is the human rights situation within one country, rather than
a dispute between two States. Accordingly, the fact-finder's terms
of reference2 49 would not be established by the disputing States,
but would be formulated by the initiating organization.250
A further distinction between IGO and NGO fact-finding con-
247. This sensitivity is reflected in the synopsis of the debate concerning the U.N. Draft
Model Rules of Procedure. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1134, at 5 (1974); Commission on Human
Rights, Report of the Twenty-Seventh Session, 50 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 4) at 53, U.N.
Doc. E/4949 (1971).
248. Fact-finding as a method of implementation of human rights is not, in contem-
porary international law and international relations, a neutral activity based on
the assumptions which were valid for international Commissions of Inquiry in-
stituted under the two Hague Conventions .... The promotion and encourage-
ment of respect for human rights are a basic purpose of the United Nations and
[ILO] .... [The task of ascertaining the facts is certainly one of a (semi-)
judicial character to be performed in an impartial way with a view to disclosing
the concrete and real situation. This, however, does not mean that fact-finding is
a neutral and uncommitted activity. It is rather a function fulfilled in the public
interest and in the light of the purposes and principles of the organisation which
provides the machinery for the investigation.
van Boven, supra note 14, at 106.
249. Terms of reference are the directions which the fact-finding body must follow in its
investigative efforts. Although the body may set forth these instructions for itself, usually
the terms of reference are found in the order authorizing the fact-finding mission. They
generally delineate what the representative of the body is to do or not to do. Terms of
reference are greatly influenced by the intended use of the information by the NGO. See
generally notes 243-46 supra and notes 269-82 infra & accompanying text.
250. Compare Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 76, art. 10 with Draft Model Rules
of Procedure, supra note 124, at 4, rule 3 and Chile Rules, supra note 126, at 94, rule 2.
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cerns the degree of separation between the initiating body and the
commission of inquiry, which is somewhat greater in IGO fact-find-
ing. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the International
Labor Organization, and the European Commission on Human
Rights mount fact-finding bodies which are quite separate from
their respective parent bodies.2 51 NGOs, however, are private insti-
tutions; an NGO mission will often include members of the organi-
zation, 5 2 or even of the NGO secretariat.53 One consequence of
this close connection between the NGO and the commission of in-
quiry is that the commission's purpose and scope are more directly
related to the purposes of the NGO.2" Hence, anyone who evalu-
ates procedures for possible use by an NGO must be mindful of
the "terms of reference" of the NGO itself, as well as the more
formal terms of reference established for an NGO fact-finding mis-
sion. If an NGO fact-finding mission is not given formal terms of
reference, it may instead be guided by the overall objectives of the
sending organization.
Another distinction between IGO and NGO fact-finding con-
cerns the scope of the fact-finding effort. Human rights fact-find-
ing by NGOs is not limited to the establishment of missions of in-
251. Members of IGO commissions usually have much closer ties to their respective coun-
tries than to the international body constituting the commission. For example, the U.N.
Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Occupied Territories consisted of representatives of
U.N. member States. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Af-
fecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, 25 U.N. GAOR
Annex 2 (Agenda Item 101) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/8089 (1970). Even when members serve in an
individual capacity, however, they often are closely connected to the government of their
country. See van Boven, supra note 14, at 99-100. See also Bender, Ad Hoc Committees and
Human Rights Investigations: A Comparative Case Study in the Middle East, 38 Soc. Re-
search 241, 251 (1971).
252. E.g., W. Butler, J. Humphrey, & G. Bisson, supra note 30, at vii-viii (missions under-
taken on behalf of the International Commission of Jurists).
253. See, e.g., AI Mission to Argentina, supra note 68, at 5 (AI International Secretariat
member Patricia Feeney was a member of the mission.); AI Mission to Sri Lanka, supra
note 39, at 9 (AI International Secretariat member Yvonne Terlingen served on the
mission.).
254. The Belgrade Rules state that the terms of reference set forth for a fact-finding mis-
sion "should accord with the instrument establishing the organization." Belgrade Rules,
supra note 69, at 163, rule 1. But see Ermacora, Enquiry Procedures, supra note 14, at 189,
192, 196, 200. Professor Ermacora argues that the purpose of U.N. ad hoc inquiry bodies is
to serve policies of the U.N. and not necessarily to ascertain facts in order to resolve con-
flicts within the concerned State. With this approach he contrasts the International Com-
mission of Jurists' fact-finding commission which was established at the behest of the gov-
ernment of British Guiana. The commission did not serve the ICJ directly, but rather
attempted "to facilitate a solution of differences by elucidating the facts." Id. at 200.
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quiry. For most international human rights NGOs, information
gathering is a continuous process. s55 IGO fact-finding bodies usu-
ally have a shorter term and a less comprehensive information
gathering program. NGO factual studies are undertaken for brief-
ing papers,2  newsletters,257 annual reports, 58 special country re-
ports,25 9 problem monographs,260 testimony in national bodies,61 or
presentations to international organizations. 262 Fact-finding must
also be undertaken in order to launch a letter-writing campaign,263
to adopt a prisoner of conscience,2 6 ' or to send a trial observer.265
Of course, NGO fact-finding often does include full-scale investiga-
255. Most NGOs monitor newspaper reports and maintain files or even libraries of clip-
pings on human rights violations around the world. Groups like the International League for
Human Rights, International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and various
church groups also receive information from local affiliate groups and individual members.
See generally Weissbrodt, International NGOs, supra note 1, at 300.
256. E.g., AI, Amnesty International Briefing: German Democratic Republic (GDR) (Oct.
1977); Al, Amnesty International Briefing: Morocco (Oct. 1977); Al, Amnesty International
Briefing: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (Mar. 1976).
257. E.g., Amnesty International Newsletter; International Commission of Jurists Review;
Human Rights Bulletin.
258. AI, Amnesty International Report 1978 (1979); ICRC, Annual Report 1977 (1978);
International League for Human Rights, Annual Review 1976-1977 (1977).
259. E.g., AI, Indonesia (1977); AI, Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of
China (1978); International Commission of Jurists, Final Report of Mission to Chile, April
1974, to Study the Legal System and the Protection of Human Rights (1974).
260. E.g., AI, Evidence of Torture: Studies by the Amnesty International Danish Medical
Group (1977); International Defence and Aid Fund, South Africa: The Boss Law (1970); J.
Mercer, supra note 24.
261. See House Hearings on International Protection of Human Rights, supra note 1, at 2
(International Commission of Jurists), 252 (Amnesty International), 375 (International
League for Human Rights); Human Rights in Africa: Report by the International Commis-
sion of Jurists: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Move-
ments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., passim (1974) (testi-
mony of Niall MacDermot, Secretary General, International Commission of Jurists); Human
Rights in Uruguay and Paraguay: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Organi-
zations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (Interna-
tional League for Human Rights), 154 (International Commission of Jurists) (1976).
262. See, e.g., U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/NGO/228-258 (1979); Weissbrodt, International NGOs,
supra note 1 at 306-08.
263. A good example is the Amnesty International campaign on El Salvador. Before the
letter-writing started, AI distributed limited circulation background material entitled El
Salvador: Case Studies, July 1976-December 1977 (Jan. 27, 1978). Subsequently, the Octo-
ber-December 1978 campaign was carried out. AI, El Salvador Campaign 1: Campaign Out-
line (July 5, 1978); Al, 1978 El Salvador Campaign: Report and Evaluation (May 14, 1979).
264. See AI, Amnesty International: Handbook for Groups 9 (1977). The Handbook also
contains some guidance for groups engaging in investigation and subsequent adoption of a
prisoner of conscience. Id. at 13, 40-41.
265. Martin-Achard, supra note 31, passim; see note 374 infra.
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tions of a country, with or without on-site inspection. An NGO
may even undertake more traditional international inquiry and act
as a third party fact-finder at the request of consenting State par-
ties, as did the International Commission of Jurists in the British
Guiana case."'
Furthermore, any given fact-finding rule may be appropriate to
some of an NGO's fact-finding efforts but not to others. The activi-
ties of NGOs vary as to the seriousness of their consequences. An
oral request of a government as to the whereabouts of a prisoner
will cause far fewer repercussions than will a press release or a sub-
mission to the U.S. Congress denouncing a State's use of torture.6 7
In the common law system, the distinction between civil and crimi-
nal liability is reflected in the stricter burden of proof and eviden-
tiary standards for criminal cases.26 8 A similar distinction needs to
be made in the application of rules of procedure to NGO fact-find-
ing. When the consequences are serious, an NGO should follow
more closely the quasi-adjudicative procedures that ensure greater
accuracy and respect for findings. For less serious actions, an NGO
may rely on less direct evidence and a less rigorous set of
procedures.
The foregoing discussion has been devoted to a general descrip-
tion of fact-finding procedures developed by a variety of interna-
tional bodies. What follows is a more detailed examination of the
methods used by both NGOs and IGOs to deal with specific issues
arising during the course of a fact-finding mission.
Ill. THE FACT-FINDING PROCESS
Certain questions are faced by every fact-finding body: Who are
to be members? What is its mandate? What sources of information
are to be used? How is reliability of information to be ensured?
Are recommendations to be made? The procedures that NGOs
adopt to deal with these questions affect the weight placed upon
NGO findings by the rest of the world. Thus, it may be useful to
compare how intergovernmental and nongovernmental organiza-
266. See International Commission of Jurists, Report on the British Guiana Commission
of Inquiry 9-10 (1965). See also International Commission of Jurists, Report on the Events
in Panama January 9-12, 1964, at 3 (1964).
267. Compare de Onis, Argentina Beset by Arrest Queries, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1976, at
5, col. 1 with Uruguay's Military Leaders Angry Over Congressional Cutoff on Aid for Arms,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1976, at 13, col. 1.
268. See C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence 364-65, 798-99 (2d ed. 1972).
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tions have decided to conduct each phase of a typical fact-finding
mission. Insight may thereby be gained into the areas in which
NGOs may profit from the experience of IGOs.
A. Composition and Nature of the Fact-Finding Body
1. Terms of Reference
In bilateral and multilateral forms of inquiry, the terms of refer-
ence governing the competence of the commission are established
by negotiation between two or more States.2"" The sovereignty of
the investigated State is encroached upon either by its own agree-
ment or by the authority of a multilateral instrument.27 The au-
thority for NGO fact-finding, however, is usually self-created.
NGOs define the scope of their study and legitimize their efforts
after the fact by the reliability of their findings.27 1
Although the general bounds of NGO fact-finding are self-de-
fined, definite terms of reference are often established for each
mission by the governing board of the organization. The terms may
be very broad, for example, "to visit Paraguay for the purpose of
studying the status of human rights, 27 2 or relatively narrow, as ex-
emplified in the International Commission of Jurists' British Gui-
ana Commission-"to examine the balance between the races in
the Security Forces, the Civil Service,. . . to consider whether ex-
isting procedures relating to selection, appointment, promotion,
dismissal [in the Civil Service] . . encourage or lead to racial dis-
crimination. .. [and] to make such recommendations as are con-
sidered necessary . "... ,273 The scope of NGO scrutiny is some-
269. See T. Bensalah, L'Enqugte Internationale dans Le Reglement des Conflits 53-62
(1976).
270. Although the general authority for an IGO fact-finding body is based in a multilat-
eral agreement, the actual terms of reference of an IGO body are often subject to objection
by the concerned State. See Ermacora, Enquiry Procedures, supra note 14, at 191.
271. See generally Scoble & Wiseberg, supra note 1.
272. See B. Stephansky & R. Alexander, Report of Commission of Enquiry into Human
Rights in Paraguay of the International League for Human Rights 1 (Sept. 1976).
273. International Commission of Jurists, Racial Problems in the Public Service 15
(1965). The terms of reference were not part of the British Guiana ordinance which con-
ferred juridical power on the commission, but were established by the International Com-
mission of Jurists. It was clear, however, that the terms of reference had been accepted by
the British Guiana government. Ermacora, Enquiry Procedures, supra note 14, at 198.
The need for a clear mandate has been illustrated by the lack of such of a mandate in the
case of the Commission of Inquiry on Iran, which was "instructed only to undertake a fact-
finding mission to Teheran to hear Iran's grievances, and to allow an early solution to the
crisis between Iran and the United States." U.N. Press Release IR/2/Rev. 1 (Feb. 25, 1980).
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times limited to the human rights of one group within a nation,7 4
but more commonly will cover the entire country.27 5
Amnesty International (AI), the International Commission of
Jurists (ICJ), and the International League for Human Rights
(League) usually provide within their terms of reference for inves-
tigation into the conditions and basis for detention, the legality of
the procedures for arrest and trial, the truth of allegations of tor-
ture, killings, or other violations of human rights by the govern-
ment, and evidence of encroachments on the freedom of associa-
tion, speech, or the press. 27' The legitimacy of the government
itself is usually considered outside the scope of a mission's
study, although some reports include some historical, political,
economic, and legal background.7 8 In contrast to these three
NGOs, fact-finding by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) is "confined solely to the inspection of material con-
ditions of detention and without regard to the reason of such de-
tention.' 279 The ICRC never proceeds without a formal written
But see W. Shore, supra note 14, at 106 (possible restrictiveness of specific terms of
reference).
274. See, e.g., National Lawyer's Guild, Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied
West Bank and Gaza (1978).
275. See, e.g., Al, Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1977); Russell International War Crimes
Tribunal, Against the Crime of Silence (J. Duffet, ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Against the
Crime of Silence] (the country at issue was Vietnam); Second Russell Tribunal, Repression
in Latin America (W. Jerman trans. & ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Repression in Latin
America] (the Russell Tribunal investigated four countries).
276. See, e.g., AI Mission to Argentina, supra note 68, at 5; AI Mission to Sri Lanka,
supra note 39, at 17; Al, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of
Korea 27 March-9 April 1975, at 15 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Al Mission to Korea];
Bizerta Report, supra note 59, at 3; W. Butler, J. Humphrey & G. Bisson, supra note 30, at
vii; B. Stephansky & D. Helfeld, supra note 30, at 1-2.
277. But see International Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan, 1971, at
46-48 (1972).
278. See Kaufman, supra note 91, at 755; see, e.g., W. Butler, J. Humphrey & G. Bisson,
supra note 30, at 1-9; W. Butler & G. Levasseur, Human Rights and the Legal System in
Iran (1976); B. Stephansky & R. Alexander, supra note 272, at 1-21.
279. Bissell, The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Protection of Human
Rights, 1 Revue des Droits de 'Homme 255, 271 (1968) (quoting International Committee of
the Red Cross, Annual Report 1958, at 29 (1958)); see J. Freymond, Guerres, Revolutions,
Croix-Rouge 129-36 (1976). The ICRC does, however, occasionally "structure their overtures
to the government according to the reasons for detention. For example, where a detainee is
an administrative detainee, held without indictment or prospect of trial, the ICRC tends to
urge that conditions of detention should be as good as economics and security will allow." D.
Forsythe, supra note 20, at 68. The ICRC has also engaged in trial observation and in lim-
ited legal assistance to persons under the laws of armed conflict. Id. at 70.
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agreement with the "detaining government," 280 wherein the scope
of fact-finding activity is mutually agreed upon by the detaining
State and the ICRC. sl
Terms of reference serve several useful purposes and should be
used by NGOs. First, written terms of reference may induce gov-
ernments to cooperate and may be subject to negotiation with the
governments. Although most NGO missions are not established by
formal agreement between the NGO and the State, there is often
some contact with the government prior to the establishment of a
mission.282 Second, formal terms of reference act as a fact-finding
commission's letter of introduction to the government. This is
helpful not only for on-site missions, but also for commissions
making contact through the mail or with embassies and consulates.
This function of terms of reference was explicitly recognized by
Amnesty International in its instruction to the Sri Lanka mission
"to re-establish a dialogue between AI and the government of Sri
Lanka. 283 Third, terms of reference serve as an aid to commission
members in resolving disputes over the scope of a commission's ac-
tivities. Although NGO missions are not as large or diverse in their
composition as IGO commissions, individuals of differing back-
grounds and views do work together on NGO missions.284
The factors discussed above tend to call for narrowly stated
terms of reference. However, as with the formulation of other pro-
280. See D. Forsythe, supra note 20, at 57-86.
281. Id.; see, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of Hellas and the
International Committee of the Red Cross, reprinted in id. at 268-70, app. D (written agree-
ment entered into in 1969). See also note 379 infra.
282. See, e.g., AI, Islamic Republic of Pakistan 5 (1977) (Before the mission, Al's Secre-
tary General and a member of the mission met with the Attorney General of Pakistan.); AI,
The Republic of Nicaragua 5 (1977) (Before departure, the mission sent a telegram to Presi-
dent Somoza.). In contrast, the National Lawyers Guild recently sent an undercover fact-
finding mission to Guatemala without informing the government because of concern for the
lives of potential witnesses. Also, it is the practice of the International Commission of Ju-
rists merely to send a telegram or letter to the Minister of Justice of the concerned govern-
ment, informing him of the forthcoming arrival of an ICJ trial observer and requesting ap-
propriate facilities. See International Commission of Jurists, Guidelines for ICJ Observers to
Trials 1-2 (1978). In addition, the ICJ prefers to send observers who do not require visas. Id.
Most major ICJ fact-finding missions, however, have enjoyed the consent of the government.
283. Al Mission to Sri Lanka, supra note 39, at 17.
284. See, e.g., AI, Islamic Republic of Pakistan 5 (1977) (The mission was composed of a
Turkish lawyer and a Dutch lawyer.); AI Mission to Korea, supra note 276, at 15 (The mis-
sion consisted of a Danish surgeon and an English barrister.); AI, Report of an Amnesty
International Mission to Spain 3 (1975) (An American attorney and a professor of philoso-
phy from the Federal Republic of Germany were the delegates.).
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cedures, there is a danger in making the terms too specific. Narrow
terms of reference may hamper a mission's operation or, if the mis-
sion exceeds its terms, give the government a pretext for attacking
its findings.8 5
2. Members
Like IGOs, NGOs face the problem of finding qualified and im-
partial mission members286 who can add the weight of personal
prestige to their findings. The bulk of NGO fact-finding is done by
permanent employees of NGO Secretariats and by distinguished
individuals who participate at the request of the NGO. No NGO or
group of NGOs has established a panel of experts for inquiry mis-
sions such as has been recommended for the U.N. 87 and estab-
lished by the ILO. ss Such a panel is not really necessary nor is it
particularly feasible.289
There is no simple method for ensuring the expertise of the
members of a mission. Since service on missions is voluntary and
can involve some hardship, members characteristically have a
strong interest in and are very knowledgeable about human
rights.290 NGOs that regularly engage in fact-finding make use of
285. The Belgrade Rules of the International Law Association usefully suggest this bal-
ance by proposing that the terms of reference should not "unduly restrict the mission," but
"should be so specific as to indicate the nature of the subject to be investigated." Belgrade
Rules, supra note 69, at 163, rule 3. U.N. inquiry commissions are routinely attacked by
concerned governments for exceeding their power under the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., Report
of the Economic and Social Council, Protection of human rights in Chile, U.N. Doc. A/33/
331, at Annex LXXXII (1978); cf. Bos, The International Law Commission's Draft Conven-
tion on Arbitral Procedure in the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1956 Nederlands
Tijdschrift Voor Internationaal Recht 234, 237-42 (discussion of curtailment of parties' au-
tonomy in arbitral proceedings by restrictive terms of arbitration).
286. Cf. Kaufman, supra note 91, at 756-58 (difficulty of assembling impartial group by
the U.N.).
287. See N. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 14, at 296-312; Leurdijk, supra note 92, at 158-61;
Note, supra note 95, at 175-83. Although the General Assembly requested the Secretary-
General to prepare a register of experts in 1967, Question of Methods of Fact-Finding, G.A.
Res. 2329, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 84, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968), no experts have
been named or used.
288. E. Landy, supra note 140, at 19-23. Recommendations for fact-finding panels have
taken various forms. See, e.g., C. Schurman, A Center for International Fact Finding: A
Review and a Proposal 26-28 (1963).
289. But see Rodley, supra note 1, at 147-50, suggesting an NGO worldwide human rights
monitoring institution which would be distinct from other NGOs and would not be involved
in publicity and lobbying activities.
290. See, e.g., W. Butler, J. Humphrey & G. Bisson, supra note 30, at viii (Professor John
P. Humphrey was a member of the mission.). Mission members are exposed to some per-
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the previous fact-finding experience of individuals. Nearly every
NGO mission has had at least one lawyer or law professor; 91 ju-
rists serve on missions in numbers not justified by any need for
legal expertise. Given the amount of evidence concerning physical
abuse, AI has recognized that a mission can be assisted in its fact-
finding by a doctor and thus has included physicians on several
missions. 92 AI missions also usually include a member of the Sec-
retariat who is familiar with the country under investigation. 93
Some NGO missions have included foreign scholars who possess
expertise on the country studied.94
In addition to the expertise needed to facilitate fact-finding, an-
other factor considered by NGOs in selecting commission members
is the prestige associated with the names of experts in various
fields. Commission members have included noted legal authori-
ties,29 5 philosophers, 28 authors2 97 a U.S. Congressman 2 9s a former
U.S. Ambassador, 9 church officials,300 a member of the Supreme
sonal risk. See C. Jenks, International Immunities 144-45 (1961); R. Rodgers, Facilitation
Problems of International Associations 69-81 (1960); Sandifer, supra note 196, at 131-32.
291. See, e.g., Bizerta Report, supra note 59, at 3.
292. See, e.g., AI, Evidence of Torture: Studies by the Amnesty International Danish
Medical Group 7-8 (1977); AI, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Israel and the
Syrian Arab Republic to Investigate Allegations of Ill Treatment and Torture 3 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as AI Israel-Syria Report] (A Dutch physician was a member of the mis-
sion.); AI Mission to Korea, supra note 276, at 15 (A Danish surgeon went on the mission to
Korea.).
293. For example, Michael McClintock, a researcher in the Latin American Department
of the International Secretariat of Amnesty International, served on the mission to Nicara-
gua. See AI, The Republic of Nicaragua 5 (1977).
294. For example, Professor Thomas Anderson, a noted North American scholar on El
Salvador, was a member of a church-sponsored fact-finding mission to that country. Unita-
rian Universalist Service Committee, Human Rights in El Salvador-1978: Report of Find-
ings of an Investigatory Mission i (1978) [hereinafter cited as Human Rights in El
Salvador].
295. See, e.g., International Commission of Jurists, Report on the Activities of the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists 1971-1977, at 31-35 (1977).
296. See, e.g., Al, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Spain 3 (1975) (mission
included Dr. Burkhard Wisser, a German professor of philosophy).
297. For example, Bertrand Russell, Jean-Paul Sartre, James Baldwin, Peter Weiss, Si-
mone de Beauvior, and Sara Lindman served on the Russell International War Crimes Tri-
bunal. Against the Crime of Silence, supra note 275, at 17.
298. See, e.g., Al Mission to Argentina, supra note 68, at 5; Human Rights in El Salvador,
supra note 294, at 1 (Congressman Robert Drinan was a member of both missions.).
299. See, e.g., B. Stephansky & R. Alexander, supra note 272, at i (Dr. Ben Stephansky is
a former U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia.).
300. See, e.g., AI, Amnesty International Report 1978, at 278 (1979) (The Reverend Paul
Oestriecher of Great Britian was a member of a mission to the Federal Republic of
Germany.).
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Court of Ireland,301 and a member of the U.N. Human Rights
Commission.0 2 Personal prestige is more important for ad hoc
commissions of inquiry than for permanent NGOs that have estab-
lished their own respectability.
Governmental representatives rarely serve on NGO commissions.
Unlike some IGOs, in which members of fact-finding commissions
have acted as though they were representing their governments
rather than the organizations that sent them,303 NGOs have not
generally had a problem with de facto State representation.30
Even though NGO commissions are ordinarily not politicized, their
impartiality is influenced by the nationality and political beliefs of
their members.3 05 AI, ICJ and League missions are usually made
301. See, e.g., International Commission of Jurists, Report on the Activities of the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists 1971-1977, at 35 (1977) (Mr. Justice Seamus Henchy of the
Supreme Court of Ireland was an ICJ observer of the trial of Bishop Donal Lamont in
Umtali, Rhodesia.).
302. See, e.g., International Commission of Jurists, Racial Problems in the Public Service:
Report of the British Guiana Commission of Inquiry 9 (1965); Bizerta Report, supra note 59,
at 3 (Professor Felix Ermacora was a member of both ICJ commissions.).
303. See W. Shore, supra note 14, at 107-10; Kaufman, supra note 91, at 752-54.
304. See Cohn, International Fact-Finding Processes and the Rule of Law, Int'l Comm'n
Jurists Rev., June 1977, at 40, 43; T. Franck, The Structure of Impartiality 253-55 (1968). It
is, perhaps, a questionable practice to use an official of one government to examine or inves-
tigate another government, because bilateral government relations may affect the necessary
appearance of impartiality. See, e.g., Human Rights in El Salvador, supra note 294 (Con-
gressman Robert Drinan was a member of this investigatory mission.).
Before the International Commission of Jurists sent a mission to South Korea, the mis-
sion was briefed by the U.S. State Department and by the National Council of Churches in
New York. See A. DeWind & J. Woodhouse, Prosecution of Defence Lawyers in South Ko-
rea 4 (1979). The mission also met with the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea when they
visited that country. There is some question whether such briefings by another government
might in some cases identify the mission with the briefing country and thus prejudice the
conduct and, perhaps, the result of the mission. Such did not appear, however, to be the
case in the ICJ's South Korean mission, but NGOs ought to be conscious of the risks inher-
ent in such governmental briefings.
305. See Note, supra note 95, at 164-65; see, e.g., Report on the Mission to Viet Nam of
the Delegation of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, U.N. Doc. A/34/559,
at 2 (1979) (The impartiality of this IADL mission must be somewhat suspect since one of
the participating members, Hope Stevens, also served as counsel in the People's Revolution-
ary Tribunal of Pnom Penh.).
Because the fact-finding tribunal possesses tremendous discretion as to the evidence
sought, how the evidence is weighed, and even what law should be applied, the fact-finders
must possess great integrity, impartiality, and independence. Cf. Damaska, Structures of
Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 Yale L.J. 480, 525 (1974) (similarity of
duties of fact-finding tribunals and duties of trial judges in Europe).
The Belgrade Rules sensibly recommend that the fact-finders be persons "respected for
their integrity, impartiality, competence and objectivity and who are serving in their per-
sonal capacities." Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 163, rule 4. But these Rules also recom-
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up of members from several countries and rarely include a national
of the country visited.306 Almost all ICRC representatives are
Swiss. 30 7 The membership of an NGO commission will often reflect
its political orientation. Members of ICRC,30 AI, the League, and
ICJ missions are drawn predominantly from industrialized West-
ern nations, whereas members of commissions of the International
Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) and the World Peace
Council come from socialist organizations and socialist-aligned
countries.309 Very few commission members are drawn from Third
World States, although AI has sent several Third World observers
to missions in the United States.310 The difficulty of establishing
the impartiality of a commission based in an industrialized nation
was demonstrated by the denial to ICRC of access to North Viet-
nam during the U.S. military involvement there, and by African
suspicions concerning ICRC intervention in Nigeria's civil war.8u
NGO fact-finding missions are usually composed of from one to
mend that the States concerned be consulted about the fact-finders. Id. rule 5. Such consul-
tation is occasionally undertaken for major U.N. fact-finding efforts, but is very rare for
NGOs. Although consultation as to mission membership would in theory facilitate the mis-
sion's entry into the subject country, such consultation may give an appearance of bias in
favor of the government, may be inappropriate for an NGO striving to maintain an identity
as independent of all governments, and may provide the government with an opportunity to
attack or resist the mission. A rule requiring consultation would be unwise, because such
consultation, if sought at all, is ordinarily undertaken informally and with considerable dis-
cretion. Governments should not expect to be consulted formally on mission membership.
The Belgrade Rules also recommend that a member, chairperson, or rapporteur of a fact-
finding mission not ordinarily be removed before competion of the mission's work. Id. at
163-64, rules 6 & 7. Such a rule appears sensible, but addresses an issue which has not been
a problem for NGOs. Politicized IGOs may have this problem.
306. See AI, Amnesty International Report 1978, at 278-79 (1979); AI, Amnesty Interna-
tional Report 1977, at 318-20 (1977); International Commission of Jurists, supra note 295, at
31-38. But see D. Weissbrodt, Memorandum to International Executive Committee of Am-
nesty International concerning Mission to Florida (June 18, 1979) (copy on file with the
authors).
307. D. Forsythe, supra note 20, at 206.
308. In regard to the ICRC, see id. at 206-14.
309. As a result of this East-West split, NGO commissions have sometimes been used for
political purposes. See Ermacora, Enquiry Procedures, supra note 14, at 203.
310. See, e.g., AI, Amnesty International Report 1978, at 139 (1979) (In January 1978, two
Zambian lawyers were sent to observe the trial of Leonard Peltier in Wisconsin.); AI, Am-
nesty International Report 1977, at 163, 320 (1977) (Shamsul Bari, an attorney from Ban-
gladesh, was sent to North Dakota to observe another Peltier trial.).
311. See T. Hentsch, Face au blocus, Le Croix-Rouge Internationale dans le Nig6ria en
Guerre (1973); Scoble & Wiseberg, supra note 1, at 630-31; Comment, The Geneva Conven-
tion and Africa, 7 E. Afr. L.J. 275, 283-89 (1971). But see D. Forsythe, supra note 20, at 48-
49 (acceptance of ICRC more widespread among third world nations such as Nigeria, Ban-
gladesh and Indochina than among socialist states).
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three individuals who visit the country concerned. 12 NGO mis-
sions are smaller and less representative than are IGO commis-
sions313 because of restrictions imposed by limited financial
means. 14 NGOs that undertake fact-finding on an ad hoc basis
without making on-site visits tend to have larger commissions with
less of an emphasis on the impartiality of members.3 13
3. Financial Considerations
The source of funds for NGO fact-finding can taint the imparti-
ality of an inquiry mission. The ICJ relies principally upon grants
from foundations and from twenty countries, including several
Third World nations.3 16 The Al Secretariat had a budget of
915,377 pounds sterling for the 1978 fiscal year ending on April 30,
1978317 most of which was raised through dues and contributions
from members.3 8s AI does not accept money from governments.
The ICRO budgeted 49,597,000 Swiss francs for 1978.319 Fifty per-
312. See, e.g., AI, The Republic of Nicaragua 5 (1977); W. Butler, J. Humphrey & G.
Bisson, supra note 30, at vii-viii; B. Stephansky & D. Helfeld, supra note 30, at i.
313. For example, U.N. fact-finding missions usually have five or six members. See, e.g.,
Report of the Economic and Social Council, Protection of human rights in Chile, U.N. Doc.
A/33/331 (1978); Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on the Investigation
Requested in Resolution 21 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1020 at 4-5 (1970). The European Commission of Human Rights had 15 members
when it investigated the Greek Case. See 1 Council of Europe, supra note 223, pt. 1, at 2.
314. See notes 316-26 infra & accompanying text.
315. The Russell Tribunals on Vietnam and Latin America each had more than 20 mem-
bers. The investigation of American war crimes in Vietnam included four Americans, the
Chairperson of the Cuban Committee for Solidarity with Vietnam, as well as a number of
outspoken authors and scholars. The Second Russell Tribunal, which received evidence on
right-wing Latin American dictatorships, was composed pimarily of individuals with a left-
of-center political affiliation. See Repression in Latin America, supra note 275, at 162-63;
Against the Crime of Silence, supra note 275, at 17. See also Cassese, Progressive Trans-
national Promotion of Human Rights, in Human Rights: Thirty Years After the Universal
Declaration 249, 254-58 (B. Ramcharan ed. 1979).
The Chicago Commission of Inquiry into the human rights situation in Chile was com-
posed of 12 Chicagoans. See Chicago Commission of Inquiry into the Status of Human
Rights in Chile 1 (1974) (This group included the father of a person killed while in military
custody at the National Stadium in Santiago.); Comment, Human Rights, Chile, and Inter-
national Organizations, 24 De Paul L. Rev. 999, 1004-06 (1975). A Commission of Enquiry
on mercenaries in Angola consisted of 42 members from 36 countries. See L. Hinds and H.
Stevens, International Commission of Enquiry on Mercenaries 15 (1976).
316. See International Commission of Jurists, Objectives, Organization, Activities 5
(1972); Note, supra note 1, at 477.
317. AI, Amnesty International Report 1978, at 283 (1979).
318. See id. at 288-89, 291.
319. International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1978, at 68 (1978).
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cent of ICRC's permanent budget comes from the Swiss govern-
ment, ten percent from the U.S. government, with the remainder
coming from other governments and national Red Cross socie-
ties.320 The League operates on a budget of $75,000 to $100,000, its
resources drawn from membership contributions, affiliated organi-
zations, foundations, and special fund raising events .32  Like AI,
the League does not accept funds from governments.22
Because most NGOs lack funds in their regular budgets suffi-
cient to mount fact-finding missions, specific fund raising efforts
are often undertaken for each mission. 28 To the extent that fund
raising is undertaken on a mission-by-mission basis, the source of
funds may give rise to an appearance of bias on the part of the
mission. For example, if an NGO during the late 1960's had under-
taken to send a mission to investigate torture under the Greek Col-
onels, the mission might have relied upon Greek expatriate groups
and individuals for some or all of its support. Indeed, without such
interested supporters, it is likely that the NGO would not have
been able to mount the mission at all. If the source of funds for the
mission had become known, however, the results might very well
have been suspect. Nevertheless, this problem may be more a ques-
tion of appearances than reality. The members of fact-finding mis-
sions are rarely aware of the source of the funding for their mis-
sion. Furthermore, mission members are ordinarily of such
unimpeachable integrity and independence that the source of their
funds would have no effect on their conclusions, even if the send-
ing NGO had a bias it wished to pursue.
Financial considerations do, however, loom large in the decisions
as to which fact-finding missions will be undertaken. 24 Some
NGOs seek funds from disinterested sources, such as other human
rights organizations, religious bodies, and special United Nations
funds. Al has attempted to solve the problem of how missions will
be funded by establishing a separate account for all special
projects, including missions, conferences, and translations.' 5 AI
320. See D. Forsythe, supra note 20, at 216-18.
321. Wiseberg & Scoble, The International League, supra note 23, at 296 n.15.
322. Id. at 295; Note, supra note 1, at 480.
323 See, e.g., Basso, Inaugural Discourse, in Repression in Latin America, supra note 275,
at 9; Note, supra note 1, at 296 n.15.
324. Cassese, supra note 1, at 257; Weissbrodt, International NGOs, supra note 1, at 300-
01.
325. See AI, Amnesty International Report 1978, at 286-87, 294-95 (1979).
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has been successful in raising money for such accounts without ty-
ing the contributions to any particular mission.
In any case, missions are expensive and the availability of funds
may affect the quality of a mission's findings and will determine
how long a mission will last, how many members the mission can
include, how many transcripts can be read, and how many records
copied . 2e Financial considerations thus dictate that investigative
efforts be carefully selected in terms of need and importance.
B. Methods of Inquiry
1. Background Fact-Finding by Secretariats
As previously discussed, the bulk of NGO fact-finding is per-
formed by the national and international offices of the organiza-
tions. There are no limitations on the types of information gath-
ered. At their international centers, NGOs collect information
about human rights problems from newspapers, magazines, profes-
sional journals, U.N. publications, government reports, letters, tel-
egrams, phone calls, and visits.32 7 Sources of information include
church officials, 28 relatives of prisoners, 29 former prisoners or ref-
ugees,3s 0 missionaries,33 1 labor unions,3 2 opposition groups,33 ex-
326. Air fares alone often run into thousands of dollars. Members of NGO missions are
rarely paid, but the'sponsoring organization pays the cost of the mission's living expenses.
Evidently disregarding the financial stringencies under which NGOs work, and relying upon
the experience of the more wealthy IGOs, the Belgrade Rules naively propose: "Fact finding
missions should operate with staff sufficient to permit the independent collection of data
and should be assisted by such independent experts as the mission may deem necessary."
Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 164, rule 10. Most NGO missions have no separate staff
and rely entirely upon the efforts of the mission members.
327. AI, Amnesty International Handbook 7, 13 (1977); Weissbrodt, International NGOs,
supra note 1, at 300. The Prisoner of Conscience Library at the Al Secretariat in London
catalogues every week approximately 1,000 newspaper and magazine articles from 5 conti-
nents. See, e.g., Argentina Admits It Holds Missing Rights Leader, Wash. Post, Sept. 22,
1977, § A, at 24, col. 1; Velasco, Dissolution of Chile's Police Agency- A Farce, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 7, 1977, at 37, col. 1; Ex-Minneapolis Woman Jailed in Argentina, Minn. Trib., May
18, 1976, § A, at 8, col. 3.
328. See, e.g., Argentina Cracks Down on Jehovah's Witnesses, Wash. Post, Nov. 25, 1978,
§ A, at 22, col. 5; Chile Under Mounting Pressure From Church on Human Rights, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 16, 1978, § A, at 4, col. 3; Pope Calls for 'Explanation' of Priests' Deaths in
Argentina, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1976, § A, at 10, col. 1; 7 Catholic Bishops Say San Salva-
dor Persecutes Church, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1977, at 7, col. 1.
329. Amnesty International has developed a form by which relatives of prisoners may
inform the AI Research Department about the prisoner. Al USA, Addendum to the Am-
nesty International Handbook 20 (1978); see note 27 supra.
330. See note 28 supra.
1981]
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:1
patriate groups,33 concerned public officials, 35 lawyers, 38 journal-
ists,3 37  and other NGOs. Church-sponsored human rights
organizations often obtain a wealth of information through a web
of personal contacts created by their missionary organizations.8
Older organizations have clippings files and dossiers on human
rights violations dating back ten or twenty years.339 AI has the
331. See, e.g., AI, The Republic of Nicaragua 27-28 (1977); American is Abducted in
Argentina, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1976, § A, at 3.
332. See, e.g., Wave of Murders Shatters Leftist Opposition in Guatemala, Wash. Post,
April 13, 1979, § A, at 10, col. 1; Peruvians Swing Away From Left, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24,
1976, § A, at 1, col. 2.
333. See note 28 supra.
334. For example, the Committee for Human Rights in Rumania is primarily an expatri-
ate group. The Committee has worked together with the International Human Rights Law
Group to protest discrimination against the Hungarian ethnic minority in Rumania. See
International Human Rights Law Group, Petition to the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights and Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities: Human Rights Violations in the Socialist Republic of Rumania (June 27, 1979)
(copy on file with the authors).
Similarly, a group of Soviet citizens joined together to promote the implementation of the
1975 Helsinki Accords. See 6 Basket Three: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Hear-
ing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
117-18 (1978); Leary, Helsinki Final Act, supra note 1, at 121-24.
335. See, e.g., House Hearings on International Protection of Human Rights, supra note
1, at 533, 541-42 (testimony of Prof. Newman, who headed an AI mission to Chile and ob-
tained information from Indian and Swedish diplomats in Santiago); A Challenge Shapes
Up for Pinochet, Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1978, at 6, col. 1; Amin's Ex-Aide:
Quitting Means Death, Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1977, § A, at 16, col. 2; Argentina Beset by
Arrest Queries, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1976, § A, at 5, col. 1; Chilean Charges General Or-
dered American's Death, Wash. Post, June 10, 1976, § A, at 21, col. 4; Chilean Officials Say
Police Had Part in 'Disappearances,' Wash. Post, May 25, 1977, § A, at 31, col. 1.
336. See, e.g., AI, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Spain 3 (1975); Argen-
tine Lawyers Finding Peril in Leftist Causes, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1977, at 3, col. 4.
337. See, e.g., Russell, Argentina: Living with Ghosts, Newsweek, July 20, 1981, at 38-40
(Former newspaper publisher Jacobo Timmerman has published numerous works regarding
human rights violations by the Argentine government.).
338. See Note, supra note 1, at 488 (Church groups have over 12,000 missionaries in Latin
America.).
339. Weissbrodt, International NGOs, supra note 1, at 300. AI representatives have
briefly described the organization's fact-finding methods:
We would also like to indicate some of the factors which may influence human
rights reporting.
The first requirement of any human rights assessment is precise, factual infor-
mation on specific violations. AI's Research Department, which is based in
London, consists of 60 professional and secretarial staff; the researchers are ap-
pointed for their knowledge of a particular country or region, linguistic skills,
and the ability to arrive at objective judgments on the basis of material gathered
from a wide variety of public and private sources, few of whom will be entirely
disinterested. AI's research is set within the narrow focus of the organization's
mandate. It identifies individual prisoners of conscience, obtains and assesses
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largest research capability of any NGO, having over 150 persons at
its international Secretariat in London, in addition to personnel at
national section offices. Both AI and the ICJ obtain reports from
lawyers and use on-the-scene observers to verify the information
received by staff. NGOs receive information in a much less struc-
tured fashion than do IGOs. ECOSOC, 4 ° ILO,3 1 UNESCO,34 2 the
reports of torture on an individual as well as a systemic basis, it examines politi-
cal and legal systems as they affect political imprisonment, prepares country re-
ports both for publication and for submission to the United Nations human
rights machinery; the researchers organize missions to particular countries and
design public and diplomatic initiatives for the release of prisoners, the abolition
of the death penalty and the reform of legal procedures and prison conditions.
Sources of information will vary from country to country; they will normally
include such public material as press reports, texts of laws and decrees, UN and
other international organization reports, and unpublished testimony from rela-
tives of victims, former prisoners, lawyers, opposition groups, church people,
journalists, and academics.
Compared with other research areas, the collection of information on human
rights violations encounters particular difficulties. Research will inevitably focus
on the point of conflict between a government and its critics, both of whom have
an interest in presenting their own point of view. The bias of a political move-
ment is usually obvious, but that of a government is equally dangerous. To a far
greater degree than in other areas, governments are not objective sources for
information on domestic human rights questions. Indeed, in most instances
where political prisoners are detained, the provision of data about their identity
and treatment will seem to run directly counter to the national interest. The
natural tendency of any government is to discourage information which would
harm its reputation. Indeed, since the passage of legislation linking the receipt of
U.S. aid to human rights observance, a bad reputation in this area can cause the
loss of economic or military assistance.
Information on human rights violations must therefore be sought in other
ways. It is our experience that a number of factors will influence the process of
information collection for a particular country. Where all are absent, as in Ethio-
pia or Guinea, it will be extremely difficult to establish the existence and extent
of violations with any precision.
Human Rights in Africa: Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Africa and on International
Organizations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25, 34 (1979)
(statement of V. McGee and S. Grant). The most significant factors listed were the follow-
ing: (1) whether there exists a popular awareness of the existence of human rights and a
belief that basic rights should not be violated; (2) whether an individual human rights vic-
tim can be confident that the reporting of a violation will not itself lead to further reprisals,
for example, under laws which forbid human rights reporting; (3) whether there exists a
strong, independent judiciary; (4) whether there exist local human rights organizations to
which violations can be reported; (5) whether the press can report freely on human rights
matters; (6) whether the common language is one easily understood by foreigners; (7)
whether there exists a strong refugee or expatriate community. Id. at 34-35.
340. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 16, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (Annex), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, 51,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
341. See notes 137-92 supra & accompanying text.
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U.N. Human Rights Committee, 43 and the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights 44 are authorized to receive government reports
containing human rights information. These reports, obviously, are
of limited value. Individual complaints are accepted by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights with a minimum of re-
strictions, 45 and by UNESCO,3 46 by the European Commission,347
the ILO,34 8 and other U.N. bodies to a limited extent. 49 The Euro-
pean Commission and the United Nations also accept NGO reports
and complaints to some extent,3 50 whereas such reports are re-
ceived without limitation by the Inter-American Commission.3 51
The ILO receives information from individuals, labor unions, and
other NGOs. 52 All IGOs have provisions for requesting informa-
342. J. Carey, supra note 95, at 129-30.
343. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 40, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (Annex), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1967) (entered into force March 23, 1976).
344. E.S.C. Res. 1074C, 39 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 24, 25, U.N. Doc. E/4117 (1965).
This reporting system was slightly amended by E.S.C. Res. 1230, 42 U.N. ESCOR Supp.
(No. 1) at 12, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967). See also J. Carey, supra note 95, at 128.
345. See notes 193-212 supra & accompanying text.
346. See Study of the Procedures Which Should Be Followed in the Examination of Cases
and Questions Which Might Be Submitted to UNESCO Concerning the Exercise of Human
Rights in the Spheres of its Competence, in Order to Make Its Action More Effective, 102
UNESCO Executive Board, UNESCO Doc. 102 EX/19, at 61-65 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
UNESCO Study]. See also Marks, UNESCO and Human Rights: The Implementation of
Rights Relating to Education, Science, Culture, and Communication, 13 Tex. Int'l L.J. 35,
60-62 (1977).
347. See notes 213-24 supra & accompanying text concerning the European Convention.
348. See notes 137-92 supra & accompanying text concerning the ILO.
349. See E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1A) at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add. 1
(1970); E.S.C. Res. 1296, 44 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 22, 24, U.N. Doc. E/4548 (1968);
E.S.C. Res. 1235, 42 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 17, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967); E.S.C. Res.
728F, 28 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 19, U.N. Doc. E/3290 (1959). See generally Weiss-
brodt, International NGOs, supra note 1, at 312 n.87; Cassese, The Admissibility of Commu-
nications to the United Nations on Human Rights Violations, 5 Revue de Droits de
L'Homme 375, 377-78 (1972); Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms in any Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Depen-
dent Countries and Territories, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1317 (1979); see also Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 1-5, G.A. Res. 2200 (Annex),
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Optional Protocol].
350. Carey, Human Rights Procedures, supra note 95, at 314 n.115; see Weissbrodt, Inter-
national NGOs, supra note 1, at 315 n.101. See also note 346 supra.
351. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.17, doc. 26, arts. 37, 53 (1967). See also T. Buergenthal & J. Torney, Interna-
tional Human Rights and International Education 73-75 (1976); notes 193-212 supra & ac-
companying text concerning the Inter-American Commission.
352. See J. Carey, supra note 95, at 132-33. See also E. Landy, supra note 140, at 182-91;
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tion from accused governments at preliminary stages. 53
NGOs would not benefit in any way from the adoption of IGO-
type restrictions on the initial sources of their information. Indeed,
one of the great strengths of NGOs is their ability to obtain news
about human rights violations quickly through their informal in-
formation networks. NGOs serve not only as passive recipients of
complaints and information, but also actively monitor the obser-
vance of human rights in various parts of the world. 4 Limitations
on the sources of information they could use would only hamper
NGOs in serving as human rights catalysts.
2. Sources of Information for Inquiry Missions
In contrast to background fact-finding by Secretariats, IGOs and
NGOs use similar procedures for fact-finding by missions of in-
quiry. Both NGO and IGO commissions take an active role in
gathering the evidence required to fulfill their terms of reference.
For example, the first action of the U.N. Ad Hoc Working Group
of Experts on South Africa was to ask all U.N. member States for
information, particularly the names of possible witnesses, and to
issue a communique through the U.N. Office of Public Information
inviting contact from "all the persons who believe that they could
provide specific and relevant information on this matter, in partic-
ular those who have been 'imprisoned or detained for opposing or
violating the policies of apartheid.' ,,.35 In its third inquiry into
South Africa, the Ad Hoc Group of Experts in 1969 solicited names
of witnesses and information not only from member States and the
notes 137-92 supra & accompanying text concerning the ILO.
353. See E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1A) at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add. 1
(1970); UNESCO Study, supra note 346, at 63-64 (1977); Optional Protocol, supra note 349,
art. 4; Marks, supra note 346, at 61; Wiebringhaus, Jurisprudence et Procedure du Comit6
des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe en Vertue du Premier Paragraphe de l'Article 32 de la
Convention Europ6ene des Droits de L'Homme, in M6langes offerts i Poly Modinos 454,
474-75 (1968). See also notes 137-92 supra & accompanying text (approach of the ILO);
notes 193-212 supra & accompanying text (approach of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights).
354. See, e.g., Scoble & Wiseberg, Amnesty International: Evaluating Effectiveness in the
Human Rights Arena, Intellect, Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 79, 81-82; Weissbrodt, International
NGOs, supra note 1, at 300; Note, supra note 1, at 488. The Belgrade Rules support the view
that at the initial stage of a mission's inquiry, "all material relevant to the purpose of the
mission should be made available to it." Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 164, rule 9.
355. Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts set up under Resolution 2(XXIII)
of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/950 (1967); J. Carey, supra note 95,
at 100.
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general public, but from the Organization of African Unity and
various private organizations, including some African liberation
movements.358
The European Commission on Human Rights takes a less ac-
tivist approach. For the most part it relies on witnesses and evi-
dence presented to it by the applicant and the investigated govern-
ment. 57 It retains, however, as does the International Court of
Justice,5 8 the right to call witnesses and gather other evidence on
its own."' The European Commission has also engaged in a few
on-the-spot investigatory visits.360
Almost all NGOs follow the practice of actively seeking informa-
tion. Since there are no "parties" to NGO investigations, the com-
missions make use of information gathered by their Secretariats 61
and by persons who come forward with evidence on their own initi-
ative or in response to publicity about the inquiry.3 62 The commis-
sions also direct specific requests for information to the concerned
government, s63 church groups, 6 4 political parties,3 65 and national
356. Allegations Regarding Infringements of Trade Union Rights, U.N. Doc. E/4646, at 13
(1969); Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Including
Policies of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/984, at 7 (1969); J. Carey, supra note
95, at 114.
357. For example, in the "Greek Case," a list of witnesses was submitted by the Greek
government and the Applicant States (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands).
The Sub-Commission summoned 30 of these witnesses to its hearings. 1 Council of Europe,
supra note 223, pt. 1, at 51 (list of witnesses proposed but not called).
358. See Rules of the International Court of Justice, art. 59, reprinted in I.C.J. Acts and
Documents, No. 3, at 93, 127 (1977). See also Alford, Fact-Finding by the World Court, 4
Viii. L. Rev. 37, 67-74, 85-86 (1958); Foster, Fact Finding and the World Court, 7 Can. Y.B.
Int'l L. 150, 171-81 (1969).
359. European Rules, supra note 218, rules 54, 64.
360. See notes 218-42 supra & accompanying text.
361. See, e.g., AI, Indonesia 144-46 (1977); AL, Islamic Republic of Pakistan 11-12 (1977);
AI, The Republic of Nicaragua 5 (1977); International Commission of Jurists, The Events in
East Pakistan, 1971, at 5-6 (1972) [hereinafter cited as East Pakistan].
362. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Law and Its Enforcement: Chile: Hearings Before the
Subcomms. on Inter-American Affairs and International Organizations and Movements of
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1974) (response of Chile's
U.N. representative to inquiries by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights).
363. See, e.g., AI, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Spain 4 (1975); AI Mis-
sion to Sri Lanka, supra note 39, at 17; B. Stephansky & D. Helfeld, supra note 30, at 2-6.
364. AI, Chile 5, 46 (1974); International Commission of Jurists, Racial Discrimination
and Repression in Southern Rhodesia i, 60 (1976); Human Rights in El Salvador, supra note
294, at 14-16.
365. See, e.g., AI Mission to Korea, supra note 276, at 28-29; Al, The Republic of Nicara-
gua 31 (1977); B. Stephansky & D. Helfeld, supra note 30, at 6.
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humanitarian organizations. 6
A complete picture of a human rights situation is very difficult
to achieve since it depends largely on the initiative of persons who
have enough interest and courage to come forward. Since those
concerned with human rights violations are most often victims or
members of political parties and other organizations opposed to
certain governments,67 it is necessary to have procedures in accor-
dance with which the evidence presented is subjected to careful
scrutiny and to encourage as complete a presentation of the con-
cerned government's case as possible.
Rule 17 of the U.N. Draft Model Rules explicitly provides for
full cooperation with the concerned State. 8 It requires that the ad
hoc body request from the concerned State a list of witnesses and
experts it wishes the body to hear. The rule also allows the State to
make statements to the body, submit written materials, and re-
spond to written or oral evidence. 69 Although NGOs have not ex-
plicitly adopted such procedures, they, for the most part, actively
solicit governmental cooperation.3 70 Governments are approached
concerning the establishment of an inquiry commission, they are
regularly asked to submit documents and names of witnesses, and
are invited to comment on information received by the commis-
sions.3 71 NGOs have not been totally without success in achieving a
degree of cooperation with concerned governments.7 2
366. See, e.g., International Commission of Jurists, Racial Discrimination and Repression
in Southern Rhodesia 47 (1976); B. Stephansky & D. Helfeld, supra note 30, at 4-6.
367. See, e.g., AI, Chile 16 (1974); AI, Indonesia 20-30 (1977).
368. See Draft Model Rule of Procedure, supra note 124, at 9-10.
369. Id. at 10, rule 17(e); cf., Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 164, rule 12 (providing the
State concerned an opportunity to comment in writing on evidence obtained independently
by the fact-finding mission or submitted in writing by a petititioner).
370. See, e.g., AI, Islamic Republic of Pakistan 5 (1977); Torture in Brazil, supra note 27,
at 2; East Pakistan, supra note 361, at 5.
371. See, e.g., AI Mission to the Philippines, supra note 29, at 11, 65-84; B. Stephansky &
D. Helfeld, supra note 30, at 5-6. See also Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts
on Violations of Human Rights in Southern Africa, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1311 at 4 (1979).
372. See, e.g., AI Mission to Sri Lanka, supra note 39, at 17; R. Goldman & D. Jacoby,
Report of the Commission of Enquiry to Mexico 1-5 (Dec. 1978) (report submitted to the
International League for Human Rights, the F~d6ration International des Droits de
l'Homme, and Pax Romana) [hereinafter cited as Pax Romana Mission]; cf. Bissel, The
International Committee of the Red Cross and the Protection of Human Rights, 1 Revue
des Droits de l'Homme 255, 272-74 (1968). But see AI Mission to Argentina, supra note 68,
at 5-6 (The mission received some cooperation from the Argentine government, but progress
was hampered by government policemen, who, while purporting to protect mission mem-
bers, intimidated and detained witnesses.).
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a. On-Site Observation
There are several kinds of NGO on-site missions, including dip-
lomatic contacts,3 7 3 trial observations,3 7 4 after-the-fact investiga-
tions,3 7 5 fact-finding in the context of on-going human rights viola-
tions,7 I and mixtures of these sorts of efforts.3 Missions may
enjoy varying degrees of cooperation from governments, may pre-
sent distinct investigative problems, and may thus require differ-
ent fact-finding procedures. On-site visits both provide useful in-
formation and lend credibility to the conclusions of fact-finding
missions. Occasionally, they afford some temporary relief in indi-
vidual cases through the mere presence of outside observers. On-
the-spot investigations can also provide the sort of fresh informa-
tion that may be necessary for prompt remedial action.
The International Committee of the Red Cross is one of the
most active NGOs engaged in on-site fact-finding. With a staff of
about 700 around the world,~ s ICRC delegates have visited hun-
dreds of places of detention in the last 30 years. 79 Among the con-
373. See, e.g., AI, Amnesty International Mission to Rhodesia January 1980, at 1, 2, 7-8
(1980); AI, Amnesty International Report 1979, at 136-40 (1979) (Al delegation to
Romania).
374. See, e.g., AI, Countries in Which Facilities Have Been Given to Amnesty Interna-
tional Delegates to Attend Trials or Interview Prisoners, 1963-1969 (1969) (unpublished
memo on file with the authors); International Commission of Jurists, 1971-1977, at 31-35
(1977) (unpublished memo on file with the authors); F~d~ration Internationale des Droits de
l'Homme, Mission d'Observation Judiciaires et d'Enqu~tes sur les Droits de l'Homme (un-
dated) (copy on file with the authors); J. Julien, Observateurs: Etude des Rapports (1979)
(unpublished memo on file with the authors); note 265 supra & accompanying text.
375.,See, e.g., AI Israel-Syria Report, supra note 292; International Commission of Ju-
rists, South African Incident: The Ganyile Case 1962 (1962).
376. See, e.g., AI Mission to Argentina, supra note 68, at 48; AI Mission to Sri Lanka,
supra note 39, at 5; Pax Romana Mission, supra note 372, at 1; B. Stephansky & R. Alexan-
der, supra note 272, at 1; B. Stephansky & D. Helfeld, supra note 30, at 1.
377. See, e.g., Al, Islamic Republic of Pakistan 5-6 (1977). If an NGO undertakes an on-
site mission, it should describe its activities. A detailed account of a mission's activities may
be found in Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Guam, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.109/L.1345, at 34-41 (1979). See also U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/L.1326 (1979); U.N. Doc. A/
AC.109/582 (1979).
378. International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1978, at 67 (1979).
379. The ICRC carried out 93 prison visits during the period from 1952 to 1961, 66 of
which involved political detainees or victims of internal conflicts. From 1962 to 1971 ICRC
delegates made 169 prison visits of which 132 involved victims of political or internal strife.
G. Utler, International Committee of the Red Cross: A Study in Conflict Management 336-
37 (1974). See generally Berlins, Neutral Eye Kept on Detainees, The Times (London), May
8, 1978, at 12; Rollow, The International Red Cross Quietly Aids Political Prisoners, Wash.
Post, May 13, 1978, § A, at 14; see also Comit6 International de la Croix-Rouge, Model
Memorandum (unpublished I.C.R.C. Doc. DO-1327, Annex III, undated) (copy on file with
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ditions for ICRC on-site visitation are: (1) access to all places of
detention, (2) freedom to speak privately with any detainees, (3)
the government's provision of ICRC with a list of detainees before
the visit, (4) authorization to repeat visits as needed, and (5) au-
thorization to distribute material assistance to needy detainees.""s
Nevertheless, the ICRC has carried out a few visits even when gov-
ernments have not acceded to all of these conditions."8 '
Despite the emphasis in this and other discussions of NGOs on
on-site investigations, most human rights fact-finding is done with-
out such visits.382 Fact-finding missions are too expensive to be
used very widely and may require at least the acquiescence, if not
the assistance, of the government subject to scrutiny. Such cooper-
ation is not always forthcoming.8 " Because of these difficulties, the
great bulk of human rights fact-finding by both IGOs and NGOs is
accomplished without on-site visits.
It should not be presumed, however, that on-site visits are al-
ways necessary for effective fact-finding. First-hand evidence is
frequently available outside the country being investigated; refu-
gees may provide their testimony; legal documents are usually
available; complaints are often smuggled out of the subject coun-
try; the government may be asked to respond to accusations in
writing or through diplomats; the long-distance telephone is a very
effective investigative tool; and testimony may be taken from other
the authors) [hereinafter cited as ICRC Model Memorandum].
Delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross normally begin their inquiry
by talking with the Superintendent of the prison facility. They next visit the prison facility
and then interview the prisoners. Finally, they undertake further discussions with the Su-
perintendent with a view to continuing visits so as to monitor progress.
380. See D. Forsythe, supra note 20, at 268-70; note 379 supra.
381. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Press Release No. 1303 (Sept. 19,
1977).
382. See generally Al, Amnesty International Report 1978, at 29-31 (1979). Over 230
pages in this Annual Report are devoted to country-by-country analyses, most of which were
prepared without the aid of an on-site visit; only two or three pages list the Al missions.
383. See Torture in Brazil, supra note 27, at 3 (Brazil has consistently refused requests by
AI and the OAS for permission to send fact-finding missions.); AI, Amnesty International
Report 1977, at 72-73 (1977) (Ghana refused permission for Al observer to attend trial.). See
generally Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Second Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Chile, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.37, doc. 19 corr. 1, at 4-8 (1976); J.
Carey, supra note 95, at 122-23 (1970); Bos, supra note 285, at 237-42; Norris, supra note 14,
at 9-10 (draft) (Haiti refused to grant consent for the Commission to visit.); Shefi, The
Protection of Human Rights in Areas Administered by Israel: United Nations Findings and
Reality, 1973 Israel Y.B. on Human Rights 337, 338-40; see also Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group of Experts on Violations of Human Rights in Southern Africa, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1311 at 4 (1979).
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visitors to the country." 4 While these fact-finding approaches may
not all be as reliable as direct observation, human rights organiza-
tions can and do achieve reliable results without on-site visits.3 85
An example of such a fact-finding effort may be found in the AI
Report on Brazil.3 80
Furthermore, on-site investigation may actually be less reliable
than other methods of inquiry in some cases. Governments often
shift prisoners, cordon off potential witnesses, prevent access to
prisons, and otherwise prevent missions from access to accurate in-
formation during the necessarily short period of their visits. 8
Governments cannot as easily control the availability of informa-
tion when the fact-finders are gathering evidence over a long pe-
riod outside the subject territories. Visits by organizations have
also tempted governments to exploit NGO involvement in human
rights cases. On several occasions, governments have tried to make
the presence of the ICRC within their countries appear as an ex-
pression of approval of governmental activity.38 8 This problem has
384. See, e.g., International Commission of Jurists, Uganda & Human Rights 5-6, 105-08
(1977); East Pakistan, supra note 361, at 5-6; Al, Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR:
Their Treatment and Conditons 14 (1975).
385. See note 384 supra.
386. See Torture in Brazil, supra note 27.
387. AI, Chile 19-23 (1974); see, e.g., de Onis, Human Rights Group Opens Inquiry in
Argentina, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1979, § A, at 3, cols. 1-3; note 436 infra. Although the ICRC
demands access to all places of detention, ICRC Model Memorandum, supra note 379, it
sometimes settles for less. See D. Forsythe, supra note 20, at 65; note 381 supra. Compare
AI, Indonesia 71-75 (1977) (describes steps taken by the Indonesian Government to transfer
prisoners before an ICRC visit) and Indonesia, Int'l Comm'n Jurists Rev., June 1977, at 3-5
with Visits to Places of Detention in Indonesia, ICRC Bull., Aug. 1, 1979, at 4.
The ICRC insists upon regular visits to prisons in order to deter such evasive conduct.
See, e.g., Comit6 International de la Croix-Rouge, Rapport de Synthise Faisant Suite I la
Troisi~me S~rie de Visite des D6lagu~s du Comit6 International de la Croix-Rouge A 2041
D~tenus de S~curite, dont 118 Femmes, dans 20 Prisons Iraniennes (Oct. 17, 1978).
388. The ICRC was attacked for political bias after the South Vietnamese government
restricted access to places of detention and selectively published portions of ICRC reports.
See Rodley, supra note 1, at 145. See also D. Forsythe, supra note 20, at 84 (Greek official
claimed ICRC had helped public image of junta.). For a general discussion of the problems
raised by the partial disclosure of ICRC reports, see notes 499-502 infra & accompanying
text. Since some government officials view the mere undertaking of ICRC visits as a guaran-
tee of decent detention conditions and are alarmed only when the ICRC decides against
visitation, a failure to publish the actual findings of the ICRC often may serve to support
the investigated government's claims of good conduct. See D. Forsythe, supra note 20, at
225; The International Committee of the Red Cross and Torture, Int'l Rev. Red Cross,
Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 2, 5 [hereinafter cited as ICRC and Torture]. See generally J. Becket,
Barbarism in Greece xii, 102 (1970).
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led to attacks on the ICRC3 89
b. Oral Evidence
All fact-finding missions rely on both oral and written evidence.
Oral testimony is the backbone of both inquiry and adjudication.
It has traditionally been considered of utmost reliability because it
allows a finder of fact to listen to and immediately question a wit-
ness, and to evaluate demeanor and credibility.3 90
A major consideration facing fact-finding bodies is the manner in
which to receive oral testimony. There are advantages and disad-
vantages to having such testimony taken before the entire body.
Under the U.N. Draft Model Rules 91 and European Commission
on Human Rights rules,39 2 commission meetings at which evidence
is received are governed by quorum requirements. Nevertheless,
rule 23 of the U.N. Draft Model Rules and , article 51 of the Euro-
pean Commission Rules of Procedure permit testimony to be taken
by one or more designated members.39 3 This exception to the quo-
rum rule allows oral testimony to be reduced to a written deposi-
tion or permits a summary form for the majority of commission in
the interests of time and expense. 94
Quorum strictures pose problems for financially-limited NGO
missions consisting of only two or three persons. In the face of a
large number of tasks to be completed in a short time, the pressure
toward achieving "a more complete picture" is very strong. Thus,
it may be impractical to require that oral testimony be heard by
the entire mission. It may also be necessary for only one member
to hear testimony if the witness refuses to talk to anyone else,3 95 or
389. See J. Becket, supra note 388, at 102 (1970); Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group
of Experts Set Up Under Resolution 2 (XXII) of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/950 at 39(1967); Defense and Aid Prisons, supra note 21, at 1-5.
390. See J. Ralston, The Law and Procedure of International Tribunals 216-17 (1926). Cf.
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (The jury may "judge by his demeanor
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether [the witness] is
worthy of belief.").
391. See Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 6, rule 8.
392. European Rules, supra note 218, rule 25.
393. See Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 12; European Rules, supra
note 218. The Belgrade Rules recognize that missions may be more effective when operating
in groups smaller than the whole mission membership. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at
165, rule 20.
394. See Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 12, rule 23.
395. For instance, the President of El Salvador would meet only with Congressman
Drinan and not with the other two members of the Unitarian Universalist Service Commit-
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if witnesses are available only in a distant country. Most NGOs
cannot afford the globe-trotting example (New York, London, Ge-
neva, Conakry, Kinshasa, Brazzaville, Lusaka and Dar es Salaam)
of the U.N. Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Southern Af-
rica.39 Nevertheless, it should remain the goal of inquiry missions
to receive and weigh oral testimony as a body in order to add
credence to group conclusions.
There are various procedures governing the conduct of witnesses
and commission members during the giving of testimony. In IGO
fact-finding, an oath or affirmation is usually required,39 7 and the
witness establishes his or her credentials.398 The U.N. Draft Model
Rules call for the mission's terms of reference to be explained and
for preliminary questions to be put to the witness.39 9 The witness
is allowed to make a statement before submitting to questioning at
the direction of the Chair.4 0 0 The witness may be excluded from
the proceedings after giving testimony.40 1 The Hague Convention
of 1907 provides several other helpful rules. Under the Convention,
the witness is not allowed to read a statement or answer from a
written draft in presenting evidence, except to consult notes and
documents. 02 Also, the witness is asked to sign the transcript of
his or her testimony.0 8
It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which such procedures
are followed by NGO fact-finding commissions since details of
NGO procedure are not spelled out either in reports or in organiza-
tion handbooks. A standard procedure should be adopted by each
NGO, but NGOs can be expected to be somewhat more informal
than IGO commissions. Since written statements can be considered
at leisure, adoption of the Hague rule regarding the use of written
statements' 0' would allow a fact-finding commission to devote the
short time alloted for oral testimony to the questioning of
tee mission to El Salvador. Human Rights in El Salvador, supra note 294, at 23-24.
396. See generally Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Violations of
Human Rights in South Africa, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1311, at 3-6 (1979).
397. See Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 78, at 11, rule 22(a); European
Rules, supra note 218, at 80, rule 55. But see notes 193-212 supra & accompanying text
concerning the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
398. See Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 11, rule 22(b).
399. Id.
400. Id. rule 22(c).
401. Id. rule 23(d).
402. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 76, art. 27.
403. Id. art. 28.
404. Id. art. 19.
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witnesses.
A difficult problem for all human rights investigation is provid-
ing protection for persons who come forward and give oral testi-
mony, especially in hearings within the country under investiga-
tion. In some instances, the public nature of hearings renders futile
any attempt to preserve the anonymity of witnesses or the confi-
dentiality of testimony. Both NGO and IGO fact-finding missions
have routinely found it necessary, however, to receive testimony
privately and for witnesses to remain anonymous.0 5 While these
measures have helped, they have not prevented governments from
surrounding commissions' temporary headquarters,0 6 arresting
prospective witnesses, 407 roughing up people as they enter or leave
the site of a commission,'0 8 and detaining, torturing, or killing wit-
nesses after their testimony.409 NGOs are helpless in the face of
such tactics except to complain publicly' 10 or to cancel hearings in
the event that witnesses are subjected to danger. In such situations
it may be better to rely on written testimony or to interview wit-
nesses only outside the country.
Another approach to the problem of witness protection is re-
flected in the Belgrade Rules, which would require that an NGO
receive from a government assurances of non-retaliation before a
fact-finding mission could proceed.41 1 Unfortunately, NGOs have
experienced great difficulty in obtaining and enforcing assurances
405. In the Northern Ireland case, the European Commission on Human Rights held
closed hearings at an airfield in Norway where anonymous witnesses testified while hiding
behind screens. A. Robertson, supra note 96, at 179. Similarly, the ICRC almost always
insists on private interviews during prison visits. See D. Forsythe, supra note 20, at 65;
ICRC Model Memorandum, supra note 379. Israel agreed in 1977 to allow ICRC physicians
to conduct medical examinations without witnesses whenever the ICRC feels it is necessary.
See U.S. Dep't of State, Report on Human Rights Practices in Countries Receiving U.S.
Aid: Report Submitted to the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 565 (1979).
406. See, e.g., AI Mission to Argentina, supra note 68, at 6.
407. Id.; AI Mission to Korea, supra note 276, at 44 (Certain Korean ex-National Assem-
blymen were placed under house arrest before they could meet with mission members.).
408. See, e.g., AI Mission to Korea, supra note 276, at 44-45 (Brian Wrobel, a mission
member, was forcibly restrained from entering the Supreme Court Building in Seoul.). See
also note 286 supra.
409. See, e.g., AI Mission to Argentina, supra note 68, at 6 (Two witnesses were detained
and others were threatened; the mission was accompanied by 16 armed men.); AI Mission to
Korea, supra note 276, at 44-45 (Many students were detained and transported out of Seoul
to prevent communiction with the mission.); AI, Political Imprisonment in Spain (1973).
410. AI Mission to Argentina, supra note 68, at 5-6 (1977); Amnesty Charges Harassment,
Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1980, § A, at 16.
411. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 164, rule 15.
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that governments will not retaliate. To require such assurances as
a condition precedent to NGO fact-finding would make it ex-
tremely difficult to establish a fact-finding mission. Governments
would simply refuse to make promises concerning non-retaliation.
Even were such promises made, an NGO has no guarantee that
they will be fulfilled. Thus, there appears to be no reason for an
NGO to adopt the approach to witness protection taken by the
Belgrade Rules.
c. Written and Documentary Evidence
Much of the written and documentary evidence used by fact-
finding commissions is compiled and analyzed by Secretariat mem-
bers. Legislation, court opinions, ordinances, regulations, press re-
leases, government reports, newspapers, reports by other NGOs,
letters, affidavits, depositions, pictures, and lists of names are gath-
ered.412 Ideally, writings, documents, and photographs used as evi-
dence in reaching conclusions should be signed or otherwse au-
thenticated. Such a procedure was effectively followed by Al in a
report on Brazil based solely on depositions signed and dated by
the deponent in the presence of two witnesses. 418 Most NGOs fail
to impose similar requirements of authentication.1 4
C. Admission of Evidence
International fact-finding bodies and arbitral tribunals have tra-
ditionally avoided the sort of restrictions on the admissibility of
evidence that are recognized by common law courts.415 Similarly,
412. See, e.g., AI, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Federation of Ma-
laysia 62-67 (1979); Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report of the Mission of
Lawyers to Argentina, April 1-7, 1979, at 2, 7-9, 20, 22-24 (1979); International Commission
of Jurists, Uganda & Human Rights 105-08 (1977); East Pakistan, supra note 361; W. Shore,
supra note 14, at 124-25.
413. Torture in Brazil, supra note 27, at 26.
414. The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs principally used notarized
written statements and oral testimony in preparing its report on Nicaragua. Commission of
the Churches on International Affairs, Human Rights Violations in Nicaragua, reprinted in
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/426, at 31 (1979). The U.N. Ad Hoc Working Group on South
Africa was criticized for using unauthenticated documents. See Kaufman, supra note 91, at
762.
415. See generally D. Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals 1-29, 176-96,
366-69, (rev. ed. 1975). "The restrictions upon admissibility of evidence sometimes encoun-
tered in municipal procedure (and connected with the system of jury trial) have no place in
international adjudication, where the relevance of facts and the value of evidence. . . are
left to the entire appreciation of the Court." S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the Inter-
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international NGOs have adopted a very broad approach to admis-
sibility in human rights fact-finding. Rules for the exclusion of evi-
dence are ordinarily designed to narrow the issues for considera-
tion by juries.4 16 Since NGO fact-finding commissions are selected
for their legal and factual expertise 4 17 jury-oriented evidentiary
rules are not necessary. 418 Exclusionary rules are sometimes also
needed to discourage misconduct in gathering evidence, particu,
larly in criminal trials.419 This is rarely a problem for NGO fact-
finding bodies.420 Courts also use exclusionary rules to promote the
reliability and integrity of the fact-finding process. 421 Instead of re-
stricting admissibility, IGOs and NGOs engaged in human rights
fact-finding have been disposed to consider all available evidence
but to weigh the evidence very carefully.422
There are other factors indicating that a broad evidentiary ap-
proach is appropriate for NGOs. Since there are no "parties" to
present opposing perspectives to an NGO fact-finding commission,
the commission must actively pursue its own evidentiary leads
without exclusionary limits. 423 Further, in regard to some typical
subjects of investigation, such as allegations of torture and mis-
treatment, it is difficult for NGO fact-finding bodies to find wit-
nesses able to give direct testimony which might be regularly ad-
national Court 557 (1965); see, e.g., Bizerta Report, supra note 59, passim.
416. See 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 28, 29a (3d ed. 1940); D. Sandifer, supra note 415, at
176-78.
417. See notes 286-315 supra & accompanying text.
418. See D. Sandifer, supra note 415, at 12, 176-78; 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 152-53 (3d
ed. 1940). See also Luneburg & Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury
Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modem Civil Litigation, 67 Va.
L. Rev. 887 (1981).
419. See C. McCormick, supra note 268, at §§ 164-65; see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 657-60 (1961) (Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments will be excluded from state courts.); Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 100 (1957)
(Evidence obtained by state or federal agents in violation of the Federal Communications
Act is inadmissible in federal court.).
420. The International Court of Justice accepts evidence regardless of how it was ob-
tained by the party introducing it. See Alford, supra note 358, at 80-81.
421. See generally C. McCormick, supra note 268, at §§ 164-66. The problem of whether
evidence is inadmissible by reason of the means of its procurement was evidently posed to
the Commission of Inquiry on Iran when it was presented with evidence seized in the U.S.
Embassy and with the possibility of hearing testimony from U.S. diplomatic hostages. Cf.
U.N. Press Release IR/1l (Mar. 3, 1980) (The U.N. Commission of Inquiry in Tehran ac-
cepted information released by the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs.).
422. See J. Carey, supra note 95, at 100-04; D. Sandifer, supra note 415, at 20, 180.
423. See, e.g., AI Mission to Agentina, supra note 68, at 26 (All statements could not be
corroborated.); B. Stephansky & R. Alexander, supra note 272, at 16, 25.
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missible in a domestic court.424 Acts of torture and mistreatment
by members of the police or armed services are often performed
without any witnesses willing to testify and sometimes without the
knowledge of higher authorities.425 Victims may justifiably fear
government reprisal against themselves or their families for testify-
ing.426 Accordingly, NGO fact-finders often need to rely upon hear-
say statements, documents which are not fully authenticated, and
justifiable inferences from indirect evidence. Such a broad ap-
proach to admissibility must, however, be accompanied by great
care in assessing the veracity and reliability of the admissible
evidence.
D. Ensuring the Reliability of Evidence
The broad approach to admissibility necessitates the use of pro-
cedures to ensure the reliability of the factual conclusions drawn
by the fact-finding body from the evidence gathered. Such meth-
ods for achieving reliability include both procedures for the taking
of evidence and considerations used in weighing the evidence.
1. Procedures for the Taking of Evidence
a. Testimony Under Oath or Affirmation
The U.N. Draft Model Rules427 and the rules for the U.N. Ad
Hoc Working Group on Chile provide that all nongovernmental
witnesses shall be sworn before testifying.428 Although U.N. and
nongovernmental bodies lack contempt and perjury prosecution
power, it is believed that the taking of an oath at least impresses
upon witnesses the seriousness of oral testimony.4 9 Government
424. See, e.g., 2 Council of Europe, supra note 223, pt. 1, at 12-17 (Commission discussed
the difficulty of obtaining direct evidence.).
425. Torture usually takes place during interrogation. Human rights fact-finding mis-
sions, if allowed in at all, are permitted by States to visit places of detention, not interroga-
tion centers. Two States which make partial exceptions to this policy are Israel and Greece.
Israel has allowed the ICRC to visit detainees, outside the presence of Israeli observers,
during the period of their detention and interrogation. See U.S. Dep't of State, Report on
Human Rights Practices in Countries Receiving U.S. Aid 565 (1979). See also ICRC and
Torture, supra note 388.
426. Franck & Cherkis, supra note 62, at 1504; see notes 405-09 supra & accompanying
text.
427. Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 11, rule 22(a).
428. Chile Rules, supra note 126, at 98, rule 15.
429. See D. Sandifer, supra note 415 at 300-02; 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1816-17
(Chadbourn rev. 1976); Kaufman, supra note 91, at 755.
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witnesses are not sworn apparently because some are of the view
that government witnesses are expected to tell the truth and be-
cause others view government representatives as advocates who are
not expected to be impartial, even under oath.
NGO fact-finding commissions rarely take sworn testimony from
those whom they interview and generally do not attempt to
reproduce the style of court proceedings. 43 0 The formality of oath-
taking might have a chilling effect on human rights victims and
other potential informants, who fear reprisal and often demand
that their testimony not be attributed.43 1 NGO fact-finding com-
missions thus generally rely upon polite probing, questioning, and
cross-checking to assure the reliability of oral testimony.
b. Careful Questioning of Witnesses
The Hague rules permit governments under investigation to put
questions to witnesses at hearings by submitting inquiries through
the chairperson of the fact-finding body.43 2 The U.N. Draft Model
Rules43 2 and the European Commission rules 434 permit government
counsel to question witnesses directly, although such direct exami-
430. See, e.g., International Commission of Jurists, Report of the British Guiana Commis-
sion of Inquiry 16 (1965); Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 164 (Rules 13-18 concern the
testimony of witnesses but contain no oath requirements.).
431. James Becket's account of the first AL mission to Greece in 1967 describes the prob-
lem with taking oaths, cross-examination, and other standard legal requirements:
In our search for information about prisoners, we began to hear tales of torture,
but they were always secondhand-that is hearsay. It was only after ten days
that a victim finally dared to speak to us, and only after the rendevous had been
carefully arranged in a safe place. She was a young woman .... For someone
who has been tortured, the only fate worse than death is the prospect of being
tortured again, and that is exactly what those who were released were threatened
with if they ever said a word to anyone about their experiences. We had hoped,
rather naively, that torture victims would sign an affidavit to be kept with a
reliable person abroad who could swear it was signed. But one look into this
woman's eyes and any legalistic demands on her suffering were out of the ques-
tion. She spoke only on the condition that we not know her name. She was as
many others would be: her hands shook, she chainsmoked and she started at
each sound from outside the room. At times in her story she broke .down
completely.
J. Becket, supra note 388, at x-xi.
432. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 76, art. 26.
433. Rule 17(e) permits "states directly concerned by the subject of the study or investi-
gation . . . [to] address written or oral evidence" and "in accordance with procedures
adopted by the ad hoc body [to] put questions to witnesses at hearings ...... Draft Model
Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 10.
434. European Rules, supra note 218, rule 56(1).
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nation rarely occurs in practice. 3 5 In human rights inquiries, vic-
tims are not formal parties represented by counsel, so that adver-
sarial cross-examination only by government counsel would
present the problem of an unbalanced elicitation of evidence. Fur-
ther, witnesses may well be intimated by government questioning.
In addition, direct participation by the government in the ques-
tioning of witnesses may create an appearance of cooperation be-
tween the government and the fact-finding body, which neither
may desire.4 6 Accordingly, for reasons of apparent impartiality,
fairness, and effectiveness, the fact-finding body ordinarily controls
the questioning of witnesses.3 7
Since the State cannot ordinarily be represented in the examina-
tion of witnesses for fear of discouraging testimony, it has been
suggested that some member of the fact-finding body examine wit-
nesses from the government's point of view.4 38 Careful questioning
by a designated commission member would serve to highlight
weaknesses of a witness's testimony. Assigning a member to such a
"devil's advocate" role can be done more easily by intergovernmen-
tal fact-finding groups, since they have larger commissions and
435. See D. Sandifer, supra note 415, at 303, 305.
436. For example, in May 1979 the U.S. Department of State sent a six-member "study
team" to Haiti. The study team attempted to determine the situation of the 600 Haitians
who had been returned to Haiti after a stay in the U.S. The team enjoyed considerable
cooperation from the Haitian government, although it wisely chose not to be accompanied
by Haitian government officials. Nevertheless, the team was able to see only 12% of the
returnees. Because the study team was sent by the U.S. government and because all mem-
bers of the study team were U.S. Government employees, it is quite possible that returnees
were reluctant to talk candidly or at all with the study team. If the study team had enjoyed
a different sponsorship or membership, the results of the study might have been different.
R. Maxim, et. al., State Department Study Team on Haitian Returnees (1979) (unpublished
memorandum on file with the authors); see Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp.
442, 486-88 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (discussing the study team and its methodology for collecting
data on human rights violations).
437. See D. Sandifer, supra note 415, at 306. NGOs obviously lack the subpoena power
and the ability to punish perjury, but IGO fact-finders also generally lack these powers and
have not been substantially inhibited in their fact-finding work. See Foster, supra note 358,
at 171-73. See also Rogge, Inquisitions by Officials: A Study of Due Process Requirements in
Administrative Investigations, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 939, 988-94 (1963); Note, Constitutional
Rights and Administrative Investigations: Suggested Limitations on the Inquisitorial Powers
of the Federal Agencies, 58 Geo. L.J. 345, 346 (1969).
438. See J. Carey, supra note 95, at 109-10, 120-22; Kaufman, supra note 91, at 762-63.
Cross-examination was used by the U.N. Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary.
Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
18), U.N. Doc. A/3592 (1957); see Kaufman, supra note 91, at 752. But see Belgrade Rules,
supra note 69, at 164, rule 14 (providing the concerned State with an opportunity to ques-
tion the petitioners in public session).
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staff.' NGOs have a problem in that missions often consist of
only one or two persons. 44 0 Even when there are three people on a
mission, they often separate to interview witnesses. The time and
resources of mission members are usually too limited to permit the
appointment of a "devil's advocate." Furthermore, there is a seri-
ous question whether a member of a fact-finding body can truly
play a "devil's advocate" role-either for the human rights victims
or for the government-without upsetting the Commission's ap-
pearance of impartiality, without frightening witnesses, and unless
he is able actually to be briefed by his "client." In contrast, the
U.N. Human Rights Committee and the U.N. Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination have demonstrated a capac-
ity for well prepared, insistent, and effective questioning of wit-
nesses without specific designation of individual members as
devil's advocates. 441
Intergovernmental fact-finding proceedings are generally far
more formal than similar efforts by NGOs, whose inquiries resem-
ble interviews more than adjudicative hearings.442 In some ways,
NGO fact-finders conduct themselves like juges d'instruction in a
civil law country.44 3 The NGO questioner need not demonstrate
facts to some independent body, such as a judge or jury, but both
poses the inquiries and analyzes the responses.444 Hence, the inter-
viewer can get meaningful information through polite, and some-
times indirect questioning. Mildly suggestive or leading questions
are used by IGOs to elicit information from witnesses44 5 and could
439. The staff of U.N. Commissions have varied, but have been as large as fifty persons.
See W. Shore, supra note 14, at 126.
440. See notes 312-14 supra & accompanying text.
441. See Buergenthal, Implementing the U.N. Racial Convention, 12 Tex. Int'l L.J. 187,
189, 218-19 (1977); Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants,
63 Minn. L. Rev. 35, 40 n.48, 44 n.67 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Weissbrodt, U.S.
Ratification].
442. See AI Israel-Syria Report, supra note 292, at 8.
443. See generally Foster, supra note 358, at 189; Kaufman, supra note 91, at 759-60. But
see Franck & Fairley, supra note 70, at 310.
444. Cf. Rosett, Trial and Discretion in Dutch Criminal Justice 19 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 353,
367-68, 371-72 (1972) (illuminates breadth of judicial discretion in Dutch trial procedure).
But see Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial"
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 Yale L.J. 240, 247-48 (1977); cf. Langbein & Wein-
reb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 Yale L.J. 1549, 1551 (1978)
(rebuts Goldstein and Marcus' criticism of the European inquisitorial model).
445. See, e.g., Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts Set Up Under Resolution
2 (XXIII) of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/950, at para. 170 (1967).
For criticism of the use of leading questions by inquiry commissions, see J. Carey, supra
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be employed by NGOs. Nevertheless, on some occasions, such as
examination of governmental representatives, NGO fact-finders
have needed to use more forceful questioning."' 6
Of course, the value of questioning witnesses has its limits. As
stated by the AI Mission to Israel and Syria:
Sharp examination.., was avoided for various reasons,
the main one being that many of the former prisoners of
war had been through traumatic experiences, including
severe interrogations, and it would not have been very
reasonable for an Anmesty International Commission to
conduct the kind of cross-examination in which the
truthfulness of statements was seriously challenged."7
Fact-finding bodies obviously have to moderate the tenor of their
questions according to the witnesses before them. Examination
should be used only to the extent that it assists in obtaining accu-
rate information.
2. Methods of Assessing the Reliability of Evidence
a. Corroboration
For international NGOs, corroboration is the most significant
and commonly-used method for determining the reliability of
human rights information.448 Faced with unreliable or politically
motivated informants and frequently with circumstantial evidence,
the NGO attempts to sift its information for common patterns and
corroborative data deriving from independent sources.449 Usually
working after the event and often at a great distance, the NGO
note 95, at 111-12; Kaufman, supra note 91, at 759-62. Questioning by the Russell Tribunal
on Vietnam often stated the desired response. See Against the Crime of Silence, supra note
275, at 507, 511, 535.
446. Kaufman, supra note 91, at 759-60. In order to question the witnesses successfully,
the fact-finding commission must know a great deal before examining the witness. Damaska,
Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1083, 1088-90
(1975). Nevertheless, the commission must be wary of any tendency to establish a prema-
ture theory of the case and thus to be more receptive to evidence which fits that theory. Id.
447. AI Israel-Syria Report, supra note 292, at 9.
448. See Carey, Human Rights Procedures, supra note 95, at 308; Kaufman, supra note
91, at 752; see, e.g., AI Mission to Argentina, supra note 68, at 22, 23, 36; International
Commission of Jurists, Uganda & Human Rights 5, 105 (1977).
449. See AI Mission to the Philippines, supra note 29, at 12; ICRC and Torture, supra
note 388; note 448 supra. Some governments also engage in human rights fact-finding and
must assess information from divergent sources. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Report on
Human Rights Practices in Countries Receiving U.S. Aid 3 (1979).
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must put a puzzling set of isolated pieces of information into a
coherent picture.
Sometimes a commission receives corroborative physical evi-
dence such as bruises, scars, and other physical evidence of tor-
ture,45 0 although the passage of time often makes this type of evi-
dence very difficult to acquire.45 1 On-site visitation can provide an
opportunity to verify witnesses' descriptions of buildings and
rooms.4 52 For example, the U.N. Ad Hoc Working Group on Chile
was able to establish that the Villa Grimaldi had been used as a
place of torture and detention after visiting a room whose blue
tiled walls matched the walls in photos of prisoners published in
three newspapers and in the description of the room given by a
former prisoner. 53
b. Use of Direct Evidence
The European Commission on Human Rights decided in the
Greek Case to impose a hearsay rule, not as a threshold require-
ment, but as a limitation on the evidence upon which final conclu-
sions would be based.45 It confined itself to evidence which it con-
sidered direct in one of three ways: "1) that the witness has
claimed to have been himself subjected to torture or ill-treatment;
2) that the witness has seen its actual infliction on another person;
3) or that the witness has seen marks or traces on another person
that could be attributed to torture or ill-treatment. ' 455 Also, the
Commission considered only those documents that were authenti-
cated or uncontested. 56 It did not consider statements by or about
unidentified persons since it had no means of verifying the authen-
ticity and veracity of such statements. 57 These evidentiary limita-
450. See AI, Evidence of Torture: Studies by the Amnesty International Danish Medical
Group 10-12, 20-26 (1977); AI, Report on Torture (2d ed. 1975); see, e.g., Al, Chile 58-59
(1974).
451. See authorities cited in note 450 supra.
452. The ICRC delegate who visited Bouboulinas Street prison in Athens was able to
verify former detainees' testimony. See J. Becket, supra note 388, at 99-101.
453. Report of the Economic and Social Council, Protection of human rights in Chile,
U.N. Doc. A/33/331 at Annexes I-V (1978).
454. See 2 Council of Europe, supra note 223, pt. 1, at 15.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. Such limitations are also present in the Belgrade Rules. Fact-finding missions
may require that evidence be submitted in writing and contain specific, verifiable state-
ments of fact. Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 164, rule 11.
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tions had a drastic effect on the European Commission's report.
The Commission was able to investigate only 30 of the 210 alleged
cases, and found only 11 allegations conclusively proven.458 These
11 cases, however, proven beyond a reasonable doubt,45 9 provided a
sufficient basis for a finding of a systematic pattern of torture and
mistreatment by the Greek government. 46 0 The respect accorded
the report no doubt stems from its solid evidentiary basis.46
Many NGO missions have applied this direct evidence standard
in drawing their conclusions, without expressly adopting a direct
evidence rule.46 For example, the ICJ report on Uganda limited its
account of events in Uganda to "firsthand eye witness reports...
corroborated by two or more sources considered to be reliable."'
63
Every mission tries, whenever possible, to base its findings on di-
rect evidence. Most NGOs do not, however, exclude all findings
based on hearsay testimony, especially where the testimony is con-
sistent with other evidence available to the mission.4 ' The advan-
tage of a strict rule is clear-the facts can be stated with authority.
But there are difficulties in applying the European Commission di-
rect evidence rule to NGO missions. The sub-commission that in-
vestigated the Greek Case had four members and a large support-
ing staff.46 5 Evidence was presented to the sub-commission both by
the complaining countries and by the Greek government.'6 6 It had
the financial resources to conduct 45 days of hearings and to pub-
lish a 1000-page report. 67 An NGO mission consisting of two per-
458. 2 Council of Europe, supra note 223, pt. 1, at 418, 421. Further investigation was
needed in 17 other cases to establish conclusive proof, but the government refused to coop-
erate. Id. at 422.
459. Id. at 14, 421.
460. Id. at 418-19.
461. See The Greek Case in the U.N.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International
Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
724 (1974); AI, Report on Torture 115-16 (2d ed. 1975).
462. See Ermacora, Enquiry Procedures, supra note 14, at 202; see, e.g., Bizerta Report,
supra note 59; Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, Violations of Human
Rights in Argentina: 1976-1979, at iv (1979).
463. International Commission of Jurists, Uganda and Human Rights, Reports to the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights 5 (1977).
464. See Salzberg, Monitoring Human Rights Violations: How Good is the Information?,
in Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy 173, 177 (P. Brown & D. MacLean eds. 1979);
notes 27-38 supra.
465. 1 Council of Europe, supra note 223, pt. 1, at vi; see Al, Report on Torture 94 (2d ed.
1975).
466. 2 Council of Europe, supra note 223, pt. 2, at 2-39 (Annex I).
467. Id.; 1 Council of Europe, supra note 223, pt. 1, at 2-5; see AI, Report on Torture 93
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sons visiting a country for a few days often can gather much infor-
mation about allegations of mistreatment, but cannot realistically
be expected to acquire direct evidence concerning each charge.
In the absence of direct evidence, NGO missions rely on the
number of allegations of torture and the similarity of alleged cir-
cumstances to establish a prima facie case of mistreatment. Where
50 complaints of mistreatment are received, and all describe simi-
lar types of torture at the same locations, there is a substantial
likelihood that some form of torture is being conducted. Findings
of fact based on such evidence have proven reliable in the past.468
Given experienced fact-finders, indirect evidence can be sifted to
reveal a pattern of governmental misconduct.469
The problem with the use of indirect evidence is not so much
reliance thereon, but the failure to distinguish in fact-finding re-
ports between findings based on direct evidence and inferences
based on indirect evidence. NGOs should clearly indicate the basis
for their conclusions.7 0
c. Admissions Against Interest
Although governments generally attempt to protect their human
rights images, they are occasionally compelled to admit some viola-
tions when confronted by substantial evidence of wrongdoing. For
example, an NGO may announce that a particular government has
detained several thousand political prisoners; the government may
consequently admit to holding half that number.4 71 Because gov-
ernment statements in this context are usually issued only after
careful deliberation and because the government is usually in the
best position to know the truth, the NGO may appropriately ac-
cept the government's admission against interest as a fact or at
least as a minimum figure for the number of prisoners held.47
NGOs may also receive government statements that only par-
(2d ed. 1975).
468. See, e.g., AI Mission to Argentina, supra note 68, at 26-28; Al Mission to the Philip-
pines, supra note 29, at 12; Al, The Republic of Nicaragua 39 (1977).
469. See Torture in Brazil, supra note 27, at 16; note 448 supra; see, e.g., AI, Israel-Syria
Report, supra note 292, at 8.
470. See J. Ralston, supra note 390, at 216-17. See also notes 484-501 infra & accompany-
ing text.
471. See, e.g., AI, Chile 16 (1974); AI, Indonesia 41-44 (1977); Al, Violations of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 9-10 (1979).
472. See, e.g., Al, Amnesty International Report 1978, at 112-14 (1979); AI, Amnesty In-
ternational Report 1977, at 13 (1977); Al Mission to the Philippines, supra note 29, at 6.
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tially deny or indirectly admit human rights violations. NGOs usu-
ally and appropriately construe such limited admissions most
strictly against the government.47 s For example, a representative of
the Argentinian Ministry of the Interior denied that his govern-
ment used electric prods to torture prisoners but displayed a work-
ing familiarity with such instruments.7 4
A more difficult issue is posed by a government's silence in the
face of accusations concerning human rights violations. A govern-
ment may stand mute because it is guilty of human rights viola-
tions or because it may not want to lend any credence to the alle-
gations and to the accusing NGO by repeating the accusations in
the process of denying them.47 5 When presented with a well-docu-
mented report of human rights violations by one of the more pres-
tigious NGOs in this field, a government should probably be ex-
pected to respond or should at least expect that its silence will be
the subject of comment in later NGO reports. Indeed, under article
51 of the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, an accused government is obliged to respond within a cer-
tain period or the alleged facts are taken as established.7 Perhaps
NGOs cannot automatically take silence as an admission of guilt
because governments do not have any legal. obligation to respond.
But the conduct of a government, including silence in the face of
accusations, is a significant factor to be considered by NGOs in
assessing the veracity of human rights information.
d. Witness Conduct
The demeanor of a witness may indicate confidence or nervous-
ness, from which a finder of fact may infer the veracity of state-
473. See Cohn, supra note 304, at 46; see, e.g., Al, Amnesty International Report 1978, at
54-55 (1979); AI Mission to Argentina, supra note 68, at 17-18; AI, Islamic Republic of Paki-
stan 12-16 (1977); International Defense & Aid Fund, Political Prisoners in Rhodesia in
1979, at 8-9 (1979).
474. See Al Mission to Argentina, supra note 68, at 53.
475. See, e.g., AI, Political Imprisonment in Spain 31 (1973); AI Mission to Sri Lanka,
supra note 39, at 9; AI, Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 14-15 (1979) (refusal to let an observer see an allegedly
tortured prisoner taken as corroboration of torture charges). But see Al, Political Imprison-
ment in South Africa 56, 76 (1978) (government officials deny absolutely that torture occurs
or that it receives official sanction); Torture in Brazil, supra note 27, at 1 (The Brazilian
government's only responses have been verbal attacks against AL.).
476. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 51, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser.LN//.17, doc. 26 (1976), reprinted in OAS Handbook, supra note 195, at 37.
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ments made" or merely that the individual has a certain disposi-
tion.4 78 The fact-finding reports of IGOs and NGOs do not usually
make reference to the importance of a witness's conduct in assess-
ing reliability, even though on-site missions are motivated to some
extent by a desire to see and hear witnesses.
The Hague rules contain a provision which forbids witnesses
from reading their statements.47 9 Although this prohibition is not
found in the U.N. 80 or other rules, the Hague rules in this respect
reflect a useful practice which would concentrate the limited time
of an inquiry body on assessing the credibility of the witnesses.
Written statements may be submitted, however, and used either to
prepare for questioning the witnesses or for other purposes at a
later time.
The U.N. Draft Model Rules, however, do exclude witnesses
from the hearing room while others are testifying if the testifying
witness so requests.4 1 The ICRC also follows this pattern, since
ICRC visitors to prisons always interview detainees individually. 482
Other NGOs might consider adopting a similar approach, espe-
cially where a mission is pressured by a government to accept the
government's "arrangements" for the taking of evidence.483
e. Burden of Proof and Production of Evidence
The concepts of burden of proof and burden of production of
evidence play a very significant role in assuring the reliability of
factual findings by placing responsibility for the production of evi-
dence on the party who either ought to possess the evidence or has
the greatest interest in presenting it,48 and by establishing a bur-
477. See Saln, Demeanor Evidence: Elusive and Intangible Imponderables, 47 A.B.A. J.
580, 581-82 (1961); note 390 supra.
478. Sahm, supra note 477, at 581-82.
479. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 76, art. 27; see W. Shore, supra note 14, at
120.
480. Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124 (Rule 23(c) merely states: "Each
witness shall then be given an opportunity to make a statement.").
481. Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 11-12, rule 22(d), (e).
482. ICRC Model Memorandum, supra note 379; Forsythe, Present Role of the Red Cross
in Protection 36 (1975) (background paper No. 1 for the Joint Committee for the Re-
appraisal of the Role of the Red Cross).
483. See, e.g., AI Israel-Syria Report, supra note 292, at 4, 8; National Lawyers Guild,
Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza 102 (1978).
484. See C. McCormick, supra note 268, at § 337; D. Sandifer, supra note 415, at 123-24; 9
J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2486 (3d ed. 1940).
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den of persuasion for the proponent of a position.485 It may well be
that an NGO, which is both the investigator and the decision-
maker, bears the burden of producing all evidence necessary to
support its findings. The accused government, however, has both
an interest in the proceeding and is most able to locate and present
relevant material. The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights486 appears to place a burden of production upon govern-
ments under investigation. Similarly, if an NGO can at least estab-
lish a prima facie case that human rights violations have occurred,
it may then insist that the government discharge a burden of
presenting contradictory evidence.487 This "rule" probably best de-
scribes the working of public opinion when an NGO has reported
that human rights have been violated and the government has
failed to rebut the findings presented in the report.
There remains a question, however, as to the burden of proof
that an NGO ought to bear in finding a prima facie case worthy of
government response. The European Commission on Human
Rights required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the Greek
Case, in which applications were brought by several other Euro-
pean countries against Greece. 48s The European Commission does
not, however, appear to use such a severe standard for individual
applications, although the precise burden is not clear..48 The U.N.
Ad Hoc Working Group on Chile also distinguished between par-
ticular cases that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt490 and
other individual allegations or general patterns of government con-
duct on which information from reliable sources had been
received.491
485. See C. McCormick, supra note 268, at §§ 336, 338; 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2485-
87 (3d ed. 1940). See generally D. Sandifer, supra note 415, at 125; Note, supra note 95, at
156-61.
486. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.17, doc. 26, art. 51 (1967), reprinted in OAS Handbook, supra note 195, at 37.
487. For example, the ICRC uses a rule of thumb that where visible traces of torture are
found, the burden of proof shifts to the detaining authority to prove that acts of torture did
not take place. See Cohn, International Fact-Finding and the Rule of Law, 1977 Israel Y.B.
on Human Rights 9, 18; ICRC and Torture, supra note 388, at 3.
488. 2 Council of Europe, supra note 223, pt. 1, at 14.
489. See notes 218-24 supra & accompanying text.
490. Report of the Economic and Social Council, Protection of Human Rights in Chile,
U.N. Doc. A/33/331, at 96 (1978).
491. Id. at 98-99, 115, 227; cf. Cohn, supra note 304, at 47-48 (Reports of internationally
accredited sources such as the International Red Cross and World Health Organization are
given evidentiary weight but are not considered conclusive.).
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AI demanded proof beyond a reasonable doubt during its mis-
sion to Israel,'9 2 but the AI report on its mission to Argentina re-
flects a variety of standards: "There was strong evidence... ; ,93
"Amnesty International believes that... ;,,494 "it is clear that...
;,945 "it is apparent that... ;,496 "There is evidence that... ;,497
"Numerous well-substantiated accounts of maltreatment of prison-
ers during transfers have been documented by Amnesty Interna-
tional;'"498 "There is no doubt that... ;,,499 "Summary executions
of political prisoners have occurred . .. ;"50 "The evidence . . . is
overwhelming." 50 1 The disparity among these various measures of
proof may be due to differences among mission members or may
reflect only stylistic considerations. A mission may, indeed, dis-
cover evidence of varying weight and persuasiveness, but some
consistency and care in the formulation of factual findings would
appear appropriate in human rights reports. The reader of a report
should be informed of the standard of proof employed by the fact-
finder.
The degree of proof employed by an NGO may vary, depending
upon the impact of the action that follows a fact-finding effort. For
example, if an NGO proposes only to send a diplomatic letter of
inquiry to a government, the NGO may merely need credible sec-
ond-hand reports of human rights violations. If an NGO is publish-
ing a major report, it ought to require more substantial evidence of
wrongdoing. This distinction is quite similar to that drawn in com-
mon law countries between civil and criminal cases, in which dif-
ferent degrees of proof are used for proceedings of quite distinct
consequences. In any case, it is not imperative that any single stan-
dard be used in NGO fact-finding, but it is important that the
standard for significant conclusions be clearly defined and dis-
closed in NGO reports.
492. AI, Israel-Syria Report, supra note 292, at 31.
493. See AI Mission to Argentina, supra note 68, at 10.
494. Id. at 18, 36, 50.
495. Id. at 11, 19.
496. Id. at 13, 35, 39, 46.
497. Id. at 19, 29, 48.
498. Id. at 22.
499. Id. at 23.
500. Id. at 24.
501. Id. at 32.
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E. Reports
Once the facts are found, NGOs face the question of how to treat
such facts in their final reports. NGOs must consider what law is to
be applied to the facts, whether recommendations ought to be
made, and how dissenting views, if any, ought to be handled.
1. Applicable Law
There are several possible standards against which an NGO
might judge a government's human rights practices. Those stan-
dards include the laws of the country, treaties to which the nation
is a party, and other prevailing international norms.
Often fact-finders discover that the government is clearly not
obeying even its own constitution, statutes, and judicial deci-
sions.50 2 Occasionally, a mission will include an expert on the juris-
prudence of the country visited, 50 8 but most frequently NGOs lack
the requisite expertise to ascertain difficult problems of domestic
law. Some missions may, however, consult domestic legal
experts. 0 "
NGO fact-finders also refer to treaties that have been signed5 5
or ratified by the nation under scrutiny.508 For example, in its
study of the events in East Pakistan which led to the indepen-
dence of Bangladesh, the ICJ noted that Pakistan had assured In-
dia in a 1950 treaty that it would guarantee equality to all citizens
regardless of religious differences.5 0 7 The ICJ also referred to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion,50 8 the Geneva Conventions of 1949,509 and the Genocide Con-
502. See, e.g., AI, An Amnesty International Report, including the findings of a mission to
Nicaragua, 10-15 May 1976, at 6, 10, 14, 19-20, 31, 38-39 (1977); Al, Political Imprisonment
in Spain 10 (1973); East Pakistan, supra note 361, at 46-48.
503. See, e.g., AI, The Republic of Nicaragua 5 (1977) (One of the mission delegates was
Dr. Kurt Madlener, Director of the Department of Hispanoamerican Penal Law of the Max
Planck Institute.).
504. See, e.g., International Commission of Jurists, A Preliminary Report by the Members
of the International Commission of Jurists Mission to Chile, April 1974, at 1 (1974); cf. G.
White, The Use of Experts by International Tribunals 61-66 (1965) (discussing the propri-
ety of using local expert witnesses for trials).
505. See Weissbrodt, U.S. Ratification, supra note 441, at 42 n.63; see, e.g., AI, Amnesty
International Briefing: Guatemala i (1976).
506. See, e.g., AI, Amnesty International Briefing. Iran 5 (1976); AI, Amnesty Inter-
national Briefing: Paraguay i (1976).
507. East Pakistan, supra note 361; see Accord Respecting Religious Minorities, April 8,
1950, 131 U.N.T.S. 3.
508. East Pakistan, supra note 361, at 51; see International Convention on the Elimina-
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vention, 510 all of which Pakistan had ratified. Significantly, the ICJ
referred first to the International Bill of Human Rights,511 even
though Pakistan had ratified neither the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights512 nor the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.13 Most NGO human rights
reports refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and/or
the International Bill of Human Rights because they contain au-
thoritative definitions of international human rights514 and because
they are so well-known.515 Finally, the ICJ inquiry on Pakistan dis-
cussed the principles of customary international law found in the
Nuremberg Charter." 8
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature, Dec. 21, 1965, G.A. Res.
2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (en-
tered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
509. East Pakistan, supra note 361, at 53-55. The ICJ referred generally to all of the
Geneva conventions done on August 12, 1949 dealing with the laws of war.
510. East Pakistan, supra note 361, at 55-57; see Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12,
1951).
511. East Pakistan, supra note 361, at 50-51. See generally H. Lauterpacht, An Interna-
tional Bill of the Rights of Man 92-165 (1945); Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and
United States Foreign Policy, 7 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 231, 265-66 n.116 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation].
512. See Human Rights International Instruments: Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions,
etc., U.N. Doc. ST/HR/4, at 12 (1978); Multilateral Treaties in respect of which the Secre-
tary-General Performs Depository Functions: List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions,
etc. as at 31 December 1979, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/13 (1980). See also Coalition for a
New Foreign and Military Policy, The Human Rights Covenants: One Body of Rights, Cove-
nants Action Guide 7 (undated).
513. See authorities cited in note 512 supra.
514. See Buergenthal, Codification and Implementation of International Human Rights,
in Human Dignity, The Internationalization of Human Rights 15, 15-18 (1979); Humphrey,
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character, in
Human Rights: Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration 21, 28-37 (1979); Weissbrodt,
Human Rights Legislation, supra note 511, at 265-66 n.116; see, e.g., AI, Political Imprison-
ment in Spain 8 (1973).
515. See United Nations, The International Bill of Human Rights (1978); AI, Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights (1978); American Association for the International Commission
of Jurists, International Bill of Human Rights (undated).
516. East Pakistan, supra note 361, at 58-60; see R. Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in
International Law 233-34 (1962). See also P. Calvocoressi, Nuremberg: The Facts, the Law
and the Consequences 132-34 (1948).
As to specific problems, other standards may, of course, be applicable. See, e.g., Violations
of Human Rights in Southern Africa, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1311, at 7-8 (1979); Al, Violations
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
17-18 (1979) (U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners). See generally
Draft Convention on State Responsibility, arts. 16-18, [1976] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 73, 74-
75, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A. (1976).
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The International Commission of Jurists' report on East Paki-
stan may serve as a model for similar efforts to assess facts under
domestic law, all the relevant human rights treaties, and under ap-
plicable customary international law. Obviously, other sources may
be apposite in different countries and situations, but the approach
of the ICJ is far more thorough than that of many other NGOs
that have used only the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,5 17
or have even failed to include any references to applicable legal
standards.518
2. Recommendations
Under the Hague model of inquiry, commissions were strictly
limited to finding facts and could not make recommendations.511
This limited role for inquiry commissions was intended to clarify
the distinction between Hague fact-finders, on the one hand, and
arbitral tribunals that make awards or political bodies that make
political judgments, on the other. During the period from 1907
through 1940, the Hague approach slowly broke down as more in-
quiry commissions began to issue reports with recommendations to
their parent bodies.520
The Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights calls for recommendations in addition to findings of fact, 1
and each report of the Commission contains conclusions and rec-
ommendations.522 Ad Hoc fact-finding bodies of the United Na-
tions generally make recommendations to the Commission on
517. See, e.g., AI Mission to Korea, supra note 276 at 10-11; International Commission of
Jurists, Report on the Events in Panama January 9-12, 1964, at 3, 8 (undated).
518. See, e.g., AI, Chile (1974); AI, Indonesia (1977); AI, Report of an Amnesty Interna-
tional Mission to Spain (1975).
519. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 76, art. 35. See also N. Bar-Yaacov, supra
note 14, at 105.
520. See note 92 supra & accompanying text.
521. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
Ser.LN/II.26, doc. 10, art. 9 (bis) (1971), reprinted in OAS Handbook, supra note 195, at 27.
See also Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser.LN/lI.17, doc. 26, art. 52 (1967), reprinted in OAS Handbook, supra note 195, at
37.
522. See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Panama, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/VII.44, doc. 38 rev. 1, at 114-16 (1978);
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Uruguay, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.LN/l.43, doc. 19 corr. 1, at 69-70 (1978); Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Paraguay,
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43, doc. 13 corr. 1, at 86-89 (1978).
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Human Rights or the General Assembly, even when such action is
not included in their terms of reference.5 23 For example, the terms
of reference for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chile only called
for it to "inquire into the present situation of human rights in
Chile" and "to report the results of its inquiries. ' 524 Despite this
narrow mandate, the Working Group has recommended courses of
action to the General Assembly in each one of its reports beginning
with its interim report in 1975.25 In its 1978 report, the Working
Group no longer confined itself to making recommendations to its
constitutive body, but proceeded to make recommendations di-
rectly to the Chilean government.52 6
The practice of NGOs is varied, but the separation of roles es-
tablished in the Hague model is remarkably well observed. Some
missions simply report their factual findings to their constituting
organizations without making any recommendations.52 7 AI reports,
however, always contain recommendations to the concerned coun-
try.528 These are not generally the recommendations of the inquiry
mission, however, but of AI itself, based upon the factual findings
of the mission.529 The reports do not indicate whether the mission
523. See, e.g., Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Violations of Human
Rights in Southern Africa, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1311 at 174-82 (1979); Report of the Commit-
tee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, 31 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 35) at 13-15, U.N. Doc. A/31/35 (1976); Report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied
Territories, U.N. Doc. A/9148 at 43-47 (1973).
524. Report of the Economic and Social Council, Protection of Human Rights in Chile,
U.N. Doc. A/10285 at 92-93 (1975).
525. Id. at 55, 66. See also N. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 14, at 279-80.
526. See Report of the Economic and Social Council, Protection of human rights in Chile,
U.N. Doc. A/33/331, at 226, 229 (1978).
527. Pax Romana Mission, supra note 372; Bizerta Report, supra note 59, at 11-16; see,
e.g., Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 165, rule 23 (The final report of the mission is to
contain findings, but the rule does not suggest inclusion of recommendations.).
528. See, e.g., Al, Islamic Republic of Pakistan 7-10 (1977); AI Mission to the Philippines,
supra note 29, at 13-19, AI, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Spain 14-16
(1975).
The ICRC apparently follows the practice of making recommendations to the government
after prison visits on such issues as the treatment of prisoners, judicial procedures applica-
ble to prisoners, family visits, work and study in prison, physical exercise, medical care, and
aid to the families of prisoners. See Comit6 International de la Croix-Rouge, Rapport de
Synthise Faisant Suite i la Deuxihme S6rie de Visite des D6lgu6s du Comit6 International
de la Croix-Rouge A 2449 D6tenue de S6cuite, Dont 165 Femmes, dans 17 Prisons Iraniennes
(Feb. 22, 1978).
529. See House Hearings on International Protection of Human Rights, supra note 1
(statement of Frank C. Newman); see, e.g., AI, An Amnesty International Report including
the findings of a mission to Pakistan 23 April-12 May 1976, at 7-10 (1977); Al Mission to
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submitted recommendations along with its findings to A.
Notwithstanding the practice of AI, some NGO fact-finding com-
missions do make recommendations in various forms. The British
Guiana Commission of the ICJ made recommendations directly to
the government of British Guiana pursuant to the commission's
terms of reference.53 0 The Commission of Inquiry to Mexico did
not make any recommendations to the International League for
Human Rights and Pax Romana, but two members of the commis-
sion (with the approval of their sponsoring organizations) sent a
letter to the Interior Minister of Mexico stating their findings and
recommending that measures be taken to curtail the government's
illegal practices.3
The Report of the National Lawyers' Guild 1977 Middle East
Delegation reflected all of these approaches. While the conclusion
of the report was limited to a statement of the mission's factual
findings, 3 2 the delegation at one point in the report made a recom-
mendation directly to the government.53s The foreword to the re-
port contained the recommendation of the sponsoring organiza-
tion.5 4 Along the same lines, the Unitarian Universalist Service
Committee mission to El Salvador reported its factual findings in
the conclusion of its report535 followed by a section addressed to
the world public, the U.S. government, and El Salvador in which
were listed seven recommended improvements to foster observance
of human rights in El Salvador. 6
Of course, where inquiry bodies are self-constituted like the Rus-
sell Tribunal53 7 or the International Commission of Inquiry in
Chile,5 3 8 the Commission itself makes recommendations either to
the concerned countries, 539 "to the conscience of all people," 0 or
Korea, supra note 276, at 9-14; AI, The Republic of Nicaragua 39-40 (1977).
530. International Commission of Jurists, Report of the British Guiana Commission of
Inquiry 15, 43-45, 115-21 (1965). See generally Ermacora, Enquiry Procedures, supra note
14, at 199.
531. Pax Romana Mission, supra note 372, at app. I.
532. National Lawyer's Guild, supra note 483, at 119-21.
533. Id. at 117.
534. Id. at vii-viii.
535. Human Rights in El Salvador, supra note 294, at 28-29.
536. Id. at 33-36.
537. See Against the Crime of Silence, supra note 275, at 14-16.
538. See International Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes of the Military Junta in
Chile, One Year of the Rule of Terror in Chile (1974).
539. See Against the Crime of Silence, supra note 275, at 650-52 (recommendation to
world opinion for the withdrawal of American troops from the Vietnam conflict).
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to "the highest moral and spiritual authorities." 541 In general, how-
ever, the prevailing NGO practice of separating fact-finding by in-
quiry missions from human rights campaign activity by the NGOs
themselves reflects the specialized, impartial, fact-finding role of
inquiry commissions originally envisioned by the Hague treaty and
should be continued.
3. Minority Views
Minority opinions and reservations of individual members are
apparently never found in NGO fact-finding reports. They are
found frequently in opinions of the European Court on Human
Rights5 42 and occasionally in Inter-American Commission 3 and
U.N. fact-finding reports.5 44 Rule 25(b) of the U.N. Draft Model
Rules calls for every dissent or abstention to be recorded.54 Since
many NGO missions consist of only two or three persons, it is not
surprising that dissenting opinions are absent. Given the manner
of selecting NGO mission members, it is not likely that sharp disa-
greement would arise. Nevertheless, working procedures for NGO
missions should give members the option of not joining in the ma-
jority conclusions.
F. Dissemination of Reports
The major question concerning dissemination of fact-finding re-
ports is whether reports should be submitted to the concerned gov-
ernment for comment or rebuttal before release to the public.
There are two reasons for following this procedure. First, given the
less than conclusive evidence upon which some findings are based,
fairness requires that governments be given a chance to rebut the
540. Repression in Latin America, supra note 275, at 161.
541. Id.
542. See, e.g., Case of Klass and others, 1978 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on Human Rights 622 (Eur.
Comm. on Human Rights) (Farinha, J., separate opinion); Lawless Case (Merits), 1961 Y.B.
Eur. Cony. on Human Rights 438, 488 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights) (Mavidakas, J., sub-
mitted a separate opinion in accordance with Rule 50, para. 2 of the Rules of the Court.).
543. See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Second Report on the Situ-
ation of Human Rights in Chile, O.A.S. Doc. OEAISer.LN/ll.37, doc. 19 corr. 1, at 191
(1976).
544. See Bender, supra note 251, at 254 n.56.
545. Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 13; Model Rules, supra note 125,
at 7, rule 20(b); see W. Shore, supra note 14, at 117-18. While it is correct to provide for the
reporting of dissenting views, as does rule 23 of the Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 165,
such dissents are extraordinarily rare, if not nonexistent, in NGO fact-finding.
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conclusions. 46 Second, failure of the government to rebut adverse
conclusions helps support the report's findings.5'7
The 1970 U.N. Draft Model Rules did not expressly require that
reports be submitted to the concerned government prior to publi-
cation, but such a procedure is implied in rule 26(c) in the state-
ment that government comments, if any, are to be submitted with
the report to the organ that created the fact-finding body." 8 The
authorizing organ would then decide on publication." 9 Interest-
ingly, the U.N. Model Rules, as they were finally adopted in 1974,
provide in rule 20(c) that only after publication of the report may
a concerned government submit its comments. 5 0 Nevertheless, the
Working Group on Chile did submit its information to the Chilean
government for comment and included in its report the comments
received in meetings and written communications. 51  After the
Working Group published its findings, the Chilean government
also responded in writing.
NGOs regularly submit their findings to and/or solicit evidence
from concerned States.552 Often, an agreement to submit findings
and receive government comment is a precondition to permission
for on-site visitation.5M The major problem with this procedure has
been the refusal of governments to respond.5" For example, AI
presented its report to the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka on May 8,
1975, with a promise that the report would remain confidential un-
til AI had learned the government reaction.5 5 Eight months passed
without any reply despite renewed requests, before the organiza-
546. See Cohn, supra note 304, at 47.
547. See notes 471-76 supra & accompanying text.
548. Draft Model Rules of Procedure, supra note 124, at 13.
549. Id. at 13, rule 26(d).
550. Model Rules, supra note 125, at 7.
551. Report of the Economic and Social Council, Protection of human rights in Chile,
U.N. Doc. A/33/331, at 12-13 (1978).
552. See, e.g., Human Rights in El Salvador, supra note 294, at 17-19; East Pakistan,
supra note 361, at 5-6; International Commission of Jurists, Report on the Events in Pan-
ama January 9-12, 1964, at 7 (undated). See also notes 471-76 supra & accompanying text.
553. See, e.g., AI Mission to Sri Lanka, supra note 39, at 9.
554. See, e.g., AI, Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China ix-x (1978);
Torture in Brazil, supra note 27, at 1; AI Mission to the Philippines, supra note 29, at 7-8.
The Belgrade Rules usefully recommend that preliminary findings be submitted to the gov-
ernment concerned "giving it an opportunity, within a reasonable time, to present com-
ments and/or rectify the matter investigated." Belgrade Rules, supra note 69, at 165, rule
22.
555. AI Mission to Sri Lanka, supra note 39, at 9.
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tion published its report.5 6
The events surrounding the publication of the AI report on the
Philippines demonstrate the problems involved in withholding
publication of a report.5 7 On May 25, 1976, AI sent its report to
the Philippine government and requested comment.5 5 8 During
June, two news agency dispatches from Manila referred to the mis-
sion report and its contents.5 9 Without responding to AI's requests
for comment, the Philippine consulate in San Francisco issued offi-
cial statements in mid-July criticizing the conclusions of the un-
published report.5 60 AI finally published the full report on July
26.561 The Philippine government later issued a formal reply and
AI published a second edition of the report including the govern-
ment reply.5 62
An NGO should never make a commitment to withhold publica-
tion of a report until it receives a government's comment. A time
limit for response should be set at the time the report is submitted
to the government, with the proviso that the full report will be
published immediately upon any public release or public comment
by the government.
Both intergovernmental and nongovernmental fact-finding bod-
ies generally seek the broadest possible dissemination of their re-
ports .56  Nevertheless, these human rights reports often receive
only very summary press comment 564 and become known to rela-
tively few informed people. United Nations, OAS, and other inter-
governmental reports covering human rights are usually lost in a
556. Id.
557. AI Mission to the Philippines, supra note 29, at 4-5. Since human rights situations
often change rapidly and because atrocities can be perpetrated suddenly, an NGO can be
most effective if it obtains fresh, first-hand information and uses it promptly in discussions
with the government or for dissemination to the public. See, e.g., Disappeared Persons and
Some International Emergency Measures to Cope with this Phenomenon, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/NGO/283 (1980).
558. AI Mission to the Philippines, supra note 29, at 7.
559. Id.
560. Id. at 8, 59.
561. AI, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of the Philippines
(1976).
562. AI Mission to the Philippines, supra note 29, at 65-84.
563. See notes 8-12, 27-30, 44, supra. See also Weissbrodt, International NGOs, supra
note 1, at 304-10.
564. See, e.g., Jurists' Group Declares "Structure of Repression" In Chile Has Not
Changed, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1978, § A, at 12, col. 1; Chile Still Violating Rights, OAS
Group Charges, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1977, § A, at 7, col. 1; Report on Argentina Calls
Summary Killings Common, N.Y. Times, March 24, 1977, § A, at 10, col. 1.
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mass of documentation. These IGOs generally lack the facilities for
making their human rights reports available to the general public,
and usually distribute them only to depository libraries and to
those individuals who make special requests.
NGOs are generally less prestigious and visible than IGOs and
thus experience proportionately more difficulty in getting press
comment on their human rights findings. Some NGOs, like the
ICJ, have established excellent press contacts and frequently get
more media coverage for their factual findings than do IGOs. Simi-
larly, other organizations, like AI, have been able to develop cam-
paign activities which reach its widely-scattered membership and
which package its human rights reports in a way accessible to a
broader group.5 65 Despite all the difficulties that IGOs and NGOs
have in disseminating their reports, the target government and its
opponents invariably seem to receive copies for use or redistribu-
tion within their ranks.
One prominent, albeit partial, exception to the general desire of
NGO fact-finders for the broadest possible publicity for its reports
is found in the practice of the International Committee of the Red
Cross. The ICRC generally provides detailed findings of its mis-
sions only to host governments.56 In cases where governments mis-
represent the findings, the ICRC reserves the right to release its
results, but virtually never does so. The ICRC released a report in
1969 because the Greek government had misquoted ICRC dele-
gates to the press and had published a part of their report.567 Simi-
565. See AI, Handbook 14-15, 16 (5th ed. 1977); see, e.g., Amnesty International, Urgent
Action Network letter (Feb. 2, 1978) (concerning the abduction of seven lawyers in
Argentina).
566. See J. Becket, supra note 388, at 98; D. Forsythe, supra note 20; ICRC and Torture,
supra note 388, at 4; International Red Cross Quietly Aids Political Prisoners, Wash. Post,
May 22, 1978, § A, at 14, col. 1. The general outline of an ICRC report is found in the ICRC
Model Memorandum, supra note 379. This format appears to have been used in the visit to
South African prisons. See Defense & Aid, Prisons, supra note 21, at 104-06. See, e.g.,
Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, in J. Becket, supra note 388, at 105-06.
567. Comit6 International des la Croix-Rouge, Rapport General sur les visites effectuees
pas les D6l6gu~s du Comit6 International de la Croix-Rouge Aux Detenus Politiques en
Grece, Mai 1967-Mars 1968, in J. Becket, supra note 388, at 99-102; see id. at 97-106. An-
other ICRC report on Greece which found prima facie evidence of torture was leaked to the
Council of Europe. See D. Forsythe, supra note 20, at 79 n.29; ICRC and Torture, supra
note 388, at 4. Similarily, the ICRC published a report on the status of civilian detainees in
Israeli-occupied territories following an unsatisfactory response by Israel to ICRC requests
and publication by Jordanian officials of part of the report. See D. Forsythe, supra note 20,
at 178.
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larly, in 1980, the ICRC issued full accounts of visits to Iranian
prisons after the new Iranian government released partial ICRC
reports.568
In addition, the ICRC releases some of the most important infor-
mation its inquiry missions gather (including the identity of the
detention centers visited and the number of political prisoners
held) in the International Review of the Red Cross, 5 9 its annual
reports,570 ICRC press releases, and in the monthly ICRC Bulle-
tin.5 7  The ICRC rule of limited public dissemination probably
helps its delegates obtain entry into more countries and more pris-
ons than other organizations. The ICRC successfully relies for its
results upon its great international prestige. 57 2 Other organizations
must, however, rely on public opinion to achieve the human rights
improvements they generally seek.
A similar publication of favorable extracts by the Uruguayan government led to the ter-
mination of relations between ICRC and Uruguay. See International Association of Demo-
cratic Lawyers, Mission d'enqu~te en Argentine et en Uruguay, 10-20 Ma 1978, at 5 (1978).
The partial publishing rule has sometimes been narrowly read by the ICRC to allow govern-
ment publication of a single report rather than all relevent ICRC reports on the country.
See D. Forsythe, supra note 20, at 63; D. Forsythe, Present Role of the Red Cross in Protec-
tion 32 (1975).
568. See, e.g., Comit6 International des la Croix-Rouge, Rapport de Synth~se Faisant
Suite A la Premier Serie de Visite des D6lguis du Comit6 International de la Croix-Rouge,
h 3087 Detenue de Securite dans 18 Prisons Iraniennes (June 1, 1977).
569. See, e.g., 18 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 294-95, 298 (1978). The Revue Internationale de la
Croix-Rouge has been published since 1919. There is a cumulative analytical index for the
English language edition, which began in 1961. International Committee of the Red Cross,
Analytical Index 1961-1974 (1976).
570. See, e.g., International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1978, at 44-45
(1979) (number of detainees in Argentina and Indonesia).
571. See, e.g., ICRC Bull., No. 41, June 6, 1979, at 2 (prisoners in Malaysia). The Interna-
tional Review of the Red Cross and the ICRC Bulletin regularly contain the number of
detention centers and political prisoners visited in a country. For example, the figures were
released on a number of detention centers and political prisioners detained in Thailand, the
Philippines, and Iran. 18 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 294-96 (1978). "The ICRC does publish the
bare outline of what it is doing through regular publications but it rarely publishes the
substance of what its delegates have seen." D. Forsythe, supra note 20, at 63. One who has
some understanding of a situation from other sources can piece together fragments of infor-
mation from the ICRC's publication. Id. The ICRC's policy regarding press releases is best
summed up in its response to the U.N. Ad Hoc Working Group on South African prisons:
"Whilst there is no secrecy about this work of the Red Cross, neither is there any publicity."
Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts Set Up Under Resolution 2 (XXII) of the
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/950 at 36 (1967), quoted in Carey, U.N.
Scrutiny, supra note 95, at 536.
572. See Comment, supra note 66, at 117.
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IV. CONCLUSION: A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO NGO FACT-FINDING
Fact-finding is an essential part of the work of NGOs established
to monitor and report on human rights violations throughout the
world. Nevertheless, NGOs have traditionally failed to rely on any
standard set of fact-finding procedures, even though the use of
such procedures may enhance the respect accorded NGO findings
and further the efforts of NGOs to secure cooperation from States
and witnesses. NGOs should thus carefully consider the fact-find-
ing models in use by both IGOs and other NGOs. The purpose of
this article has been to describe such models, to recommend that
NGOs adopt certain practices applicable to all fact-finding efforts,
and to encourage NGOs to adopt whatever other procedures they
find appropriate to their work.
Nevertheless, nothing herein should be construed as a proposed
set of universal fact-finding procedures for use by all NGOs in all
circumstances. On the contrary, it is the thesis of this article that
efforts to impose uniform rules of procedure such as the Belgrade
Rules are misguided and injurious to the mission of human rights
NGOs. The fact-finding rules currently in existence reflect the ex-
periences and objectives of IGOs and thus are inappropriate for
wholesale adoption by NGOs. Most NGOs lack the resources avail-
able to IGOs and thus cannot be expected to perform the same
fact-finding functions. Moreover, current rules were to some extent
designed with the interests of governments in mind and thus may
be insensitive to the special problems and needs of NGOs.
Notwithstanding the inadvisability of a uniform set of fact-find-
ing rules for NGOs, there should be some way to encourge NGOs
to conduct their fact-finding efforts in a fair and unbiased manner.
A relatively non-restrictive way of doing this would be to require
that NGOs disclose in their final reports certain information re-
garding the fact-finding methodology actually employed during the
investigation of a human rights problem. If NGOs were required to
reveal how they went about gathering the facts upon which their
conclusions are based, they might be more inclined to adopt thor-
ough and even-handed fact-finding policies and procedures. It
would, of course, be impractical to require such disclosures in
every letter, appeal or press release. Nevertheless, the report on
any major inquiry should reflect the following: (1) the terms of ref-
erence of the fact-finding body, (2) the identity of the body's mem-
bers, (3) a description of the materials upon which the report is
based, including the identity of witnesses to the extent that their
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safety will not be jeopardized, (4) any statements by the govern-
ment under investigation or attempts made to obtain such govern-
ment statements, (5) a description of the circumstances surround-
ing any interviews that may have been conducted during the
course of the investigation, such as the identity of the inter-
viewer(s), whether governmental officials were present, whether an
oath or affirmation was administered, whether careful questioning
was possible, the duration of the interviews, whether the interviews
were public or private, whether witnesses were harassed during in-
terviews, and what provisions, if any, were made for the protection
of witnesses, (6) an account of any on-site visits made, including a
list of participants, a description of places inspected, an account of
contacts with government officials, and a description of facilities
provided to the mission by the government, (7) whether the fact-
finding body chose to disregard any evidence during the prepara-
tion of its report, (8) an indication of the methods employed to
ensure the reliability of evidence, including any efforts made to
corroborate witnesses' statements, the use of direct evidence, etc.,
(9) a specification of the international and/or municipal legal
norms applied to the facts, (10) a clear separation of factual find-
ings from any recommendations the NGO may wish to make, and
(11) a statement of what efforts, if any, were made or will be made
to obtain a government response to the report, and an account of
any such response already obtained.
It should be noted that the foregoing disclosure standards do not
purport to regulate the manner in which NGOs engage in fact-find-
ing. These suggested standards are intended merely to enable in-
terested observers and the international community to assess the
reliability of an NGO's human rights fact-finding. The standards
reflect an awareness that the need for reliability and fairness must
be balanced against an NGO's need for flexibility in investigating
and responding to human rights problems throughout the world.
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